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16 Vt. 619

Burroughs v. Wright

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided March 15, 1844

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1844-03-15

<p>When property has been attached by one officer, and is in his custody, a return by another officer, who holds a writ of attachment in his hands against the owner of the property, that he has attached the same property, subject to the first attachment, — still leaving the property in the possession of the first attaching officer, — will create no lien upon the property.</p> <p>The advertising of property, previous to its sale on execution, is required for the benefit of the debtor, and to protect his rights; and if he waive that provision, and consent to a saje without advertisement, the sale will be legal.</p> <p>Where an officer, having attached property, levied an execution upon the same property, subject to such attachment, and the execution in the suit in which the attachment was made was put into the hands of another officer in season to charge the property, and the first officer proceeded and sold the property on the-execution in his hands, and then tendered to the second officer the amount of the execution which he held, together with his fees, it wasjield that the second officer could not refuse such tender, and commence an action against the first officer for his proceedings with the property.</p>

Relies on Watson v. Todd · Munger v. Fletcher

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1844-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently November 1911

5 state decisions

2018441850186018701880189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Hebard, J.

¶2One principal question in the case is, whether the plaintiff, by virtue of the writ in favor of the Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Co., acquired any lien upon this property. And in relation to that we are clear that he did not. The case of Watson v. Todd, 5 Mass. 271, is a leading case upon this point, and has been followed *625by subsequent decisions in Massachusetts, and has been recognized as law in this state, and is decisive of this part of the case. At the time when the plaintiff pretended to attach that property, it was already attached and in the custody of Wright. No lien can be created by attachment without an actual talcing, or in some way having the control of the property, excepting in case of certain kinds of property, in which the statute has provided another mode of attaching. In this case the plaintiff had no right to the custody of the property, and did not have it in fact. The Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Co., to have acquired a lien upon the property, should have put their writ into the hands of the officer who had the legal custody of it. The property being rightfully in the possession and custody of the defendants, the plaintiff committed a trespass in taking it from them, and of course the defendants had a right to re-possess themselves of it, and by so doing they were not trespassers.

¶3The other branch of the inquiry is in relation to the manner of disposing of the property. The property was not posted fourteen days, as required by law, but was sold by the consent of Ramsay, the debtor. The law requires the property to be posted for the benefit of the debtor and to protect his rights, and when he waives that protection, and consents to a sale without its being posted, the sale will be legal. The case of Munger v. Fletcher, 2 Vt. 524, is authority for this, and is a much stronger case. In that case, one of the attaching creditors, who had a lien upon the property, refused to enter into the arrangement, but the sale was held to be legal. In this case, the Farmers’ Sg Mechanics’ Co., the only creditors of Ramsay who have any occasion to complain, had no lien upon the property, and no legal interest in the disposition of it. The first three attaching creditors had no farther interest in the property than to the amount of their judgments, and those judgments the debtor, or any one acting for him, had a right to pay, and thus discharge their lien upon the property. Before the commencement of this action Wright tendered to the plaintiff, he having the executions for collection, the full amount of all those judgments and officer’s fees. This the debtor had a right to cause to be done, and it was the duty of the officer having the executions to have received it; and his refusing to receive it gives him no right of action.

¶4The charge of the court we consider erroneous, and the judgment' is reversed,

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