¶1The defendant, Robert Towle, appeals his conviction of four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632-A-.2 (2007) (amended 2008), and four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another, see RSA 626:8 (2007). He was charged "with engaging in fellatio and anal penetration with his minor son, J.T. He was also charged with committing the crime of criminal liability for the conduct of another by encouraging his wife to engage in three sexual acts with J.T., and by encouraging another adult woman to have sex with J.T. On appeal, the defendant argues that the Superior Court (Bomstein, J.) erred by denying his motions to proceed pro se and for a mistrial. We reverse and remand.
¶2I. Background
¶3At the final pre-trial conference on December 28, 2009, the defendant’s attorney, Lincoln T. Soldati, sought and received a continuance of the trial until January 25, 2010, to allow him to review new evidence with the defendant. Attorney Soldati then advised the court that the defendant was concerned that Attorney Soldati’s recent election as mayor of Somersworth created a conflict of interest. The following colloquy between the court and the defendant then occurred:
THE COURT:... What did you want to tell me about this Office of Mayor issue?
THE DEFENDANT: . . . [I]t would seem contrary to Mr. Soldati’s position of mayor to try to, you know, keep the community safe, you know, if I was exonerated from these charges. You know, it seemed like, well, he got a sex offender off back into the community. You know, it seems contrary to, you know, his goal as mayor and to have the confidence of his community behind him.
That only came to light — it’s not like, well he — you know, he got elected mayor and now it’s an issue. That is not how it is. What had come to mind is, is after he got appointed as counsel in August, it was early September he came and visited me at the prison.
He only came ... with this Court’s file that was handed to him with the indictments. We went over like my background, like *801education, family, you know, criminal history, . . . and we only generally and briefly touched about, you know, this case. Right? And then, you know, the visit was over.
The next I hear from him, right, in any form is ... nearly four months later, [when] I’m told that on the next business day I have a final pretrial conference, and then Wednesday we’re picking [the jury] ----
This was unexpected. I was not given any advance notice of [a] trial schedule. I had not met with counsel to discuss the case, to go over trial strategy, any evidence that I may have, expected witness testimony, what witnesses I intend to call. Any evidence whatsoever has not been discussed.
So when he informed me that we’re picking a jury on Wednesday and having the two-day trial, I was befuddled to imagine how counsel would expect to go ahead believing that this case would only involve two days, not knowing who to call for witnesses, or what to even ask the witnesses that are intended to be called, or what evidence I have to bring forward. . . .
I believe that counsel should have met with me to some degree instead of automatically assuming what the case is based solely upon information received from the prosecution. I believe that a continuance is necessary. And, Your Honor, I’m not looking forward to a continuance. I want this case over and done with. I want to present my defense, argue it, and move on with my life, and then my family can move on with their life. I’m only asking for a continuance just so long enough to gather my exculpatory evidence.
After that, Your Honor, let’s schedule it, let’s go to trial, let’s get it over and done with. I cannot go to trial with no prepared defense. And that’s where I stand today before this Court, with no prepared defense. So please, Your Honor, I’m only asking for a continuance just so long enough to gather my evidence, and also in which time I can review the case more thoroughly or even to... begin to review my case with counsel.
Also, and a note that I failed to mention that gave rise to a conflict is that when Attorney Soldati informed me, oh, yeah, you *802know, we haven’t discussed the case, but we’re going to trial...[,] I was under the impression he was going to sink my defense because it would be ludicrous for any attorney to go forward as such. So I was thinking he was going to sink my defense, go to trial, put on an effort like he gave a representation that was adequate enough, you know, just to sink the case so he can get that conviction so he did his community a favor, and the community around here. That’s what gave rise to it.
THE COURT: Okay. First, with respect to what I understand to be Mr. Towle’s motion to — for new counsel based on the — his alleged or perceived conflict of interest arising from defense counsel’s election as Mayor of Somersworth, I’m going to deny that motion to the extent that you’re requesting new counsel....
With respect to . . . Mr. Towle’s motion to continue, again, Mr. Soldati has represented that he can be prepared for trial by January 25th. That’s four weeks from now. It would certainly seem to be adequate time in which to prepare for trial and obtain whatever exculpatory evidence or other trial preparation is needed to be accomplished.
