Âś1delivered the opinion of the court:
Âś2This is an action by the executors of the estate of Elsie Weil for a refund of $108,391.10, estate taxes paid as a deficiency assessment resulting from the Commissionerâs disallowance of the full deduction claimed by them for piâoperty previously taxed.
Âś3The issue arises in this way: Bertha Bosenheim died on April 15, 1947, leaving her entire estate by will in equal shares to her nephew and niece, Henry and Elsie Weil, who died on August 28, 1949, and March 27, 1952, respectively. Henry Weil left his entire estate by intestacy to his sister, Elsie Weil, whose death occurred before any distributions had been made from the estate of her brother. Plaintiff Bobert M. Benjamin, appearing herein as one of the executors of Elsie Weilâs estate, is the husband of Elsie Weilâs daughter. His firm served as attorney for the administrator of Henry Weilâs estate.
Âś4At the time of Elsie Weilâs death on March 27, 1952, her gross estate included property which she had inherited as joint heir with her brother, Henry Weil, from her aunt, Bertha Bosenheim and property, primarily cash and securities, which she had inherited as sole heir of her brother, Henry Weil.
Âś5It is the property in the Henry Weil estate inherited by Elsie Weil which gives rise to this suit. Henry Weilâs gross estate at the time of his death was valued at $1,972,112.59. It consisted of $1,259,894.20 in individual property, which he had himself accumulated, and property valued at $712,218.39, which he had inherited from his aunt, Bertha Bosenheim (hereinafter referred to as âBosenheim propertyâ).
Âś6The executors of Elsie Weil realized that that portion of Henry Weilâs estate which he had received from the Bosen-heim property and which she now received had already had one deduction in Henry Weilâs estate and therefore could not be claimed as an additional deduction in her estate, while that portion that consisted of Henry Weilâs individual property which she inherited from him would be allowable as a deduction since she died less than 5 years after her brotherâs *340death. The executors sought to treat most of the taxes, charges, and expenses of the Henry Weil estate as having been paid out of the part of the Rosenheim property which she inherited from Henry Weil and therefore could not claim as a deduction. The net effect of this paying of taxes and expenses out of inherited property which could not be the basis of a deduction would be to reduce the estate tax of the Elsie Weil estate.
Âś7By virtue of section 812(c)
Âś8*341More specifically, in the estate tax return for the estate of Elsie Weil filed by her executors on June 25,1953, showing tax due in the amount of $659,328.88, the executors claimed deductions for property previously taxed in two prior estates: '(1) thĂŠ estate inherited by Elsie Weil direct from-Bertha Rosenheim (in the amount.of $679,725.72 and not at issue here), and (2) the estate of Henry Weil. In reporting'the property inherited from the Henry Weil estate, the executors of Elsie Weil adopted the previous administratorâs allocation of charges between the individual and Rosenheim properties.
Âś9The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in auditing thĂŠ estate tax return of Elsie Weilâs estate, took the position that, since the individual property represented approximately 64 percent of Henry Weilâs gross estate, it should bear that percentage of the estate taxes, with the Rosenheim property bearing , the remaining 36 percent. By charging approximately 64 percent of the estateâs expenses and taxes to the individual property he obtained a balance of $889,308.39 as the net amount of Henry Weilâs individual property inherited by Elsie Weil instead of the value of $1,160,315.80 which her executors had claimed as a deduction. The difference between this amount and that originally claimed, or $271,007.41, was restored, or credited, to the Rosenheim property account, which, being taxable in Elsie Weilâs estate, gave rise to an additional tax of $108,391.10, the subject matter of this suit.
Âś10In denying the validity of this additional tax, plaintiffs assert that they have complied in every way with section 812(c) and are entitled to apportion the debts, administration expenses, and taxes in the way they were apportioned in the prior estate, since the provision of the section in no way negatives their right to do so.
Âś11Defendant, in arguing for a rule of apportionment, as applied by the Commissioner in these circumstances, asserts, inter alia, that in charging property deductible as property previously taxed for the purpose of exonerating the estate taxes payable on the remainder (and larger) part of the estate of Elsie Weil, plaintiffs have, in substance, frustrated *342the congressional intent that the same property shall not be deductible in successive estates.
