¶1(constitutional .AND Xocal law.)
¶2the compact of Í802, settling the boundary lina'between Virginia trait Tennessee, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, it is declared that •all claims and titles to lands derived, from Virginia, or North Cnrolbia, or Tennessee, which'have fallen into the respective states, shall remain as secure to the owners thereof, as if derived from the government within whose boundary (hey have fallen, and shall not be prejudiced' ■pr affected by the establishment of the line. Where 'the titles,'both of the plaintiff and defendant in ejectment were derived under grant* from Virginia, to lands which fell within the limits of Tennessee, it was held that a prior settlement right thereto which would, in equity, give the party a title, could not:be asserted as a sufficient titlo in an action of ejectment brought in the circuit couit'of Tennessee.
¶3Although the state courts of Tennessee have decided, (hat under their statutes declaring an elder grant founded on a junior entry tobevoid, a junior patent founded on a prior entry, shall prevail at law against g senior.patent.'founded on a junior entry'; .this doctrine, has never been extended beyond cases within the express purview of the statute of Tennessee, and could not apply to the present case of titles deriving all their validity.from the laws of Virginia, and confirmed by the compact between the two states.
¶4The general rule is, that remedies in respect to real property ace to be - pursued according to the lex loci roi sité. The acts of the two states *213rtft to be construed as giving the- same validity and affect to the titles, in thp'disputed territory as they had, or wóuid'have, in the state, by which they were granted, leaving du) remedios to enforce such titles to be regalatcd by the lex fori.
¶5íhe ramqdiea in the courts of the United States, at cpminon law end .ip - equity. «re to bp, not according to the practice of state courts, but seeor^ing to the principles'of common law end equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which' we derive our knowledge of thoao principles. Consistently with this 'doctrine it mayhrtMtnitted, that whprc, by (he statutes of a state, a title which would £i)>erwj¿e *0 deemed tpereiy .equitable, is recognized as a legal title, or a title which would bp valid at law, is, under circumstances tf an equitable ■ature, declared void, the right of the parties in snch daso may be as Stilly considered in a suit at law, in the courts of the United States) at jp wuy state court.
¶6-A. Conveyance by the plaintiffs lessor during the pendency of an action of ejectment, can only operate upon his reversionary interest, and cannot extinguish the prior lease. The -existence of such lease is a fie* tion: but it is upheld for tho purposes of justice. If it expire during ' the.pendency of a suit, the plaintiff cannot -recover his term at law, without procuring it tojre enlarged by the court, and can proceed only for antecedent damages.
¶7In the above case if was- held that the statute pf limitations of Tennes. see was not a good bar to the action, thera bping no proof that the land.3 in controversy were always within.the original limits of Tennessee, .and thostutute could not begin (o run until it was ascertained by thecpmpact of 1802.that the land fell within the jurisdictional tipiús of Tennessee.
¶8Error to the district court of East Tenessee.
¶9This was an action of ejectment brought by the;defendant in error, (the plaintiff’s lessor in the court below,) against the present plaintiff, and S'. Martin, on the 4th of February, 1807, in the district court for the district of East Tennese.e, which possessed circuit court powers. The défendant in that court pleaded separately the. general issue, as to 400 acres, and disclaimed all fight to the residue of the tract specified *214in the declaration. A verdict was given for the plaintiff in October term, 1812. From the statement contaihed'in the bill of exceptions, taken' at the trial of the cause, it appears that the land for which the action was brought, is situated between two lines, run in 1779 I-y Walker and Henderson, as the boundary lines of Virginia and North Carolina^ The former state claimed jurisdiction to the line run by Walker, and the latter to the line run by Henderson. After the separation of Tennessee from North Carolina, the controversy between Virginia and Tennessee, as to boundary, was settled in 1802, by gunning a line equidistant from the former lines. The land in dispute fell within, the state of Tennessee. Both the litigant parties claimed under grants issued by the state of Virginia, the titles to lands derived from the said state having been protected by the act of Tennessee, passed in 1803 for the settlement of the boundary line.
¶10The plaintiff rested his title on a grant, (founded on á treasury warrant) to John Jones, dated August the 1st, 1787, for 3,000 acreg ; 1,500 acres of which were conveyed to the lessor by Jones, on. the 14th of April 1788; and proved pqssession in the defendant when the suit was commenced.
¶11The-defendant,-to support his title to the said 400 acres, offered in evidence a grant fór the same to Joseph Martin, dated January 1st, 1788, founded on a settlement-right, and intermediate conveyances to himself.1 He also offered in evidence, that a settlement was made on said land, in 1778, by William Fitzgerald, who assigned his-séttlement-ri'ght to the said Jo*215seph Martin; that a certificate in right' of settlement .was issued to Martin by the commissioners for adjust* ing tifj^s'to impatefited lands; on which certificate, and on the payment, of the composition money, the above grant was issued. This evidence was rejected by the court below. The defendant also offered in'efidencé a deed of conveyance from the plaintiff’s lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, dated January 2d, 1810, for the land in dispute; but the same was also rejected. He. also claiméd the benefit of the statute of limitations of the state of Tennessee, on the ground that he, and those under whom he. claims, had be,en in continued and peaceable possession of the 40Q acres since the year 1788.