So to the extent that the defendant is making a motion for a further continuance beyond January 25th, that motion is denied as well.
¶4The court asked the prosecution and defense if they had anything further to discuss and hearing that neither did, concluded the hearing.
¶5The defendant then asked whether he could “move to correct.” When the court asked what he wanted to say, the defendant stated: “I was not requesting for a new appointment of counsel, Your Honor.” When the court asked why the defendant argued that Attorney Soldati had a conflict of interest, if not to request that new counsel be appointed, the defendant answered: “To proceed pro se, because I don’t want to be delayed with appointment of new counsel to go through all this over again, you know. So I’d like to have it amended that I was not asking for appointment of new counsel.” The court then said: ‘Well, at least at this stage — that’s fine. I mean, I’m not removing Mr. Soldati. If there’s some further motion dealing with anything, I will address it.”
¶7The defendant argues that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution by failing to treat his statements as a motion to proceed pro se. He asserts that because he timely and unequivocally invoked his constitutional right to self-representation and “[n]othing about the circumstances suggested that [he] was not making his request knowingly, intelligently, or without awareness of the dangers of self-representation,” the trial court erred by not permitting him to proceed pro se.
¶8We first consider the defendant’s arguments under the State Constitution, using federal cases only to aid our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 233 (1983). Both Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to self-representation and the right to counsel. State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 516 (2006); see State v. Barham, 126 N.H. 631, 636 (1985); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). The two rights are mutually exclusive; the exercise of one right nullifies the other. Ayer, 154 N.H. at 516.
¶9Because the two rights “are antithetical, and the exercise of one right nullifies the other[,]... we respect a waiver of the right to counsel only if the defendant has evinced an understanding of the right and has asserted an unequivocal desire to relinquish it.” State v. Panzera, 139 N.H. 235, 238 (1994) (citation omitted). Thus, to be effective, an assertion of the right to self-representation must be: (1) timely; (2) clear and unequivocal; and (3) knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Ayer, 154 N.H. at 516. The issue in this case is whether it was clear and unequivocal.
¶10While the dissent contends that whether a request for self-representation is clear and unequivocal is a question of fact, and, therefore, we review the trial court’s decision deferentially, the parties have not addressed this issue in their briefs. We need not decide the proper standard of review in this case because the defendant prevails under either a de novo or a deferential standard of review. See People v. Marshall, 931 P.2d 262, 274 (Cal. 1997).
¶11As we said in State v. Sweeney, 151 N.H. 666, 670 (2005), “To invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant need not recite some talismanic formula.” (Quotation omitted.) An affirmative, unequivocal, timely request will suffice. Here, there is no dispute that the defendant’s request was timely. Based upon this record, we conclude that the defendant’s request to represent himself was also affirmative and unequivocal, even though it was conditional. It was only after the court denied his request to *804dismiss his lawyer and 'to continue the case beyond January 25 that the defendant asked to represent himself. In other words, the defendant was essentially saying that if the court would not dismiss his lawyer or grant a continuance, then he wanted to represent himself.
¶12We adopt the approach of a number of courts, which have held that a conditional request is not equivocal. Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant is not deemed to have equivocated in his desire for self-representation merely because he expresses that view in the alternative [and] simultaneously requests the appointment of new counsel.”); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[The defendant] repeatedly indicated his desire to represent himself if the only alternative was the appointment of [the public defender]. While his requests no doubt were conditional, they were not equivocal.”); State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1990) (“The case law is clear that a request to proceed pro se is not equivocal merely because it is an alternative position, advanced as a fallback to a primary request for different counsel.” (quotation and brackets omitted)); Gallego v. State, 23 P.3d 227, 236 (Nev. 2001) (“[T]he district court erred in finding the request [to proceed pro se] equivocal simply because [the defendant] preferred to have new counsel”).
¶13Although a judge may deny a request to proceed pro se when it is “merely a tactic for delay,” United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2000), or an “impulsive response,” People v. Barnett, 954 P.2d 384, 411 (Cal. 1998) (quotation omitted), or is “made in passing anger or frustration ... or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice,” id. at 410 (quotation omitted), or is an insincere ploy to disrupt the proceedings, see Marshall, 931 P.2d at 274-75, the record in this case does not support such a conclusion. Here, faced with a timely, unequivocal and clear request to represent himself, the trial court’s failure to inquire further constituted structural error requiring automatic reversal and a new trial. State v. Ayer, 150 N.H. 14, 25 (2003).