Âś12The issue is whether the second decedent (or her executors) may, within the limits of the purpose of section'812(c), increase the deduction for property previously taxed in the second estate merely by treating taxes and other obligations payable by the prior gross estate as having been paid out of property deductible as property previously taxed in that estate, rather than out of property generating the expenses, or whether each class of property must be charged with its proportionate share. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the defendant is the correct one. It seems that, where the only alternative is to charge property previously taxed, the taxable property should be charged with at least a proportionate part of the charges against the gross estate.
Âś13Section 812(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
Âś14Plaintiffs, in seeking to establish all of Henry Weilâs individual property (except for that part â $102,325.72â used to pay administration expenses prior to receipt of the Rosenheim property) as property previously taxed, assert that all of these conditions have been met, and apparently *343there has been a prima facie compliance. The estate of Elsie Weil received the property in question within 5 years of Henry Weilâs death; it can be identified as the property received; it formed a part of Henry Weilâs gross estate; an estate tax was paid on the gross estate; the relationship between the two decedents was not the proscribed one of husband and wife, and, lastly, no apparent deduction was sought or allowed on the property in determining the net value of that portion of Henry Weilâs estate which is claimed as tax-deductible property in the Elsie Weil estate.
Âś15It is a familiar rule of law, however, that a thing may be within the letter of a statute and yet not be within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.
Âś16In order correctly to assess the legal significance of the transaction in question here it becomes necessary, therefore, to look beyond its mere form. When we do this, we find that in charging practically all liabilities to property previously taxed in order to enlarge the amount of property that would be free of taxation in the successor estate of Elsie Weil, the administrator of Henry Weilâs estate would thereby enable the Elsie Weil estate to gain advantages which were not the kind of benefits which the Congress intended to make available to decedentsâ estate when it authorized the deduction for property previously taxed.
Âś17This courtâs trial commissioner has found that
In administering the estate of Henry L. Weil, his administrator ⌠paid administration expenses, debts, and estate taxes owed by his estate, to the maximum extent practicable, out of principal assets identified as having been received by his estate from Bertha Bosenheim. ⌠The administrator had in mind ⌠that to the extent that administration expenses, debts, and estate taxes were paid out of property inherited by Henry L. Weil from Bertha Bosenheim, the previously taxed property deduction in the estate of Elsie Weil, if she died within 5 years of Henry L. Weil, would be greater and the estate tax payable by her estate would thus be less.5
Âś18*344The primary purpose of section 812(c) is to prevent a double tax on the same property within a comparatively short period of time.
Âś19Moreover, the Congress amended section 812(c) in 1934 to provide that inherited property could not.enjoy the property previously taxed deduction in an estate if the same property had been the subject Ăłf a similar deduction in the estate from which the property was inherited.
The. amendment [section 402 of the Revenue Act of 1934] makes it clear that no deduction will be allowable for prior taxed property, unless it appears not only that the property was included in the gross estate of the prior decedent from whom the property was acquired, but also that the estate of such prior decedent was. not entitled to a deduction for such property in determining the value of the net estate of the prior decedent.8
Âś20Thus the 1934 amendment clearly indicates a congressional intent to give the benefit of the property previously taxed deduction only to the one decedent (here, Henry Weil), not to his legatee or statutory heir.
Âś21It is, therefore, quite evident that Henry Weilâs administrator, in attempting to employ the property previously taxed deduction authorized by section 812(c) to increase the property previously taxed deduction in the successor estate of Elsie Weil and to reduce the estate tax payable by her estate, was enlisting section 812(c) in the service of a cause which was not within the purpose or intent of the congressional enactment. The estate of Henry Weil enjoyed the benefit of the deduction for the Rosenheim property, *345and that was as far as the 1934 amendment intended that it should go.
Âś22Upon the precise point at issue here there apparently has been no direct adjudication. However, several litigated cases have defined more precisely the availability of property previously taxed in decedentsâ estates and these are not without useful precedent in the proper disposition of the case at bar.
