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← 160 Kan. 167 - Moore v. Smith

Moore v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

1945

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
5
states following
June 2020
most recently cited

45 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently June 2020 · most notably Moyer v. Board of County Commissioners (1966), Preisler v. Doherty (1954)

45 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Green v. Okanogan County · Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Railroad Commission of Texas · Dickey Oil Co. v. Wakefield · City of Boston v. Santosuosso · City of Plankinton v. Kieffer

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he fact that an issue has become moot does not necessarily mean that the appellate court is without jurisdiction to determine it.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We have a number of decisions involving actions in forcible detainer which, it may be argued, support or tend to support dismissal of an appeal as moot even though rights of the parties may be affected thereby. We have gone far in these cases in saying that we will not consider the merits of an appeal from a judgment of forcible detainer rendered against a tenant claiming under a lease, after the lease has expired. (Mueller v. Seiler, 158 Kan. 440 , 148 P. 2d 266 , and cases there cited.) These cases are not persuasive on the instant issue for the primary reason that we have a statute (G. S. 1935, 61-1303) which specifically provides that judgments in actions for forcible entry and detainer ‘shall not be a bar to any after action brought by either party.’ Judgments in such cases not being res judicata, the reason for refusing to dismiss an appeal would in many cases, at least, disappear. It could not well be said that vital rights would be affected by dismissal if the former judgment is not a bar to subsequent action between the parties. In saying this we are not unmindful of the fact that in McHenry v. Hubbard, 156 Kan. 415 , 134 P. 2d 1107 , section 61-1303 was held inapplicable in certain cases. The statute, however, still stands and is pertinent in appraising our former decisions in forcible detainer cases. Furthermore, our conclusion here as to the sound rule to be applied would not be altered even if it could be shown to be inconsistent with some statements made in the”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[a]n appeal will not be dismissed as moot unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the actual controversy has ceased and the only judgment which could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.