Volume 162 — Indiana Reports

<p>From Brown Circuit Court; W. J. Buckingham,, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Arthur L. Gray against John B. Seitz. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Erom Starke Circuit Court; T. F. Hoxoard, Special Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jacob A. Cannon against Andrew O. Castle-man. Erom. a judgment for defendant, plaintiii appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Blackford Circuit Court; JE. G. Vaughn, Judge. Suit by Riley R. Gadbury and another against the Ohio'& Indiana Consolidated Natural and Illuminating Gas Company to quiet title. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court, under subdivision 2, §1337j Burns 1901.

<p>From Marshall Circuit Court; A. C. Gapron, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Harriet B. West against John B. W. Giller. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Boone Circuit Court; B. S. Higgins, Judge. Action by the Long & Allstatter Company against Edward Barnes and another. From a judgment in favor of defendants; plaintiff appeals. Transferred from the Appellate Court, under §133^ Burns 1901.

<p>Trial. — Answers to Interrogatories. — Conclusion.—A finding by the jury in answer to an interrogatory in an action on a promissory note that plaintiff purchased the note in suit in the usual course of business,' is nothing more than a conclusion, and is not a finding of a particular question of fact as contemplated and provided by §555 Burns 1903. p. 29.</p> <p>Bills and Notes. — Fraud.—Notice by Indorsee. — Trial.—Answer to Interrogatory. — An indorsee in an action on a promissory note is not entitled to a judgment as against a general verdict for defendant, where the jury found in answer to an interrogatory that plaintiff “ had notice and knew ” at the time he purchased the note that it was procured by fraud, as alleged in defendant’s answer, pp. 29, 30.</p> <p>Appeal and Error. — Bill of Exceptions. — Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Pr'opria Sua Causa. — A bill of exceptions settled and signed by a judge who Fad been one of appellant’s attorneys in the trial of the cause can not be regarded as a part of the record, pp. 30, 31.</p>

<p>Cokvebsion. — Complaint.—A complaint in an action for damages for conversion alleging that “on or before” a certain date the plaintiff tvas the owner and in possession of the property in controversy “to the value of $600,” and that “on or about” that date the defendant converted the same to his own use, sufficiently shows that the plaintiff was the owner of the property at the time of the alleged conversion, and that the property.was of some value.</p>

From Laporte Circuit Court; A. G. Capron, Special Judge. Suit for injunction by Emmet II. Scott and others against the city of Laporte and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Rewabds. — Pleading.—Elections.—Bribery.—A complaint in an action to recover a reward provided by statute need not aver .that plaintiff rendered the services with a knowledge that the reward was offered, or with an intention to recover the same. p. 62.</p> <p>Elections. — Bribery.—Bernard for Furnishing Evidence. — Neither the vote buyer nor the vote seller is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of 52330 Burns 1901 that “ any person or persons having knowledge or information o£ the violation of the provisions of this act, who shall procure or furnish or cause to be procured or furnished the testimony necessary to secure a conviction of” any person who sells, barters or offers to sell or barter his vote, or offers to refrain from voting, shall be entitled to a reward of $100, payable out of the treasury of the county, and the vote buyer can not rapover said reward although he furnished the testimony which secured the conviction of the vote seller, pp. 62-69.</p> <p>Pleading. — Answer.—"Where a paragraph of answer alleges facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the action, the mere fact that it purports to be only a partial answer does not render it insufficient as to such part. p. 69.</p>

<p>Statutes. — Amendment.—Title.—Constitutional Law. — Under §21, article 4, of the Constitution, as construed, which requires the title of an act amended to he set out in full, an act seeking to amend an act having for its title “-An act to establish a state board of health, defining its powers and duties, providing a system of registration, and report of vital and sanitary statistics in connection therewith, and prescribing the duties of certain officers in relation thereto; providing for town, city and county hoards of health, prescribing penalties for tbe violation of the provisions thereof, fixing an appropriation for the expenses of the same, repealing acts in conflict therewith, and declaring an emergency” which omits from the title of the amendatory act the words “providing for town, city and county boards of health, prescribing penalties for the violation of the provisions thereof ” is invalid, pp. 70-72.</p> <p>Elections. — Statutory Provision as to Time. — Directory Only. — Health Boards. —The provision of section eight of the act of 1891 (Acts 1891, p. 15) that the board of county commissioners “shall annually at their first meeting in December, elect a secretary, who shall be the executive officer of the board who shall serve as such health officer for one year from the first of January next ensuing his election” is directory only as to the time of performance, pp. 72-73.</p> <p>Same. — Health Boards. — Secretary.—Where the hoard of commissioners failed to elect a secretary of the board of health at their first meeting in December as provided by the act of 1891 (Acts 1891, p. 15), and postponed such election until their meeting on the 5th day of the next month, the person so elected was entitled to the office from and after his election and qualification for the remainder of the term of office. pp. 73, 74.</p>

