¶1ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶2Appellant insists that the judgment entered against him on November 8,th was void because entered in his absence, and being void the court was without authority to thereafter, on November 12th, set aside the judgment and enter judgment against him in his presence.
¶3The judgment entered on November 8th was not void because rendered and entered in the absence of the appellant. In Ex parte Gibson, 137 Texas Cr. Rep. 72, 128 S.W. 2d 396, it was held that under Art. 766, V.A.C.C.P., a judgment follows the verdict as a matter of law and is the declaration of the result of the trial rather than a part of the trial itself where the presence of the defendant is required.
¶4The record shows that the action of the court setting aside the judgment of November 8th and rendering and entering judgment on November 12th was within the term in which the judgment was entered and before appellant gave notice of appeal. Being within the term, the court had full power and control over the judgment entered and authority to correct, modify or set the same aside. 12 Texas Jur., p. 736, Sec. 366; Williams v. State, 145 Texas Cr. R. 536, 170 S.W. 2d 482.
¶5Appellant further insists that the former misdemeanor conviction relied upon by the state is void because the judgment entered in the proceedings did not describe the offense for which he was adjudged to be guilty. This contention is without merit. The complaint and information in the case in which the judgment was rendered show that appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated. The judgment in a misdemeanor case is not required to describe the offense for which the defendant *411is adjudged to be guilty. Fowler v. State, 144 Texas Cr. R. 382, 162 S.W. 2d 969.
¶6The motion for rehearing is overruled.
¶7Opinion approved by the Court.