¶12The court decided that the statute did not apply. The cause was then brought before this court by. writ of error.
¶13Mr. ¿aw for the plaintiff in error,
¶14argued, 1. That the'defendant below ou^ht to ha vie been permitted to give evidence showing that his . grant had preference in eqúity over the plaintiff’s grant. By the law, as settled in Tennessee, the. prior settlement right' of the defendant, though an equitable title, might be set up as a sufficient title jn an action at law. The opinion of the judge below proceeds on the idea that the Virginia practice must prevail, under which such a title could only be asserted in equity. The acts .-for carrying into effect the compact settling the boundary, declare that the claims and titles'derived from Virginia shall not be .affected or prejudiced by the change of jurisdic*216tio¡h. But are the claims and titles less secure, if the forms of legal proceedings of Tennessee be adopted? Is there any difference whether the plaintiff’^ grant be vacated on the equity side of the court, or rendered inoperative in an actioin of ejectment? It is admitted, that as to the nature, validity, and construction or contracts, the lex loci must prevail. But the tribunals of one Country' hive never carried theif courtesy to other countries so far as to eh&oge the form of action, and ’the course of judicial proceedings, or the time within which the . action must be commenced.a 2. The deed from the plaintiff’s lessor, pending the suit, showed an outstanding title in another, and ought to have prevented’the plaintiff from recovering,b 3i It is a universal principle that the statute of limitations of the place where the' suit is brought is to govern in determining the time within, which a suit must be commencedc 4. New exceptions to the operation of the statute off limitations as to real property cannot be constructively established' by the courts.d The statute of limitations of Tennessee ought to he applied to suits commenced in the courts of Tennessee for lands which were always, within the jurisdiction of that state as claimed by her, and which fell within her territory upon the final settlement of' the boundary. The title to such lands pay be determinable only by the law of. Virginia» *217but the mode of pursuing the remedy on that title must ■ depend upon the lex fori.
¶15The Attorney-General, contra,
¶16insisted, that by the compact between the two states, the law of Virginia, was made the law of the titles to these lands. By the settled practice of that state, as Well as the established doctrine of the common law, the legal title-must prevail ii. a court of law. The case of real property is an exception to the general rule, as -to applying the statute of limitations according to the lex fori, and not according to the iea: loci. Generally speaking, suits for such property jaust be commenced in the courts, of the'country where the land lies, and, cousequently, both the right and the remedy are to be determined by one and the same law. But this is an anomalous case depending- upon the peculiar na~' ture and provisions óf the compact of 1802, between the two states. The statute of limitations of Tennessee could not operate upon these lands until they were ascertained to lie in Tennessee; and the peculiar rule established by the courts of Tennessee,'permitting an equitable title to be asserted in an action at law, would not apply to a controversy concerning titles wholly depending on :he law of Virginia. The proceedings in ejectment are fictitious in form, but for all the purposes of substantial justice they are considered as real. If the term expire pending the action, the court will permit it to he enlarged, and no conveyance by the lessor of the plaintiffs while the suit is going on can operate to extinguish the prior lease. The court *218below, therefore, committed no error in refusing to perthedeed of conveyance from the plaintiff’s lessor to be given in evidence in order-to establish the existence of an outstanding title-.
¶17ttmneíu°right, in Sé* cannot asserted as a sufficient title than action at ^ssee°to Soverlands lying within the dis-g*aedterritory ginia and l/y'the Jgyto w°fh in the limits of TpGnocsscc "the titles of Merited hfrorn finia3 by Vir"
¶18Feb. 24th.
¶24delivered the opinion of the-court, and-after stating the facts,^proceeded as follows;
¶25The,first question is, whether -the'circuit court were right in rejecting the- evidence, offered by the defendant establish a title in himself under the grant of Joseph? that grant being'posterior in date to the grant-under which the plaintiff claimed; and this depends up- .... . , . , on the consideration, whether a prior settlement right, would, in equity, give the party á title to the*anc^ 03n be asserted also, as-a sufficient title in an actjan of ejectment. '
¶26_ , By the compact settling the boundary line Between' and Tennessee, and the- laws- made in par-suance thereof, it is declared, that all claims and titles*to lands derived from the governments of Virginia, or North-Carolina, or Tennessee, -which have fallen into- * % * respective states; shall remaní as secure to he owners thereof, as if derived from the government ^thin whose line they have fallen; and shall not be? in any wise prejudiced or affectéd in consequence of the establishment of the said line. The titles, both of the plaintiff and defendant in this case, were derived under grants- from Virginia ; and'the argument is, that as in Virginia no equitable claims-or rights ante-; cedent to the grants, could be asserted, kva court-o£ *219law in an 1 ejectment, but were matters cognizable-in equity only, that the. rule must, under the compact between the two states, apply to all the suits inihecburts in Tennessee, respecting the lands included an those grants.