<p>From Superior Court of Allen County; J. H. Aiken, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Frances M. Howe against Edward White and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under clause 2, §1337j Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Henry Circuit Court; W. O. Barnard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Marion S. Foreman against the Indianapolis & Greenfield Rapid Transit Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>Constitutional Law. — Act of 1889 to Prevent Blacklisting. — Provision not Embraced in Title. — The act of March 9, 1889, 'entitled “An act for the protection of discharged employes, and to prevent blacklisting,” in so far as it applies to employes who have voluntarily left the master’s employment, is invalid, such provision not being embraced in the title. pp. 103-105.</p> <p>Pleading. — Complaint.—Failure to Plead Substantive Pacts. — General allegations in a complaint, that defendant caused the plaintiff to be discharged from, employment he had obtained, and had prevented him from obtaining employment, are but conclusions of the pleader, and state no cause of action, p. 105.</p> <p>Libel. — Complaint.—“Labor Agitator.” — “ Blacklisting.” — In an action for libel a complaint charging that defendant by whom plaintiff had previously been employed bad “ blacklisted ” plaintiff, and accused him with being a “labor agitator” is not sufficient, in the absence of aver.ments that the words “ labor agitator” bore an actionable meaning, or that “blacklisting” imputed to plaintiff the commission of crime or other conduct exposing him to public hatred, punishment, disgrace, or derision, p. 106.</p> <p>Tobt. — Preventing One from Obtaining Employment. — Complaint. — A complaint charged that the defendant railroad company prevented plaintiff from being employed by a certain other railroad company, by stating upon inquiry from such other company that plaintiff was a labor agitator, and was an active member of a certain labor organization. Held, that the complaint was not sufficient to charge a common law liability for interference with plaintiff’s occupation, p. 107.</p>

<p>Limitation oy Actions. — Action for Personal Injuries.- — Paragraph of Cernir plaint Filed after Two Tears. — In an action against a railroad company based upon the employers’ liability act, and brought within the time limited, by law, the complaint charged defendant’s engineer with affirmative negligence in applying the steam and causing the locomotive to back. After the expiration of the period of limitations an additional paragraph was filed charging negligent acts of omission on the part of the engineer in the manner of adjusting the machinery of the locomotive. During the trial the first paragraph was dismissed and a verdict returned on the additional paragraph. Held, that the statute of limitations had not run, the cause of action being the same in both paragraphs. pp. 109, 110.</p> <p>Raiukoads. — Injuip to Employe. — Pules.—Construction.—Ejusdem Qeneris.— Evidence. — A rule of a railroad company providing that enginemen . “must not leave their engine with steam on unless it is in charge of an employe of this company. When it is placed upon a siding, or elsewhere, to stand, the throttle must be fastened shut, the reverse lever fixed on the center, and the tender brakes must be shut tight,” has no application to a locomotive engine while under the direct and immediate control of its engineer; nor has the rule any application to a locomotive which the engineer had brought to a temporay stop upon a main track, since the words “or elsewhere” must be construed to refer to things of the same kind as the word “siding.” pp. 110-112.</p> <p>Same.' — Injury to Fireman. — - Negligence of Engineer. — Employers’ Liability Act. — Under the employers’ liability act (27083 Burns 1901), a railroad company is liable for injuries to a fireman while his locomotive was taking coal, although the fireman had authority to indicate to the engineer where to stop the locomotive, when the injury was caused by the negligence of the engineer in charge of the locomotive in permitting it to move while the eoal was being taken, pp. 113, 114.</p> <p>Customs am Usages —Practice an to Position Taken by Firemen when Locomotive is Coaling. — Evidence.—In an action against a railroad company for injuries to a fireman resulting from the negligence of the engineer in permitting his locomotive to move while coaling, it is competent for the plaintiff to prove a custom or practice among the company’s firemen as to the position occupied at the particular coaling place by firemen while running with the particular engineer, where it is necessary to show that the engineer had notice of the fact. p. 114.</p>

<p>Negligence. — Complaint.—In an action for negligent injuries, it is not essential that the complaint to be good upon demurrer should specify with any great degree of particularity the elements entering into the cause of action, pp. 118, 119.</p> <p>Master and Servant. — Personal Injuries. — Negligence.—Proximate Cause. —Miners.—Where a eager in a coal mine was, in the performance of his duty, upon the cage, loading a car of coal upon the cage to be hoisted, and the engineer, without waiting for a signal, as required by the rules of the company, negligently started his engine and rapidly hoisted the cage into the mouth of the shaft, and against its timbers and sides, thereby injuring the eager, the negligence of the engineer was the proximate cause of the injury, pp. 119, 120.</p> <p>Appeal and Error. — General Verdict. — Answers to Interrogatories. — Conflict. —The general verdict is conclusive on appeal unless there is a real and substantial conflict in some vital particular between it and the facts found, or some of them, which can not be avoided or explained by any reasonable intendment or inference, and by which the general verdict is necessarily overthrown, pp. 120, 121.</p> <p>Evidence. — Inferences.—Master and Servant. — Negligence.—In an action for personal injury of a eager in a coal mine, caused by the premature hoisting of the cage, it was shown that the engineer was intemperate, careless, and frequently hoisted the cages without being notified by signal so to do. There was no direct proof that the engineer started the engine at the time the cage was hoisted and the plaintiff was injured, but it was shown that the cage was suddenly hoisted without previous signal. The engineer testified that the engine' was standing still, and attempted to account for the upward movement of the cage on the theory that it was overbalanced by the empty cage at the top of the shaft suspended by a reverse wire. There was no evidence that anything of this kind ever happened before. Held, that the jury was justified in concluding that the engine was carelessly started by the engineer, pp. 122-124.</p>

<p>Elections. — Vote Selling. — Prosecution.—Reward.—One who violates, or procures, counsels or causes to bo violated any of the provisions of . §2329 Burns 1901, is not entitled to the reward provided by §2330 Burns 1901 for furnishing testimony necessary to secure a conviction of any person who sells, barters, or offers to sell his vote.</p>

From Superior Court of Madison County; S. C. Ryan, Judge. Action by tlie State, on the relation of Lavina Rife, against Isaac E. May, clerk of tbe Madison Circuit Court. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>From Howard Circuit Court; J. F. Flliott, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Hannah E. Mendenhall and others against the Diamond Plate Glass Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, they appeal.</p>

<p>From Grant Circuit Court; II. J. Paulas, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Clinton Wliisler against David Wliisler and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

