David v. David’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 4 district · 58 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It cannot be denied that in some respects and for some purposes a partnership may be regarded as a legal entity, and it has been so held by this court as recently as McLane v. State Tax Commission, 156 Md. 133 , 143 A. 656 [1928]. But it is equally well settled that it is not such an entity as is a natural person or a corporation, and that its status as an independent entity is limited and incomplete. . . . But without further elaborating the subject, it is sufficient to say that, for the purposes of this case, the vital difference between a partnership and a legal entity complete in itself, such as a natural person or a corporation, is that each partner is severally liable for the wrongful acts and omissions of the partnership, and that he is bound to contribute to his copartners his proportionate share of any sum advanced by them to satisfy an enforceable demand against it. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Waller v. Keene

2. ““* * * So that, in this state, in an action by a married woman against her husband, based upon loss or damage occasioned by his negligent or wrongful act, her coverture at the time of the tort is a complete bar to the action, not because she was a married woman at the time of the tort, but because she was at that time married to the defendant; the effect of the Married Woman’s Acts in this state, as construed in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, supra, being merely to remove the disability which at common law prevented a married woman from suing in tort in her own name, but not to create in such cases as this a cause of action where none existed before.” (Italics added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ennis v. Donovan

3. ““The distinction between a plea in abatement and a plea in bar is that the former delays the suit, while the latter destroys the cause of action. It is said, generally, that a plea in abatement, to be good, must tender a better writ, but a plea in bar denies that the writ should have issued at all. A plea, therefore, which sets up matter which has in law merely the effect of postponing the enforcement of the right alleged in the declaration is necessarily in abatement, because it does not destroy, but only suspends the right of action, but one which alleges facts which negative the existence of any right of action must be in bar.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Southeast Securities Co. v. Christensen