Âś23Where, as here, the issue concerns the amount of property inherited from the prior estate and allowable as property previously taxed in the estate of the second decedent, the decision does not turn on whether the second decedent dies before the debts, expenses, and taxes of the prior estate have been discharged and the prior estate distributed or whether the second decedent actually received a part or all of the prior estate before his death. In both situations the basic issue is whether the second decedent is entitled to deduct his prior decedentâs gross estate or only his net estate. We believe the sounder view on this question is expressed in Bahr v. Commissioner,
Âś24The question of the amount deductible presents itself in a slightly different form, but with essentially the same result, where the second decedent, while still alive, receives a part, or all of the prior decedentâs estate. In this situation the second decedent may attempt to enlarge the property previously taxed allowance in his own estate by discharging the debts, expenses, and taxes of the prior estate out of his own separate property, or out of some other fund, such as income earned by the corpus of the prior estate. To claim the gross amount as deductible (regardless of the theory) is obviously in conflict with the net estate rule. The courts, with exceptions, have resolved the conflict implicit in this situation by upholding the net estate rule, rationalizing the result on the basis of congressional intent. This court, for instance, permitted only the net estate to be deducted in the cĂĄse of Edith Bloedorn v. United States.
Âś25In summary, several principles have emerged from the cases which may be stated as follows: The objective sought to be attained by the second estate by means of the deduction must be within the intent of the Congress â a mere compliance with -the letter of the law is not enough; the amount claimed must be the net estate, not the gross estate, and the .gross estate .cannot be substituted for the net estate as a .deduction simply by paying its obligations out of the-separate-funds of the successor decedent.
Âś26Plaintiffs in their argument rely on those cases which have interpreted section 812(c) to mean that an inheritor cannot deduct under that section more than the net value of his inheritance, and they distinguish their case from those where the obligations of the prior estate were paid out of the second decedentâs separate property, emphasizing that all of the estate taxes, debts, and administration expenses of the estate of Henry L. Weil were in fact paid out of the principal of his gross estate. Further, they rely upon the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of *347Wisconsin in the case of Horlick v. Kuhl
Âś27The pertinent part of the Horlick case involved certain property in the estates of three decedents â a father (who left a gross estate-'valued at $17,000,000), his daughter, and his son, all of whom died in that order within a period of 5 years from July 6,1938. At the sonâs death, his executors filed an estate tax return of almost $1,000,000 and the Commissioner assessed an additional tax of $165,000. An. action to recover claims on six grounds was subsequently commenced. Plaintiffs rely upon Claim 5. There the daughter had bequeathed her brother, the son, $100,000, and at his death the legacy had not been paid. His executors deducted it in his,.estate as previously taxed property. This was disallowed. The question was one of identifying the legacy as property taxed in the prior estate of the daughter, but not in that of the father. The court found that the executors of the son and daughter had selected two items in the daughterâs estate which had not been previously taxed in the fatherâs estate. âTo avoid further extending this long opinion,â the court stated a minimum of facts and did not discuss its reasons, but merely concluded that the $100,000 had been âsufficiently identified by the plaintiff as property which formed part of the gross estate ⌠of a prior decedent ⌠on whose estate an estate tax was paid.â If issues were raised other than the identity of the property, there is no indication of it in the brief opinion. It may be implied on the facts given that the case holds that the second decedent simply deducts the gross amount of the property which he receives from the prior estate. As we have seen, this is not the law, at least not in those cases where all of the prior estate (presumably Horlick involves one legacy of several) passes to the second decedent. For this reason, and because we do not know the nature of the property used *348to discharge the tases and other obligations payable by the prior (daughterâs) estate, whatever the Horlick case may be said to hold, we do not think it a proper precedent in the case at bar.