From Howard Superior Court; Hiram, Brownlee, Judge. Action by Anna E. Hancock and husband against the Diamond Plate Glass Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Transferred from the Appellate Court, under. §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Erom Kosciuslco Circuit Court; J. D. Ferrall, Judge.</p> <p>■ Suit by Ellen Emmons against Oscar A. Harding and wife.. Erom a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Warrick Circuit Court; E. M. Swan, Judge. Action by Louis J. Meyer and others against the town of Boonville and others- From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Erom Allen Circuit Court; Edward O'Rourke, Judge.</p> <p>Charles ~W. Dunn was convicted of murder in the first degree and he appeals.</p>

<p>Highways. — Purchase of Toll Roads. — Act of 1895. — Repair of Purchased Roads Must be by County Commissioners. — Under the act of March 9,1895, authorizing county commissioners to purchase toll roads, and providing that when any such road is purchased and conveyed to the county it “shall thenceforth be free, and shall be kept in repair, as provided by law for the repair of other roads,” the words “other roads” mean other free roads of the same class, pp. 184-193.</p> <p>Same. — Duty of County Commissioners to Repair Free Qravel Roads Purchased Under Act of 1895. — Mandamus.—Under the act of March 11, 1901, constituting the board of commissioners of each county a board of free turnpike directors, and vesting in them the exclusive control and management of such roads, it is the duty of such hoard to take charge of and repair roads purchased pursuant to the act of March 9, 1895; and upon their failure to do so mandamus will lie. pp. 185-193.</p>

<p>From Rush Circuit Court; Douglass Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William J. Hayes and others against the School City of Rushville and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>From Elkhart Circuit Court; J. D. Ferrad, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John F. Scott against the city of Goshen and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>DrvonCE. — Indefinite Order for Payment of Alimony. — In a suit for divorce, an order directing the defendant to pay into the office of the clerk of the court for the use of the plaintiff the sum of $4 per week until further, order of the court does not conform to the statute, §1059 Burns 1901.. pp. 211, 212.</p> <p>Same. — Judgment for Alimony. — Contempt.—A judgment for alimony is not enforceable by contempt proceedings, p. 212.</p>

<p>From Marion Criminal Court (33,839); Fremont Alford, Judge.</p> <p>William Potter was convicted of manslaughter and appeals.</p>

From Grant Superior .Court; R. T. St. John, Special Judge. Action by the State, on the relation of Rosella Boone and others, against James M. McCarty and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appealed. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Contracts. — Consideration.—Mutuality.—Term of Existence. — A contract between a land company and a real estate agency whereby the latter was to take charge of the real estate of the former and sell and dispose of the same at such prices as might be deemed advantageous, for which the land company agreed to pay a commission of ten per cent, on all sales, and to locate factories upon the land upon such terms as should thereafter be agreed upon, is not invalid for want of consideration, mutuality, or lack of definite term of existence, pp. 224-226.</p> <p>Appeal and Error. — Interrogatories to Jury. — Where, in support of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the general verdict, only a part of the interrogatories and answers are set out in the briefs, the Supreme Court will consider only those thus pointed out. pp. 226, 227.</p> <p>Same. — Verdict.—Answers to Interrogatories. — Conflict.—The special findings of the jury in answer to interrogatories will not prevail against the general verdict unless the facts so found when considered of themselves, and after indulging all reasonable presumptions against them, are found inherently so repugnant and inconsistent with the general verdict, supported by all reasonable intendments, that they can not be reconciled therewith, and one or the other is necessarily erroneous, p. 228.</p> <p>Appeal.— Verdict. — Answers to Interrogatories. — Presumptions.—Any fact that might have been proved under the issues must he considered as proved in determining the legal force of answers to interrogatories as against the general verdict, p. 228.</p> <p>Contracts. — Agency.—Partnership.—A contract with a firm of real estate agents, consisting of two members, to sell town lots and assist in locating factories, at a fixed commission for such sales, and a price to be afterward determined by the parties for the location of factories, is not rendered unenforceable by reason of the fact that but one member of the firm conducted the business, where it was not stipulated in the contract whether the business of the agency should be conducted immediately and personally by both or either of the partners, pp. 228-230.</p> <p>Principal and Agent. — Partnership.—Assignment of Agency. — The assent by the principal to the assignment of a contract of agency is equivalent to an agreement to substitute the assignee as agent, p. 230.</p> <p>Trial. — Answers to Interrogatories. — Appeal and Error. — A special interrogatory which was answered by the jury: “Evidence not conclusive,” will be treated as left wholly unanswered, p. 230.</p> <p>Principal and Agent. — Partnership.—Assignment of Agency. — "Where a firm consisting of two members entered into a contract for the sale of certain town lots and thereafter one member of the firm assigned his interest in the contract to the other, and the assignee continued to sell lots and make reports thereof in his individual name for a period of seven months, which were received by the principal without objection, such acceptance amounted to a ratification of the assignment, pp. 230, 231.</p> <p>Trial. — Jury.—Impaneling Special Jury. — Discretion of Court. — Appeal and Error. — Where a cause was set for trial on a certain day in the next term of court and it appeared when the cause was called for trial that the jury had not been summoned to appear until two days later, the action of the court in calling a special jury from the bystanders, over the defendant’s objection, was not reversible error, since it will be presumed that the court had justifiable cause for ordering the special jury. pp. 231-233.</p>

From Cass Circuit Court; D. H. Chase, Judge. Action by Dora M. Seivers, administratrix of the estate of Deleno Gaby, deceased, against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

From Clinton Circuit Court; J. V. Kent, Judge. Action by Harry S. Couchman, administrator of the estate of John 8. Couchman, deceased, against Cyrus A. Prather and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Appealed from Appellate Court, under subdivision three, §1337j Burns 1901.

