16 Va. App. 815 - Scott v. Scott’s Empirical Analysis
1993
Citation profile
18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently August 2016
18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brown v. Lukhard · Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill · Ambrogi v. Koontz · American Airlines, Inc. v. Battle · 12 Va. App. 702 - Cohen v. Fairfax Hospital Ass'n
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he dissent argues that [Code § ] 65.2-708(C), the tolling provision for the two-year statute of limitations ... in [Code § ] 65.2-708(A)[,] does not apply when an employee is under an Award. The effect of such a holding would be that [§ ] 65.2-708(C) applies to employees but not to employers, since employer’s applications seek to terminate [existing] awards. If no award exists, then there would be no basis upon which an employer could file a change in condition application. Indeed, the Commission routinely dismisses employer change in condition applications which are filed when an award is not in place. However, if the Virginia General Assembly intended to preclude employers from invoking [Code § ] 65.2-708(0, it could have done so within the language of the statute. There is simply no exception specified within the language of [Code § ] 65.2-708(0 that indicates that this provision is inapplicable to change in condition filings by employers. Here, the employer paid wages at a rate greater than or equal to the pre-injury wage to an employee who was physically unable to return to [her] pre-injury work due to a compensable injury and who was provided work within [her] capacity. Pursuant to the plain language of [§ ] 65.2-708(C), this is all that is required for the wages to “be considered compensation.” Accordingly, we terminate the outstanding award effective July 8, 2006[,] as the employer properly paid compensation in connection with the filing of its application pursuant”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“a court may only look to the words of a statute if the statute is clear and unambiguous. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321 , 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). “An ambiguity exists where the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.” Id. “[A] statute should, if possible, be given a reasonable construction which will effect rather than defeat a legislative purpose evident from the history of the legislation.” Ambrogi v. Koontz, 224 Va. 381, 389 , 297 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1982).”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“[E]xcept: (i) thirty-six months from the last day for which compensation was paid shall be allowed for the filing of claims payable under § 65.2-503 and certain claims under subsection B of § 65.2-406 or (ii) twenty-four months from the day that the claimant undergoes any surgical procedure compensable under § 65.2-603 to repair or replace a prosthesis or orthosis.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.