Âś28Plaintiffs, in relying upon the net estate rule (as extended to include discharge of obligations of the prior estate from the decedentâs separate property) overlook the significance, for their own argument, of the source from whence came this limitation on the amount deductible. The fact is these limitations have been imposed by the courts in order to prevent decedentsâ estates from using the deduction for purposes the Congress never intended that it should be used. The same reasons which called forth these limitations now compel this court to go a step further and restrict the use of property deductible as previously taxed property in prior estates in connection with claims for the same type of deduction in. a successor estate, just as it has done in regard to the use of a second decedentâs separate property for the same-purpose.
œ29We must clearly distinguish between the net amount of property representing an ⢠entire prior estate and the net amount of property representing only- a portion of a prior estate; for this case teaches us that the latter may in fact represent the gross amount (with minor deductions)- of all the taxable property in the prior estate.
Âś30. Thus, in the case at bar, the plaintiffs are claiming as a deduction what amounts to the gross amount of- the taxable prior estate. But instead of using separate funds of the second decedent to effect this, they are using other funds in the prior estate (Elsie Weilâs property also, even though not in possession, because she became legally entitled to it upon her brotherâs death) which have a special status -by virtue of the very law on which their claim is based. ⢠We think that, for purposes of the 1934 amendment to section 812(c), the result of -the cases should be the same, whether the second decedent attempts to use his own separate funds or funds he inherits untaxed from the prior estate as property previously taxed, that is, only the net amount, or proportionate net amount, of the prior taxable estate should be allowable as a deduction in his own estate. When the second decedent inherits all of the property in the prior estate, any property *349deductible in that estate as property previously taxed becomes, as to his own estate, analogous to the use of his own separate property insofar as its availability for discharging the obligations of the prior estate is concerned and should be governed by the same rule.
Âś31Property deductible in the prior estate by virtue of section 812(c) becomes taxable in the second estate. If the second decedent is free to treat such property as having discharged estate taxes generated by the nondeductible property in the prior estate, it results in an increase of property previously taxed in the second estate. The greater the deduction in the successor estate, the greater the loss of revenue from that estate. The second decedentâs individual property is also subject to the estate tax. If such property may be used to discharge' the obligations of the prior estate, it too escapes taxation in the second estate to the extent that it is used to increase the tax-exempt' property in the second estate. If the latter practice is not within the ambit of section 812 (c), as we have held, it must follow that neither is the former. Both practices are subject to censure for the same reason. There is, in fact, an even stronger case for the disallowance of the use of property previously taxed for the purpose as claimed by plaintiffs, because the Congress has expressly provided that property is not allowable as property previously taxed in successive estates. Although there might be some question, because of the literal language of section 812 (c), of the âidentityâ of the property so used, there can be little doubt that in using property deducted as previously taxed in the prior estate to create additional property previously taxed in the second estate, there is, in substance, a mere substitution of the two classes of property in the prior estate, so that when the taxable property of the prior estate appears in the second estate in an amount equal to its net amount plus the amount of estate taxes payable by it, the increment over real net amount is nothing .more than the tax-exempt property of the prior estate appearing in a different form in the second estate but claiming the same benefit. To allow plaintiff to recover would permit the Elsie Weil estate, in effect, to enjoy a second deduction on a part of the Rosenheim property which she had received through the Henry Weil estate. *350Such a second deduction is specifically forbidden in the 1934 amendment to section 812 (c), supra.
Âś32In addition (except in a case where a testator otherwise directs in his will or other instrument), the New York State law requires that Federal estate taxes be apportioned and paid out of the estate as a whole, and that such taxes, administration costs, and other charges shall be apportioned ratably among the'persons interested in the estate.
Âś33We therefore conclude that plaintiffs, in charging estate taxes payable by Henry Weilâs estate, have frustrated the congressional intent that property previously taxed shall not be deducted in successive estates, and, for purposes of Elsie Weilâs estate tax return, the taxable property in Henry Weilâs estate shall be treated as. if it had in fact borne its proportionate share of Henry Weilâs estate taxes; as determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the resulting liability for additional taxes as assessed.
Âś34Accordingly, plaintiffsâ petition is dismissed.