¶14Because the defendant prevails on his state claims, we need not reach the federal issues. See Ball, 124 N.H. at 237. In light of our decision, we also need not address the defendant’s remaining arguments.
¶15Reversed and remanded.
¶16concurring specially. I join Justice Duggan’s opinion for the court, but write separately to address more fully the points raised by the dissent.
¶17*805The dissent asserts that there is record support for the implicit finding of the trial court that the defendant’s request for self-representation was “neither unequivocal nor sincere.” Post at 818. Even if one assumes that the trial court actually made such a finding sub silencio — a proposition I reject — I do not agree that the record is sufficient to support it.
¶18In support of its position, the dissent makes three basic points. First, it characterizes as specious the defendant’s claim that Attorney Soldati had a conflict of interest in representing him arising out of Soldati’s election as Mayor of Somersworth. However, the dissent does not clearly articulate what bearing it believes the merits of the defendant’s complaints against Soldati have on the question of whether his request for self-representation was clear and unequivocal. There are two possibilities. On the one hand, if the dissent means to suggest that the mere lack of merit of the defendant’s complaints against Soldati provides a justification for the trial court’s denial of his request to proceed pro se, such a theory is legally unsound.
¶19The defendant voiced two complaints about Attorney Soldati: (1) that Soldati had a conflict of interest because he was Mayor of Somersworth; and (2) that Soldati had not had sufficient meetings or communication with him and was not adequately prepared for trial. When, at the outset of the colloquy, the trial court understood the defendant to be seeking to discharge Soldati and replace him with new counsel, it was entirely appropriate for the court to assess the merits of the defendant’s complaints against Soldati and to deny the request if it found, as it did, that there was no good reason to remove Soldati. This follows from the well-established principle that, while an indigent defendant has the right to constitutionally effective representation by court-appointed counsel, he has no right to insist on the appointment of any particular attorney. See State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 517 (2006). However, once the defendant “corrected” the record to indicate that he wanted to remove Soldati so he could represent himself, the situation changed significantly. See State v. Flanagan, 978 A.2d 64, 80 (Conn. 2009) (“[D]efendant’s right to self-representation raises distinctly different, and more compelling, concerns than does his right to replace competent counsel....”). This results from the fact that, under Faretta v. California, a defendant need not have a good reason for desiring to represent himself. See Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 884 (1975) (“[Although [the defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” (quotation omitted)); id. at 836 (“We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies [of the law]... [f]or his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 794 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[Defendant’s] motivation *806for waiving counsel was not the issue. . . . Once [the defendant] properly asserted his right to proceed pro se the trial court was obligated to undertake an appropriate inquiry under Farettaeven though [the defendant’s] request apparently rested upon nothing other than dissatisfaction with defense counsel.”); Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The right of a defendant in a criminal case to act as his own lawyer is unqualified if invoked prior to the start of trial.” (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 265 n.12 (Pa. 2011) (“[A] court’s disagreement with a defendant’s reason for proceeding pro se does not constitute grounds for denial of this constitutional right.”). Hence, once the equation changed from “Soldati versus new counsel” to “Soldati versus self-representation,” it was the defendant’s determination as to whether Soldati had a conflict of interest or was unprepared — not the trial court’s — that should have been controlling.
¶20On the other hand, if the dissent means that the defendant’s complaints about Soldati were so far-fetched that the trial court could have found even the defendant himself could not genuinely have believed them to have merit, I agree that under appropriate circumstances this could be a proper factor for a trial court to evaluate in ruling on a defendant’s request for self-representation because it may be indicative of manipulative intent. But here the record simply does not support such an inference. Given the scorched-earth quality of much of modern-day political discourse, can we really say it is implausible that a lay person in the defendant’s shoes might *807have a genuine, albeit unwarranted, concern that the elected official serving as his counsel would be affected by the prospect of criticism resulting from his representation of a person accused of committing sexual offenses against a child? Moreover, in addition to the alleged conflict of interest, the defendant expressed concern over Soldati’s lack of preparation; and the record shows that this complaint had at least some validity, as evidenced by the fact that Soldati himself asked for and received a four-week continuance of the trial date so that he could review new evidence with the defendant.