Prom Delaware Circuit Court; J. G. Leffler, Judge. Proceeding by Amos L. Eallis and others to ascertain and have entered of record a certain highway to which John ~W. McCreery and others entered objections. Prom a judgment of the circuit court in favor of petitioners, John W. McCreery appeals.

From Posey Circuit Court; William Louden} Special Judge. Suit by William A. McGregor and others against Louis Lengelsen and another- to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. From a judgment for plaintiffs, Edward Lengelsen appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>From "Wells Circuit Court; J. M. Smith, Special Judge.</p> <p>Action by Lovina Sparks and husband against William S. Smith. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Bartholomew Circuit Court; F. T. Hord, Judge. Action by the board of trustees of the school town of Crothersville against John Krause and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court, under subdivision 2, §1337j Burns 1901.

<p>New Tbial. — Newly Discovered Evidence. — Diligence.—A new trial will not he granted on the ground oí newly discovered evidence as to the previous history, habits, and moral character of a witness, where the only excuse shown for the failure to produce the evidence at the trial was the fact that the witness had at different times been known by different names. - p. SOO.</p> <p>Same. — Newly Discovered Evidence. — Impeachment of Witness. — A new trial will not be granted to enable the defendant to procure evidence to contradict or impeach a witness, p. SOO.</p> <p>Same. — Neidy Discovered Evidence. — Affidavit of Witness. — A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence should be accompanied by the affidavits of the witnesses by whom the new matter is to be proved, or an excuse for the failure so to do. p. 300.</p> <p>Homicide. — Self-Defense.-—Defending Relative. — Instruction.—In a prosecution for homicide, the evidence showed that the deceased retreated as far as it was possible, and was calling upon a sister of defendant to desist from stoning him, when defendant, who had not been present and knew nothing of the difficulty, attacked deceased with a knife inflicting a mortal wound. Held, that the court properly refused to give an instruction relating solely to the right of defendant to defend a relative from an unlawful attack, pp. 301, 302.</p>

From Fulton Circuit Court; A. C. Capron, Judge. Suit by the Wabash Railroad Company against the Cincinnati, Richmond & Muncie Railroad to enjoin defendant from constructing a crossing over plaintiff’s l’oad. From the action of the court in granting a temporary restraining order, defendant appeals.

<p>From Monroe Circuit Court; J. B. Wilson, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Perry School Township against Samuel M. Kerr, auditor of Monroe county. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>From Superior Court of Madison County; H. G. Ryan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph L. Iligley and others against Patrick T. O’Brien. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Grant Circuit Court; II J. Paulus, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Joseph W. Littlor against the Consumers Gas Trust Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>Appeal and Error. — Exception to Pleading. — The reservation of an exception to the action of the court in permitting defendant, during the trial, to file an additional paragraph of answer is not properly shown by recital in the original bill of exceptions containing the evidence incorporated in the transcript, p. 330.</p> <p>Tender. — Refusal.—Objections.—Where a tender was refused because it was insufficient in amount, without objection to the kind of money the tender was sought to be made, and the money offered was shown to be money of the United States, the tender will be held sufficient though it is not shown that money offered was legal tender, pp. 330, 331.</p>

<p>Wills. — Life Estate. — Vesting of Fee. — Light of Lemainderman to Defend.— Where a will gave testator’s widow a life estate and provided that after her death the remaining real estate should be sold by the executor and after the payment of certain small legacies the balance of the proceeds should be divided among testator’s children, the title to the real estate during the life of the widow was in the beneficiary children, who could convey the estate, and a purchaser thereof was entitled to defend the estate against all persons but the life tenant and tlie right of the executor to sell it when the contingency arose, pp. 335, 336. ,</p> <p>Estoppel. — Acquiescence by Landoumer in Construction of Lailroad. — Where the owner of a remainder in real estate with the right to defend the estate stood by, ¡without protest or complaint, while an electric road was constructed across the real estate, he cau not, after the completion and operation of the road for a period of five years, recover the possession of the land. pp. 336, 337.</p> <p>Same — Acquiescence by Landoumer in Construction of Lailroad. — Public Policy. —Eminent Domain. — The doctrine that a landowner who stands by, without objection, and permits an electric railroad to be constructed across his real estate will be estopped from recovering possession of the. land, rests upon principles of public policy, and not upon the right of eminent domain, p. 337.</p>

<p>From Superior Court of Allen County; J. II. Aiken, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Andrews Land, Homo & Improvement Company against Ovid W. Conner. From a judgment for plaintiff', defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

Erom Steuben Circuit Court; P. V. Hoffman, Special Judge. Suit by Editb M. Hammond against William G. Croxton and others to quiet title. From a judgment in favor of defendant Croxton, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under subdivision 2 of §1337j Burns 1901.

Erom Allen Circuit Court; E. O’Rourke, Judge. Action by Frances E. Crow and others against Charles W. Branstrator, administrator of the estate of William Branstrator, deceased, and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Erom Hamilton Circrtit Court; 11. K. Kane, Special Judge. Proceeding by Erank H. Keiser and others for the construction of a ditch. William A. Mills and others remonstrated. Erom a judgment in favor of remonstrants, certain petitioners appeal.

From LaPorte Circuit Court; J. O. Richter, Judge. Aetiou by William Graham, administrator of the estate of James S. McGuire, deceased, against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>From Miami Circuit Court; J. T. Cox, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Cicero R. McBride against the National Masonic Accident Association. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1837u Burns 1901.</p>

From Vigo Circuit Court; J. E. Piety, Judge. Action by Kate Kidder against tbe Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. The court sustained a demurrer to defendant’s interpleader, and defendant appeals. Appealed from, Appellate Court, under subdivision 3, §1337j Burns 1901.