Âś35FINDINGS OF FACT
Âś36The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Robert K. McConnaughey, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:
Âś371. Plaintiffs are the duly qualified and acting executors of the will of Elsie Weil, who died March 27,1952, domiciled in the City, County and State of New York, where her estate is being administered. Plaintiffsâ office as such executors is at 1 East 44th Street, New York 17, New York, within the jurisdiction of this court.
Âś382. Jurisdiction of this action is conferred upon this court by sections 1491 and 1346(a) (1) of title 28, United States Code, and section 7422 of title 26, United States Code [Internal Revenue Code of 1954].
Âś39*3513. This action arises under chapter 3, section 812(c), of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 123, 124, as amended.
Âś404. Pursuant to the provisions of section 821 of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, plaintiffs, on June 25, 1953, duly and timely filed with the District Director of Internal Eevenue, Upper Manhattan District, New York, an estate tax return for the estate of Elsie Weil showing tax due in the amount of $659,328.88, which was duly and timely paid.
Âś415. In computing, in the said return, the estate tax liability of the estate of Elsie Weil, deceased, plaintiffs, pursuant to the provisions of section 812(c) of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, took, in Schedule I of the return, âProperty Previously Taxed,â deductions for property previously taxed in two prior estates: (a) a deduction in the amount of $679,725.72 for property previously taxed in the estate of Bertha Eosenheim, aunt of the decedent Elsie Weil, who had died April 15, 1947; (b) a deduction in the amount of $1,160,315.80 for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil, brother of the decedent Elsie Weil, who had died August 28, 1949.
Âś426. Bertha Eosenheim left her entire estate, by will, in equal shares to her niece, Elsie Weil, and her nephew, Henry L. Weil. Henry L. Weil left his entire estate, by intestacy, to his sister, Elsie Weil.
Âś43,7. The deduction of $679,725.72 taken by plaintiffs, in Schedule I of the said estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Bertha Eosenheim, has not been questioned by the District Director of Internal Eevenue or by any other person in behalf of the United States, and no issue exists with respect thereto.
Âś448. The deduction of $1,160,315.80 taken by plaintiffs in Schedule I of the said estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil was, as more fully appears in findings 10 and 12, infra, reduced by the District Director of Internal Eevenue to $889,308.39.
Âś459. The reduction of the deduction stated in finding 8 hereof increased the estate tax liability of the estate of Elsie Weil, as determined by the District Director of Internal Eevenue, by the amount of $108,391.10.
Âś46*35210. By notice of. deficiency dated May 1, 1956, pursuant to section 6212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the District Director of Internal Revenue notified plaintiffs of the determination of a deficiency of estate tax in the amount of $274,631.20, to be reduced to $140,264.84 upon filing of evidence of payment of State estate taxes in the amount of $134,366.66.
Âś4711. Evidence of payment of state estate taxes in the amount of $134,366.66 was duly filed by plaintiffs with the District Director of Internal Revenue on December 19,1956, and was accepted by him.
Âś48il2. The asserted deficiency of $140,264.84 referred to in the notice of deficiency dated May 1,1956, resulted from certain adjustments made upon audit of the estate tax return of the estate of Elsie Weil. Among these was an adjustment reducing the deduction in Schedule I of the estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil from $1,160,315.80 to $889,308.39. Plaintiffs do not question any of the other adjustments made upon such audit and stated in the notice of deficiency.
Âś4913. On June 1, 1956, plaintiffs paid to the District Director of Internal Revenue the amount of $140,264.84 stated in the notice of deficiency dated May 1, 1956. The receipt of this payment, was not scheduled by the .District Director until June 10, 1956. The payment included the amount of $108,391.10 by which, as stated in finding 9, the. estate tax liability of the estate of Elsie Weil was increased by the said reduction of the deduction for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil from $1,160,315.80 to $889,308.39.
Âś5014. On December 19, 1956, plaintiffs paid to the District Director of Internal Revenue $24,661.63, representing interest on the deficiency of $140,264.84 determined by the notice of deficiency dated May 1, 1956, at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of filing of the estate tax return, June 25,1953, to the date of payment of the deficiency.
