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← 161 Wis. 2d 150 - Loveridge v. Chartier

161 Wis. 2d 150 - Loveridge v. Chartier’s Empirical Analysis

1991

Citation profile

73
cited by 73 later decisions
5
states following
January 2023
most recently cited

7 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 73 later decisions — most recently January 2023 · most notably 222 Wis. 2d 475 - A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Insurance (1998), Strenke v. Hogner (2005)

7 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

4101991200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 136 Wis. 2d 304 - Green Spring Farms v. Kersten · 117 Wis. 2d 529 - Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board · 93 Wis. 2d 433 - Wirth v. Ehly · 97 Wis. 2d 260 - Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. · 119 Wis. 2d 722 - Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “if the degree of certainty that the conduct will cause injury is sufficiently great to justify inferring intent to injure as a matter of law.”
    13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the defendant knows, or should have reason to know, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm, but also that there is a strong probability, although not a substantial certainty, that the harm will result but, nevertheless, he proceeds with his conduct in reckless or conscious disregard of the consequences.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A] court cannot infer intent to injure as a matter of law merely because the insured's intentional act violated the criminal law. Raby and Poston stand for the proposition that an insured's conviction of a crime gives rise to an inference that the insured intended injury as a matter of law in only two situations: (1) if intent to injure is an element of the crime, Poston, 107 Wis. 2d at 219 , and (2) if the crime in question involves the insured's committing an intentional act that carries with it "a substantial risk of injury or death," Raby, 153 Wis. 2d at 114 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.