State v. Bitting’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 176 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 180 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * If the statute does not include intent or knowledge as an element of the crime, their proof is not necessary.” State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1 , 291 A.2d 240, 242 (1971).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Capshaw v. State · State v. Butkus

2. ““When a mental element is a constitu-tent of a crime, the character of that element must be identified. In determining which of these crimes require proof of a general intent and which require proof of a specific intent, the language chosen by the legislature in enacting a particular statute is significant. When the elements of a crime consist of a description of a particular act and a mental element not specific in nature, the only issue is whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. If he did so intend, he has the requisite general intent for culpability. When the elements of a crime include a defendant’s intent to achieve some result additional to the act, the additional language distinguishes the crime from those of general intent and makes it one requiring a specific intent. (Emphasis supplied) General Statutes § 53-16 defines aggravated assault as simply “an assault upon another with any deadly . weapon.” It contains no language of intent, as do other classifications, such as General Statutes § 53-15, assault with acid on other burning substance; § 53-28, assault with intent to rob; § 53-239, assault with intent to commit rape; § 53— 240, assault with intent to carnally know a female child. The repeated references to intent in several sections relating to different crimes, and its omission in § 53-16, does not indicate a legislative intent that aggravated assault be characterized as a specific intent crime. Aggravated assault is simply a common-law assault ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Harrell v. State

3. “The trial court's decision to deny the motion to exclude a witness' prior record when offered to attack his credibility will be upset only if the court abused its discretion. In determining whether there has been an abuse, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Shaw