160 W. Va. 1 - State v. McGee’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
35 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently October 1996 · most notably 161 W. Va. 517 - State v. Starkey (1978), 160 W. Va. 234 - State v. Boyd (1977)
35 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 157 W. Va. 640 - State v. Thomas · 151 W. Va. 1 - State v. Hamric · 151 W. Va. 364 - State v. Riley · Halstead v. Horton · 137 W. Va. 477 - State v. Pietranton
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The trial judge in a criminal trial must consistently be aware that he occupies a unique position in the minds of the jurors and is capable, because of his position, of unduly influencing jurors in the discharge of their duty as triers of the facts. This Court has consistently required trial judges not to intimate an opinion on any fact in issue in any manner. In criminal cases, we have frequently held that conduct of the trial judge which indicates his opinion on any material matter will result in a guilty verdict being set aside and a new trial awarded. See State v. Pietranton, 137 W.Va. 477 , 72 S.E.2d 617 (1952); State v. Summers, 118 W.Va. 118 , 188 S.E. 873 (1936); State v. Shelton, 116 W.Va. 75 , 178 S.E. 633 (1935); State v. Austin, 93 W.Va. 704 , 117 S.E. 607 (1923); State v. Staley, 45 W.Va. 792 , 32 S.E. 198 (1899); and State v. Hurst, 11 W.Va. 54 (1877).”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“When the State seeks to cross-examine a defendant in a criminal case regarding previous convictions for the purpose of testing his credibility, the trial court is required to consider the probative value thereof measured against the risk of substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused and is further required to instruct the jury properly regarding the limited purpose of the question and the limited purpose for which the jury may consider it.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““We are not unaware of the contention that such a rationale is pure sophistry and that the State, under the guise of testing credibility, relies upon the hope that the jury, in spite of being instructed by the court as to the purpose for which the evidence is admissible, will nonetheless consider the revelation of other convictions as indicating guilt in the case being tried.” [ 230 S.E.2d at 837 ]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.