<p>Natural Gas. — Rights of Lessee. — Railroad Right of Way. — One who leases land for natural gas purposes is charged with notice of the rights of a railroad company occupying the premises as a right of way, and to the extent of a conflict between the terms of the lease and the rights of the railroad company the rights of the latter are paramount, p. 395.</p> <p>Adverse Possession. — Easement of Railroad. Right of Way. — Where a railroad company enters upon and occupies land only as a railroad right of way, the title acquired hy adverse possession is only an easement for the purposes of a right of way. pp. 395-397.</p> <p>Natural Gas. — Rights of Lessee. — Railroad Right of Way. — Injunction.— One holding a lease of land giving him the exclusive right to explore thereon for natural gas has such a proprietary interest in the land that he may enjoin a railroad company from sinking a well on a part of the land over which it has acquired an easement for a right of way. p. 397.</p> <p>Same. — Transportation of Natural Gas. — Increase of Flow. — The fact that a gas company was using a pumping station for the purpose of overcoming the friction incident to the flow of gas through many miles of pipe does not show a violation by the company of §7507 Burns 1901, where it is not shown that the gas pressure was increased, or that the pressure in the pipe exceeded 300 pounds to the square inch. p. 398.</p> <p>Injunction. — To Prevent Construction of Pipe Line over Railroad Right of Way. — The construction of a pipe line within the limits of a railroad right of way over lands leased for natural gas purposes will not be enjoined by the lessee, where the construction of the pipe line is almost completed, and about $5,000 expended thereon, since there is an adequate remedy at law. pp. 398, 399,</p>

From White Circuit Court; T. F. Palmer, Judge. Proceeding for the opening of a street in the town of Wolcott. An appeal was taken by the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of the town, the railroad company appeals.

<p>Erom Superior Court of Marion County (58,701); J. M. Leathers, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Erank II. Holland against tbe Lake Erie & "Western Railroad Company and others. Erom a judgment for plaintiff’ defendants appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1387o Burns 1901.</p>

From Delaware Circuit Court; J. G. Leffler, Judge. Action hy Thomas S. Guthrie against James Carpenter and others. From a judgment for plaintiff for less than the relief demanded, he appeals, transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Receivers. — Appointment.—Partnership.—Where in an action by a partner to obtain an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs the complaint charged, and the evidence established, that defendant was unnecessarily exposing the assets of the late firm to waste and loss, and misappropriating the assets, to the damage of plaintiff; that he had collected and refused to divide $308, and failed to charge himself on the books of the firm with the amount of the accounts he had collected; that he took notes of debtors of the firm payable to himself, to the exclusion of plaintiff, and sold the notes and appropriated the proceeds to his own use, the court was authorized to appoint a receiver, pp. 425-427.</p> <p>Same.- — Appointment.—Partnership.—Insolvency.—Where in an action by a partner for an accounting and settlement of the partnership it was alleged and proved tfyat the-defendant partner who had possession of the firm’s assets was exposing the same to waste and appropriating the firm’s property to his own use, the action of the court in appointing a receiver will not be reversed because of the failure of the proof to show that defendant was insolvent, p. 428.</p>

<p>Courts. — Town Clerk.Has Exclusive Jurisdiction of Prosecutions for Violations of Town Ordinances. — The circuit court had no jurisdiction of prosecutions for the violation of town ordinances, except when appealed from the judgment of the town clerk, after the act of 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 57, 22 4346-4346d Burns 1901) creating the court of town clerk and giving such court exclusive jurisdiction of prosecutions for violations of town ordinances went into effect, p. 429.</p> <p>Same. — Jurisdiction.—Appeal.—Where the court from which the appeal is taken had no jurisdiction of an action to recover a penalty for the violation of a town ordinance, the Supreme Court on appeal therefrom has no power to determine the validity of the ordinance, p. 429.</p>

<p>From Whitley Circuit Court; J. W. Adair, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Samuel Hamilton against David Hamilton and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>Erom Superior Court of Madison County; JET. G. Ryan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Valentine Liebler against the city of Alexandria. Erom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Jay Circuit Court; J. M. Smith, Judge. Action by Barton W. Quinn, administrator of tbe estate of Robert A. Boblett, deceased, against tbe Chicago & Erie Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Appeal and Ebbob. — Assignment of Error. — New Trial. — Partition.—Independent assignment of errors on appeal from a partition proceeding that the court erred in refusing to give appellants a trial of the issues joined on the pleadings, and in rendering judgment against appellants, over their objections, without hearing any evidence on the issues formed in said cause, can not be considered on appeal, since such questions refer to matters which must be presented to the trial court by a motion for a new trial, and the ruling of the court thereon assigned as error on appeal. pp. 450, 451.</p> <p>Same. — New Trial. — Partition.—Where the issues in a partition proceeding ■¡vere submitted to the court for trial, an interlocutory judgment for partition rendered and commissioners -appointed, and the report of commissioners made at the succeeding term of court, to which exceptions were filed, a motion for a new trial filed at the next term-of court was too late under ?570 Burns 1901. p. 451.</p> <p>Appeal and Ebeoe. — Partition.—Motion to Set Aside lieport of Commissioners. — Where the grounds of a motion to set aside the report of commissioners in a partition suit required proof to sustain them, and no evidence was given in support of said grounds of objection, the action of the court in overruling the motion can not be reviewed on appeal. p. 451.</p>

From Cass Circuit Court; B. JET. Chase, Judge. Suit by the Central Bermudez Company against Lizzie W. Brown and husband to enforce a street improvement assessment. From a judgment for plaintiff, defend- ‘ ants appeal.