¶27Remedies, in respect to real are according*11 to the lex loci jd sitos. ■ ■
¶28The general rule is, that remedies m respect to real , , , estates are t® be pursued according to the law of place where the estate is situate.a Nor do the court *220perceive any. reason to suppose that it was the intention of the legislature of either state, in the acts before'us, to vary the application of the rule in cases within the compact. Those acts are satisfied by construing them to.give the same validity and effect to.the titles acquired in-the disputed territory, as they, had, or would have,, in the state by which,they were granted, leaving the remedies to enforce such titles to he regulated by the lex.foni.
¶29The doctrine of the state courts of Tennessee,permitting an equitable title to be assented in an action at law, only applies to cases within the express purview of the Matutes of ’ Tennessee.
¶30The question- then is, .whether in the circuit, courts of the United States^ a merely equitable title can be set up ás a defence in an action of ejectment. It is understood that the state courts of Tennessee have *221decided that under their statutes, declaring an elder grant founded on a younger entry, to be void, tné priority of entries is examinable at law; and that a junior patent founded on a prior entry, shall prevail in an ac-¿ion of ejectment against a senior patent founded on a junior entry. But this doctrine has never been extended beyond the cases which have been construed to be within the express purview of the statutés of Tennessee. The present case stands upon grants of Virginia, and is not within the'purview of the statutes of Tennessee; the titles have all their validity firom the laws of Virginia', and are confirmed by the stipulations of the compact: Assuming, therefore, that in the case of entries under the laws of Tennessee, the priority of such entries is examinable at. law, this court do not think that the doctrine applies to merely equitable rights derived from other sources. •
¶31™ourts °f the United States at com* mon law and to be” not act00j-h® ^ut^Lcwding to the principlesof common lawande^uity England!Thhi conciled’ with decisions of the courts of Tennessee, equUab!eStUl« inanacUon'at
¶32There is a more general view of this subject, which deserves consideration. • By the laws of the United 1 f J • Slates, the circuit courts have cognizanoe of all suits of a civil nature at common law, and in equity, incases which fall within the limits prescribed by those laws. By the 24th section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is pro•vided, that the laws of the several States, except where , . . tt • , the constitution, treaties, or statutes ot the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be r.egarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the.United States, in cases where they . J * ply. The act of May, 1792, confirms the modes of proceeding then used in suits at common law in the courts of the United States, and declares that the modes *222tit proceeding in suits of equity, shall be “according to the pñnciples,: rules, and usages which belong to courts Of equity, as contra-distinguished frorp courts of cbiaampn laW)” except so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, It is material to consider whether it was the intention of Congress, by these provisions, to. confine the courts of the United States in their mode of administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which existed in the courts of the respective states. In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of the .state courts would give it, and relief tre equity only, when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not he had at law. In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in a its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitablé jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court, therefore think, that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature,the remedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of *223state courts, but according to the principles of common laW and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive pur knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admitted, tbát where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognised as a legal title, or a title which would be good;at law, is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as they ryould be in any stare court.
¶33In either view of this first point, the court is of opinion that the circuit court decided right in rejecting the evidence offered by the original defendant. It was matter proper for. the cognisance of a court of equity* and not admissible in a suit at law.
¶34The next question is, whether the circuit court decided correctly in rejecting the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff’s lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, for the land in .controversy, made during the pendency of the suit. The answér that was given at the bar is deemed decisive; although an action of ejectment is founded in fictions, yet to certain purposes it is considered in the same manner as if the whole proceedings were real; for all the purposes ot the suit the lease is to be deemed a real possessory title. Jf.it expire during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff cannot recover his term at law, without procuring it to be enlarged by the court, and can»proceed only for antecedent damages. In the present case the lease is to be deemed as a good subsisting *224lease, and the conveyance by the plaintiff’s lessor during the pendency of the suit could not operate upon his reversionary interest, and, consequently, could not ex" tinguish the prior lease- The existence of such a leape is a fiction; but. it is upheld-for the purposes of justice, und there is no pretencethat it works any injustice m this case.
¶35tetío”s*offTen nessee phcable to this ease.
¶36^ast question is, whether the statute of limifaof Tennessee was a good bar to the action. It is .. , , , , admitted, that it would be.a good bar only upon the supposition that the . lands in controversy were always within the original limits of Tennessee; but there is no such proof in the cause. The compact of the states does not affirm it, and the present boundary was an amr ic.able adjustment by that compact. It cannot, the; e-fore, be affirmed by any court 'of law, that the land was within the' reach of the statute of limitations of Tennessee until after the compact of 1802. The statute could not begin to run until it was ascertained that the land waá within the jurisdictional limits of the state of Tennessee.
¶37The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.a