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161 So. 2d 578

Docket No. 63-14.

Robinson v. State

Carlton ROBINSON, a/k/a Robbie Robinson, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 10, 1964.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1964-03-10

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Where there is simply a doubt, as here, that an accused has been prejudiced by a remark of the court, we must grant him a new trial.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Thomas v. State, Beckham v. State

“[t]he dominant position occupied by a judge in the trial of a cause before a jury is such that his remarks or comments, especially as they relate to the proceedings before him, overshadow those of the litigants, witnesses and other court officers. Where such comment expresses or tends to express the judge's view as to the weight of the evidence, the credibility of a witness, or the guilt of an accused, it thereby destroys the impartiality of a trial to which the litigant or accused is entitled.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 711 So. 2d 225 - Acosta v. State

Relies on 109 So. 2d 422 - Hamilton v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1964-03-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently January 2003

18 state decisions

10019641970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*579 Henry R. Carr and William B. Seidel, Miami, for appellant.

¶2James W. Kynes, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Leonard R. Mellon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

¶3Before BARKDULL, C.J., and TILLMAN PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5The appellant was convicted of unlawful possession and dispensing of marijuana.

¶6During the course of the defendant's trial, by jury, appellant's counsel was cross-examining a state witness when the court made the following remark:

"The witness Tymes is an honest, poor man, who has had a very hard time getting an education. He is not as well educated as we are and for that reason his answers may not appear to be like those of an educated man. He is doing the best he can."

¶7Counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial, for the reason that this remark constituted a comment by the court upon the veracity of the witness. Appellant contends the denial of this motion was reversible error; we agree.

¶8The comment, by the court, in regard to the witness went into that realm where the jury could have been persuaded, by virtue of the judge's comment, to rely on this witness's veracity. The comment amounted to the judge vouching for the witness's character. In Hamilton v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 422, 424-425, Judge Horton pointed out the dangers involved in such a situation:

"The dominant position occupied by a judge in the trial of a cause before a jury is such that his remarks or comments, especially as they relate to the proceedings before him, overshadow those of the litigants, witnesses and other court officers. Where such comment expresses or tends to express the judge's view as to the weight of the evidence, the credibility of a witness, or the guilt of an accused, it thereby destroys the impartiality of a trial to which the litigant or accused is entitled."

¶9We do not say that the trial judge's comment in this case amounted to any preference, or even an indication of such, but it could have been so interpreted, and on that possibility we must reverse for a new trial. Where there is simply a doubt, as here, that an accused has been prejudiced by a remark of the court, we must grant him a new trial.

¶10Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

¶11Reversed and remanded.

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