¶1OPINION OF THE COURT
¶2The question presented is apparently one of first impression *240involving the applicability of CPLR 1008 to a third-party defendant who seeks dismissal of plaintiffs action for failure to prosecute (CPLR 3216). Section 1008 provides:
"Answer of third-party defendant; defenses
"The third-party defendant shall answer the claim against him by serving copies of his answer upon the third-party plaintiff. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff in his answer any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant shall have the rights of a party adverse to the other parties in the action, including the right to counter-claim, cross-claim and appeal. ” (Emphasis added.)
¶3Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. She sued defendant Spina, who in turn commenced a third-party action against Henry Jaeger, as Administrator of the estate of plaintiffs deceased husband. Plaintiffs husband was operating the automobile involved in the accident with Spina. Plaintiff was a passenger in her husband’s vehicle.
¶4The third-party defendant (hereinafter Administrator) served plaintiff with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 (b) (3) to resume prosecution of her action and to then serve and file a note of issue.
¶5In response plaintiffs counsel submitted his affidavit in which he set forth discovery problems sufficient to constitute a justifiable excuse. However, no evidence is presented of a "good and meritorious cause of action”.
¶6A denoted "courtesy copy” of the Administrator’s motion was apparently sent to Spina’s counsel. Spina has neither served a 90-day demand nor brought any motion against the plaintiff.
¶7While CPLR 1008 provides that the third-party defendant *241has the rights of a party adverse to the other parties, the motion must be denied because there must be service of the demand upon defendant/third-party plaintiff. (See, e.g., Juracka v Ferrara, 137 AD2d 921; Fichera v City of New York, 79 AD2d 597; Jones v First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 101 AD2d 1005; Mihaly v Mahoney, 126 AD2d 791.) Absence of such service is fatal to the Administrator’s motion since defendant/ third-party plaintiff is the only party asserting any claim against the Administrator.
¶8Plaintiff has subsequently filed a trial note of issue; the court will schedule a pretrial conference.
¶9 The demand was addressed to both plaintiffs counsel and defendant/ third-party plaintiffs counsel; the only proof of service submitted to the court was service upon the former. The demand provides that default in compliance "will serve as a basis for a motion by the third-party defendant for dismissal of the action as against him for unreasonably neglecting to proceed”. (Him obviously refers to third-party defendant.)