From Boone Circuit Court; J. L. Clark, Special Judge. Proceeding by the Lafayette & Indianapolis Rapid Railway Company against Charles F. Butner and others to condemn lands for right of way. From an order denying an application by the railroad company for the appointment of appraisers, it appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Railroads. — Trespassers.—A boy eight years of age, who climbed upon a box-car, without invitation, to watch a sale of wild horses in an adjoining'lot, was a trespasser, p. 468.</p> <p>Same. — Trespassers.—The law does not require a railroad company to search for trespassers on its cars standing upon side-tracks before moving the cars. pp. 468, 469.</p> <p>Same. — Injury to Trespasser. — A railroad company is not liable for an injury to' a trespasser unless it appears that it had knowledge of the situation of the trespasser in time to have prevented the injury, or that the injury was purposely or recklessly inflicted, p. 469.</p> <p>Death by Wrongful Act. — Evidence.—Where in an action for the death of a child it appeared that death was almost instantaneous, arid was' caused by bis fall from tbe top of a box-car, under the wheels of a moving train, a particular description of the various injuries was not material, and evidence of such injuries was properly excluded, p. 470.</p> <p>Railroads. — Injury to Trespasser. — In an action against a railroad company for the death of a boy caused by falling off a car on which he was standing watching a horse sale in an adjoining lot, evidence of a sale of horses at the same place on a former occasion which had the effect of attracting men and boys to that vicinity was properly refused, as it did not prove that defendant invited or' expected trespassers upon its property, or that it must have anticipated that the movement of cars on its tracks could not be carried on without special warning to persons who might congregate about the tracks, pp. 470, 471.</p> <p>Death by Wrongful Act. — Parent and Child. — Action far Death of Child. —Occupation and Financial Condition of Plaintiff. — Evidence.—Harmless Error. — Where the facts proved did not make defendant liable in an action by a parent for the death of his child, the refusal of the court to admit evidence of the occupation of plaintiff, and the value of his property, was harmless, p. 471.</p>

<p>Elections. — Contests.—Appeal.—Contested Ballots as Exhibits in Special Findings. — Beviem.—Where the findings on appeal from an election contest consist merely of statements that certain ballots were cast at certain precincts, and protested, and counted for one or the other of the candidates, and the original ballots filed as exhibits, without the finding of any ultimate facts as to the condition of such ballots, there is no evidence before the Supreme Court from which it can determine whether the ballots were legal or illegal, pp. 472-480.</p> <p>Elections. — Contests.—Appeal.—Silence of Special Finding. — Presumption.:—■ Where the special finding of the court in an election contest, by reason of its indefiniteness, is silent as to the legality of a large number of ballots, and other facts Were found on which the conclusions of law were properly stated, it will be presumed, on appeal by the contestor, that the contestor having the burden of proof failed in respect to the facts upon which the special finding is silent, pp. 480, 481.</p>

<p>From Cass Circuit Court; J. M. Rabb, Special Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Lux & Talbott Stone Company against Albert U. Donaldson and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Lake Circuit Court; A. C. Gapron, Special Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Louis C. Breyfogle against Thomas H. Hall and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>From Wayne Circuit Court; H. C. Fox, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Frank W. Rinebart against George T. Eepler. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §133Yu Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Dubois Circuit Court; E. A. Ely, Judge,</p> <p>Action by Jabez O. Casto against John G-. Eigeman. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>From Gibson Circuit Court; O. M. Welborn, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Nugent Gravel Company against Anthony J. Klein. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under subdivision 2, §133Yj Burns 1901.</p>

<p>Er.om Lake Circuit Court; W. C. McMahan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Charles Berkes against the Republic Iron & Steel Company. From a judgment for plaintiff', defendant appeals. "Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>Infants. — Disaffirmance of Contract. — It is not necessary in order to give ■ effect to the disaffirmance of a contract by an infant that the other party be placed in statu quo. p. 528.</p> <p>Same. — Disaffirmance of Contract.— All voidable contracts by an infant in reference to personal property may be avoided by such infant at any time during his minority or on his arrival at full age. p. 528.</p> <p>Pbopebty. — Lease.—A lease of real estate for years is personal property. p. 528.</p> <p>Infants. — Removal of Disability. — Coverture.—Statutes.—The statutes which enlarge the power of married women to contract simply remove the disability of coverture, and the disability of infancy of infant married women is the same as if such statutes were not in force, p. 529.</p> <p>Infants. — 3£arriage.—Disability.—Termination of Guardianship. —Section 2G9Q Burns 1901 does not purport to remove the disability of infancy from an infant married woman when her husband is twenty-one years of age, but only terminates her guardianship and'authorizes her guardian to settle with the wife, with the assent of the husband, p, 529.</p> <p>Same. — Lease.—Disaffirmance.—An infant who with her adult husband has executed a lease of her land for a period of two years and received the first year’s rent during her minority, may, upon arriving at her majority, a few days after the commencement of the second year of said lease, disaffirm the same, and recover possession of the real estate, without restoring or offering to restore the rent received for the first year. pp. 528-530.</p>

<p>Erom Wells Circuit Court; E. G. Vaughn, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Eliza E. Tomlinson against William II. Tomlinson. Erom a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Marshall Circuit Court; Harry Bernetha, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Francis M. McCrory against William O’Keefe, treasurer of Marshall county. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.</p>

From Wabash Circuit Court; H. B. Shively, Judge. Action by the State, on the relation of Benjamin Heaston, drainage commissioner, against Eugene Ager. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

Erom Hamilton Circuit Court; J. F. Neal, Judge. Jamos E. Harrison was tried and acquitted on the charge ■of selling intoxicating liquors in a room not located on a street or highway as required by statute, and the State appeals.

