Trustee Process. The trustees disclosed that, in the winter of 1839 — 40, they became indebted on book account to the principal debtor, but the account remained unadjusted, and the precise sum due was not ascertained and agreed upon until Jan. 18, 1843, when it was fixed by the parties at $103,65, and that said sum was still due from them. That, March 17, 1841, the principal debtor gave to the plaintiff an order on the trustees for $100, of which the trustees immediately after had notice, and the said Shattuck requested them to either pay or accept said order. That they declined doing so, as the account had not then been adjusted, but repeatedly told said Shattuck that, when the account should be adjusted, they, the trustees, would pay to him whatever should be ascertained to be its amount. That on the 30th Sept. 1842, and previous to the commencement of this process, they had notice from the claimant, Woodruff, that the amount due on said account had been, by the principal debtor, assigned to him for good consideration.

The court found the facts set forth in the disclosures to be true, and that the plaintiff, Shattuck, still held the order given to him by said Smith, and that this process was commenced, as an action on book account against said Smith, previous to the adjustment of said account in Jan. 1843, — and rendered judgment that the trustees were not chargeable. Exceptions by plaintiff.

The proceeding under the trustee statute, in this State, is, as between different claimants, in the nature of an equitable proceeding, or a proceeding in rem against the fund in the hands of the trustee. The facts, in this case, show that, as between the plaintiff and Woodruff, the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the fund; although the assignment to Woodruff was prior to the commencement of the trustee process, yet the plaintiff, by bringing’the trustee process, does not thereby waive his prior lien. Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 424. Cox’ Digest 322.

The order of Smith on the trustees, and the facts in connection with it, amount to such an appropriation of the fund, that the plaintiff might maintain an action against the trustees in the name of Smith; and, if the trustees are thus liable, there can be no objection to their being made chargeable in this action. The proceeding is in the nature of a bill of interpleader; it settles all rights, and concludes all parties, and ought to be sustained. Graighle v. Notnagle, I Pet. C. C. Rep. 245, Cox’ Dig. 323.

By the statute, (sect. 17,) Woodruff has no right to object to the plaintiff’s claim, and to become a party, except “so far as it respects his title to the goods &c. in question;” and as Shattuck’s right is paramount to his, the plaintiff ought to have judgment, the same as if no adverse claimant had interposed.

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