Âś51Âż5. By âStatement of Estate Tax Dueâ dated September 21, 1956, as adjusted by âNotice of Adjustmentâ dated May 1, 1957, the District Director of Internal Revenue finally assessed against plaintiffs a deficiency in estate tax, and interest thereon, in the amounts theretofore paid by plaintiffs as stated in findings 13 and 14.
Âś52*35316. On December 4, 1957, plaintiffs filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue a claim for refund of estate tax' in the amount of $108,391.10 resulting from the adjustment made upon audit of the estate tax return of the estate of Elsie Weil reducing from $1,160,315.80 to $889,308.39 the deduction allowed for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil.
Âś5317. By registered letter dated November 24, 1958, sent to plaintiffs, the District Director of Internal Revenue gave notice of disallowance in full of the claim for refund of estate tax.
Âś54,18. In the estate of Henry L. Weil, his principal assets which had been received by him by bequest from Bertha Rosenheim and his principal assets which had not been so inherited were segregated and identified. Estate taxes, debts, and administration expenses of the estate of Henry L. Weil totaled $580,078.03. Of this total, estate taxes and certain debts and administration expenses of the estate of Henry L. Weil, totaling $477,752.31, were paid by his administrator out of principal assets owned by him at his death identified as property received by him by bequest from Bertha Rosenheim; the balance of the debts and administration expenses, totaling $102,325.72, were paid out of his principal assets identified as not having been so inherited by him.' The details of these respective payments consisted of the following items:
Âś56The debts, administration expenses, and estate taxes of the estate of Henry L. Weil related to the administration of his *354entire estate and not to any single class of assets. Consequently, the plaintiffs have not alleged and do not maintain .that there was any relation between the various payments of estate taxes, debts, and administration expenses made by the administrator of the estate of Henry L. Weil, as set forth above, and the classes of assets of that estate out of which the respective payments were made. Prior to the receipt by the estate of Henry L. Weil of distributions from the estate of Bertha Rosenheim, debts, administration expenses, and claims of the estate of Henry L. Weil were paid out of principal assets identified as not having been received from Bertha Rosenheim. Once distributions from the estate of Bertha Rosenheim began to be received by the estate of Henry L. Weil, in the spring of 1950, administration expenses, debts, and estate taxes were paid, with minor exceptions, from principal assets identified as having been received from Bertha Rosenheim.
Âś5719. In administering the estate of Henry L. Weil, his administrator, in accordance with what the administrator and its counsel considered routine and customary practice as a condition to the application of section 812(c), paid administration expenses, debts, and estate taxes owed by his estate, to the maximum extent practicable, out of principal assets identified as having been received by his estate from Bertha Rosenheim. In determining to do so, the administrator of the estate of Henry L. Weil had in mind that section 812(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 required that, if a beneficiary who died within 5 years of a decedent were to have the benefit of a deduction for property previously taxed, the property taxed in the prior decedentâs estate must have been identified, segregated, and retained until the death of the subsequent decedent. The administrator had in mind also that to the extent that administration expenses, debts, and estate taxes were paid out of property inherited by Henry L. Weil from Bertha Rosenheim, the previously taxed property deduction in the estate of Elsie Weil, if she died within 5 years of Henry L. Weil, would be greater and the estate tax payable by her estate would thus be less.
Âś58*35520. The estate of Henry L. Weil had not been distributed at the date of death of Elsie Weil. Henry Weilâs gross estate amounted to $1,972,112.59, consisting of $1,259,894.20 in individual property and $712,218.39 representing the value at the date of Henry Weilâs death of the property that he had inherited from his aunt, Bertha Rosenheim.
Âś5921. The adjustment of the deduction for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in notice of deficiency dated May 1, 1956, was based on his determination that the aggregate of the estate taxes, debts, and administration expenses of the estate of Henry L. Weil was allocable proportionately to the property of Henry L. Weil inherited from Bertha Rosenheim and his property not so inhei'ited.
Âś6022. The deduction of $1,160,315.80 taken by plaintiffs in Schedule I of the estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil was taken with respect to the property owned by Henry L. Weil at the date of his death, and still held by his estate at the date of Elsie Weilâs death, which was identified as not having been received by Henry L. Weil by bequest from Bertha Rosenheim.