From Howard Superior Court; Hiram Brownlee, Judge. Action by William J. Hayes and others against Enos A. Scott and wife. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Homicide. — Imohmtary Manslaughter. — Indictment.—An indictment charging one with involuntary manslaughter, under §1981 Burns 1901, must show that the accused was engaged in the commission of.some unlawful act from which the homicide in question resulted, p. 555.</p> <p>Same. — Involuntary Manslaughter.— Unlawful Act. — Pointing of Firearm.— Indictment. — An indictment charging involuntary manslaughter as a result of the pointing of a firearm, in violation of §2073 Burns 1901, is insufficient, where there is no allegation that the pointing of the firearm was purposely done. pp. 556-558.</p>

<p>From Delaware Circuit Court; J. G. Leffler, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Frank K. Davis against tbe Muncie Pulp Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u ' Burns 1901.</p>

From Marion Circuit Court (12,605); H. G. Allen, Judge. James Hoop filed an application for a license to sell intoxicating liquors in the town of Acton. From a judgment of the circuit court sustaining the action of the hoard of commissioners in refusing to strike a remonstrance from the files and to consider the application for a license, the applicant appeals.

From Huntington Circuit Court; J. C. Branyan, Judge. Action by the Union Traction Company of Indiana against Alfred Forst, executor of the last will and testament of Sarah Forst, deceased. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1887u Burns 1901.

<p>Status. — Legislature.—Apportionment of Members. — Judicial Question. — Constitutional Law. — When the validity of a legislative apportionment act is brought into dispute, the question becomes a judicial one, and the courts have the right to determine whether the discretion vested in the General Assembly has been exercised according to the restrictions put upon it by the Constitution, pp. 576, 577.</p> <p>States. — Legislature.—Apportionment of Members. — Light to Maintain Suit. — ■ A legal voter of the State at the time the last preceding enumeration of the male inhabitants for legislative purposes was taken may maintain suit to test the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly based thereon apportioning the number of senators and representatives of the State, though the wrong complained of does not exist in his own senatorial or representative district, p. 577.</p> <p>Same. — Legislature.—Apportionment of Members. — Parties to Suit. — The only defendants necessary to a suit to test the constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act are the clerk, sheriff, and auditor of the county in which the suit is brought, pp. 577, 578.</p> <p>Same. — Legislature.—Apportionment of Members. — Constitutional Law. — The. apportionment act of 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 358) failed to apportion a senator to four contiguous counties though such counties contained 1,766 inhabitants more than the senatorial unit of 13,886, but added another county to the district, which then contained an excess of 3,889. A county contiguous to the county thus added was given a senator, although it-lacked 2,599 inhabitants of the senatorial unit. The act contained other and similar inequalities. Held, that the act does not conform to the requirements of §§4 — 6, article 4, of the Constitution, and that the act is void. pp. 578-580.</p>

<p>From Montgomery Circuit Court; Jere West, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus by tlie State of Indiana, on the relation of "William E. Moore, against the Board of Commissioners of Clinton County. From a judgment for defendant, relator appeals.</p>

<p>Sales. — Contracts.—Cmstruction.—Plaintiff agreed to sell defendant its certain output of glass at prices at a certain per cent, lower than the lowest price of a certain named glass company in order to enable defendant to compete successfully with the customers of such glass company. Held, that it was no defense to a demand by defendant for a reduction of the price of the glass on account of rebates made by the company whose prices were adopted as a basis of computation that such rebates were not made in the ordiiiary course of trade, but for the purpose of preventing competition, pp. 609-611.</p> <p>Contbacts. — Construction.—Sales.—Defendant agreed to purchase of plaintiff all of its output of glass at a certain per cent, lower than the lowest price made by a certain named glass company, payment to be made by defendant on receipt of same, less two per cent. Held, that each shipment should be treated as a separate sale and transaction, the prices to be paid to be computed on the basis of the prices before established by the company whose prices were referred to, and that (defendant was not entitled to a rebate on the price of glass made by such company to its customers except upon glass delivered and accepted by him after the date of the rebate made by such company, pp. 611-615.</p> <p>Same. — Sales.—Evidence.—In an action to recover a balance alleged to be due plaintiff from defendant for glass sold by the former to the latter under a contract fixing the price at a certain per cent, lower than the lowest price of a certain glass company, certain circular letters issued by such company to its customers informing them of the prices of glass were properly admitted in evidence, pp. 615, 616.</p>

From Marion Circuit Court (10,699); II. C. Allen, Judge. Action by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company against Benjamin L. Webb, Sallie M. Webb, his wife, the State Bank of Indiana, and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, and for defendant State Bank of Indiana on its cross-complaint, Benjamin L. Webb and wife appeal. Appealed from the Appellate Court, under subdivision 3, §1337j Burns 1901.

<p>Estoppel. — Mortgage Foreclosure. — Sale of Sheriff’s Certificate. — The purchaser of property at foreclosure sale who, while he holds the sheriff’s certificate, and is in' full and complete possession, sells and delivers the propel^ with the consent and approval of the mortgagor, and receives the purchase price, is estopped to reclaim such property after receiving the sheriff’s deed.</p>

<p>Raiiroads. — Injury at Crowing. — Negligence.—Where one or more railroad tracks cross a public street of a city in a populous neighborhood, greater vigilance and care on the part of the company to avoid injuring persons using the street are required than at ordinary highway crossings in the country, or in sparsely settled and unfrequented places. p. 650.</p> <p>Same. — Injury at Crowing. — Double-Track Road. — Negligence.—A pedestrian at the crossing of a street and a double-track railroad in a populous city was waiting to cross as soon as a freight-train moving on one track in the opposite direction from a locomotive on the other, and obscuring the view and drowning the noise of the locomotive, should move off the crossing. When the freight-train had passed, the pedestrian, without notice or warning of the approach of the locomotive which was running at the rate of thirty miles an hour, started to cross, and was struck by the locomotive and killed. Held, that the railroad company was guilty of negligence, and that a complaint alleging such facts, and averring that the pedestrian was free from negligence, is sufficient on demurrer, pp. 650-654.</p> <p>Death by Wrongful Act. — Action by Parent for Death, of Child. — Amendment of Complaint Pending Trial. — Where a complaint by a parent for the death of his infant son alleges the age of the child, the relationship, that the child was healthy and strong, that plaintiff was entitled to his services, care, and custody, and that the child was killed by defendant’s negligence, to the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000, it is not an abuse of the court’s discretion to permit an amendment, after the argument to the jury has begun, alleging that, by reason of the death of the child, plaintiff was deprived of its services from the time of its death until it would have arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and would have been of the value of $10,000, where the evidence fully authorized the amendment, pp. 654, 655.</p> <p>Pleading.- — Amendment of Complaint Pending Trial. — The refusal to require plaintiff to refile his complaint after amendment pending trial is not ground for reversal, where defendant is permitted to file demurrers to the amended complaint, p. 655.</p> <p>Negligence. — Death by Wrongful Act. — Burden of Proving Contributory Pegligenee. — Instruction.—In an action by a parent against a railroad company for the death of his infant child, an instruction that “the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that plaintiff’s said son was guilty of such contributory negligence, if any there was, and that defendant must prove that fact by a fair preponderance of the evidence” is incorrect, but the defect therein is cured by another instruction charging the jury that contributory negligence may be made to appear by a preponderance of all the evidence given in the case. pp. 656, 657.</p> <p>Eailroads. — Crossing.—Duty to Warn Pedestrians. — It is the duty of á railroad company to give to a pedestrian at a street crossing timely warn-" ing of the approach of a train, even though such warning is not required by statute or ordinance, p. 657.</p> <p>Damages. — For Death of Child. — Measure of Damages. — In an action by a parent for the death of his infant son, an instruction that the plaintift could not recover “the value of the child’s services independent of the expense of caring for and maintaining the son during minority,” is not materially defective or misleading, p. 657.</p> <p>Same.— Wrongful Death of Child. — Measure of Damages. — In an action by a parent for the death of his infant son, it is proper to instruct the jury that the care which the law requires a child to exercise is according to his maturity, experience, and capacity, and that it is to be determined by the jury upon the proof of all the facts of the particular case. pp. 657, 658.</p>

<p>From Superior Court of Vanderburgh County; John U. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Louisa J. Cochran against Thomas Boleman and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §133^ Burns 1901.</p>

From Greene Circuit Court; O. B. Harris, Judge. Action by Iiomer Lowder and others against the Nor-dyke & Marmon Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant company appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>Municipal Coepobations. — Street Improvements. — Remonstrance.—Time of Filing. — A remonstrance against the improvement of a street not filed until after the improvement was “advertised for contract” is too late. pp. 668, 669.</p> <p>Same. — Street Improvements.— Ordinance. — Front-foot Rule.— An ordinance for a street improvement is not invalid because of a provision therein that the cost of the rvork should be assessed by the front-foot rule, since the ordinance must be read in connection with the statute, pp. 669, 670.</p>

<p>From Superior Court, of Vanderburgh County; John II. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Robert E. L.'Angel against Anua S. Taylor and another. Erom a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant Anna S. Taylor appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1387u Burns 1901.</p>

<p>From Miami Circuit Court; N. N. Antrim, Special Judge.</p> <p>Injunction proceeding by Winfield S. Sowers and another against the Cincinnati, Richmond & Muncie Railroad and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Erom the Decatur Circuit Court; Ben L. Smith, Special Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by Charles P. Miller and others against John II. Brown and others. Erom a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Rape. — Evidence.—Criminal Law. — Under (¡1875 Burns 1901, providing that proof of penetration shall be sufficient evidence of the commission of the offense of rape, a conviction will not be disturbed because of failure of proof of penetration in unambiguous terms, where the inference of pene- ' tration was the only one which would reasonably comport with the details of defendant’s conduct toward the prosecuting witness, pp. 689, 690.</p> <p>Criminal Law. — Failure of Proof of Age of Defendant. — A conviction for felony will not be reversed because no testimony was introduced to prove that defendant was over thirty years of age. p. 690.</p>

<p>Ei’om Tipton Circuit Court; James F. Elliott, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus, on the relation of Alexander C. Armstrong, against the Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Company. From a judgment for relator, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>From Cass Circuit Court; J. 31. Babb, Special Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Andrew J. Murdock against the Logansport, Rochester & Northern Traction Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>From Elkhart Circuit Court; J. 11 Ferrad, Judge.</p> <p>Petition of Samuel A. Collins against the Winona, Warsaw, Elkhart & South Bend Traction Compauy for a receiver. From an order appointing a receiver the defendant appeals.</p>

From Howard Superior Court; Iliram Brownlee, Judge. Action by Sarah J. Carr and another against the Diamond Plate Glass Company and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court,'under §1337u Burns 1901.

<p>From Boone Circuit Court; S. R. Artman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by James A. White against Clark L. Lindsay and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>From Dearborn Circuit Court; G. E. Downey, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Wm. H. O’Brien against John Ulrich and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>From Whitley Circuit Court; J. W. Adair, Judge.</p> <p>Action hy Edward Zumbrun against Nathan B. Moore and another. For a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>