Âś6123. The said deduction was taken for property forming a part of the gross estate, situated within the United States, of Henry L. Weil, who died within 5 years prior to the date of death of Elsie Weil.
Âś6224. The property for which the said deduction was taken was identified as having been received by Elsie Weil from the estate of Henry L. Weil by inheritance.
Âś6325. An estate tax with respect to the property for which the said deduction was taken was finally determined and paid by the estate of Henry L. Weil.
Âś6426. The amount of the deduction taken on the estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil was the value of the said property finally determined in determining the value of the gross estate of Henry L. Weil, but only to the extent that the value of that property was included in the gross estate of Elsie Weil.
Âś6527. In determining the value of the net estate of Henry L. Weil for purposes of the estate tax paid by that estate, *356no previously taxed property deduction was allowed in respect of the property for which the deduction was taken in the estate of Elsie Weil.
Âś6628. The prior decedent, Henry L. Weil, was not the spouse of Elsie Weil.
Âś6729. All of the estate taxes, debts, and administration expenses of the estate of Henry L. Weil were paid out of the principal of his gross estate; none was paid out of income or out of any source other than the principal of the gross estate of Henry L. Weil.
Âś6830. The deduction of $1,160,315.80 taken by plaintiffs in Schedule I of the estate tax return for property previously taxed in the estate of Henry L. Weil was in an amount less than the amount arrived at by deducting from the gross estate of Henry L. Weil the aggregate of all liens, debts, administration expenses, and Federal and State estate taxes to which his estate was subject.
Âś6931. Plaintiffs are the owners of the said claim; no assignment thereof or of any interest therein has been made; and no part thereof has been paid.
Âś7032. No other action than the disallowance by the District Director of plaintiffsâ claim for refund, referred to in finding 17, has been had on this claim either in Congress or by any department of the United States Government or in any judicial proceeding.
Âś7133. No suit or process is pending for or in respect of plaintiffsâ claim in any other court against any persons acting or professing to act mediately or immediately under authority of the United States.
Âś72conclusion op law
Âś73Upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, and their petition is therefore dismissed.
Âś74 â812. Net estate.
âFor the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined ⌠by deducting from the value of the gross estateâ
â(c) Property previously taxed.
âAn amount equal to the value of any property (1) forming a part of the gross estate situated in the United States of any person who died within five years priorâ to the death of the decedent ⌠where such property ⢠can' be identified as having been received by the decedent from the donor by gift, or from such prior decedent by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, or which can * be identified as having been acquired in exchange for property so received âŚ. This deduction shall be allowed only where ⌠an estate tax ⌠was finally determined and paid by ⌠the estate of such prior decedent, ⌠only to the extent that the value of such property is included in the decedentâs gross estate and only if in determining the value of the net estate of the prior decedent no deduction was allowable under this subsection, ⌠⌠in respect of the property or property given in exchange therefor.â
Âś75Ibid.
œ76 Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.41(a) (1949).
Âś77Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
Âś78 Finding 19.
Âś79 H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1918).
œ80Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 402, 48 Stat. 753.
"Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) and paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of section 308 of the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended, are amended by Inserting before the period at the end of the second sentence of each such paragraph a comma and the following: âand only if in determining the value of the net estate of the prior decedent no deduction was allowable under this paragraph in respect of the property or property given in exchange therefor.â â
Âś81 H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1934).
Âś82119 F. 2d 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941).
Âś83126 Ct. Cl. 591 (19535). cert. denied, 347 U.S. 954.
Âś8462 F. Supp. 168, 176 (1945).
Âś85 The deduction is not available if the prior decedentâs estate received the benefit of a property previously taxed deduction with respect to the original property.
Âś86 See section 124, Decedent Estate Law, 13 McKinleyâs Consolidated Laws of New York, Annotated; also Tax Law, 59 McKinleyâs Consolidated Laws of New York. Annotated (Part 2), section 249-S. See also Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, as to applicability of state law in,payment of taxes out of estate as a whole.