¶21Furthermore, even if the trial court could supportably have found (1) that the defendant’s initial request to replace Soldati with new counsel was a manipulative effort to delay the trial and (2) that despite his suggestion that the court had misunderstood his initial request, the defendant’s attempt to “correct the record” was actually a change in position (from wanting new counsel to wanting to represent himself), such findings would not provide a basis for the court to have regarded the defendant’s request to proceed pro se as a further effort to delay the proceedings because, when he made this request, the defendant specifically indicated that he wanted to represent himself so as to avoid the need for a continuance.
¶22Rather than an effort to' delay the trial, what the dissent finds most objectionable is that the defendant’s request to proceed pro se may have been motivated, at least in part, by his desire to pressure the court into revisiting its denial of the appointment of new counsel. But the reality is that such an implicit threat (“If you won’t appoint new counsel for me judge, then I’ll make your life more difficult by representing myself.”) is present in virtually all requests for self-representation conditioned on the denial of a request for new counsel. Yet, courts have not generally regarded such conditional requests as equivocal.
¶23For example, in Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1989), the court dealt with a factual situation that clearly presented the so-called “bargaining chip” scenario. The defendant first requested counsel, then asked to represent himself when he became dissatisfied with his public defender, then requested counsel again, and finally asked to represent himself again when the same public defender was reappointed as his counsel. Id. at 1445. Following his conviction in state court, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court. The district court denied relief, finding that “because [the defendant] asked to represent himself solely as a means of dispensing with [the public defender], his request for self-representation was in fact a thinly veiled motion to substitute counsel” rather than “a genuine request for self-representation.” Id. at 1443. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that while the defendant’s requests for self representation “no doubt were conditional [upon the denial of his request for new counsel], they were not equivocal.” Id. at 1445; accord Williams, 44 F.3d at 100 (“A defendant is not deemed to have equivocated in his desire for self-representation merely because he expresses that view in the alternative, simultaneously requests the appointment of new counsel, or uses it as a threat to obtain private counsel.”). As Judge Murnaghan pointedly observed in his Frazier-El dissent:
There is no reason that a conditional pro se request should send the district court into analytical disorientation. Rather than flatly denying a request for self-representation because the form of the request is a conditional one, the court should simply frame the *809conditional request in clear terms and make the defendant acknowledge on the record that the court has properly understood the request... .
Forcing defendants to articulate their position in such precise terms is one step toward combating the “reversible error” scenario. The second step is even simpler. As long as the district court elicits the precise contours of a defendant’s request, appellate courts will not countenance arguments by defendants on appeal that the district court improperly allowed them to proceed pro se. The district court need not worry about clever defendants manipulating them into “reversible error” as long as the district court does a sufficient job of engaging the defendant on the record.
¶24Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 572-73 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
¶25As the above discussion makes clear, even if it is assumed that the trial judge in this case had some unarticulated concern that the defendant might be trying to manipulate the proceedings by, for instance, asking to proceed pro se merely for the purpose of securing Soldati’s removal and with the intention of making a new request for counsel after Soldati had withdrawn, the court had ample tools available to prevent such abuse. As part of a Farettacolloquy with the defendant, the court could have made it clear that based on its finding of a lack of cause for removing Attorney Soldati, the defendant’s choices were to proceed to trial with Soldati or to represent himself, that the trial would not be further continued, and that if the defendant made the decision to proceed pro se he would be bound by that decision and would not be able to change his mind because there would be inadequate time remaining to re-engage counsel before the start of trial. See United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (court acted properly in denying request for counsel where defendant was warned that if present counsel was dismissed he would not be provided with fourth court-appointed attorney); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976) (district judge may give defendant “choice between proceeding with counsel already appointed or going pro se”). In addition, the court could have appointed Soldati to act as defendant’s stand-by counsel. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. In my view, however, on this record, what the court could not do is simply deny the request for self-representation based on a presumption that the request was designed to delay or disrupt the proceedings. See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[E]ven well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights.”).
¶26*810The second point relied on by the dissent to support its thesis that the defendant’s request was equivocal is the fact that, after the trial court denied his request to proceed pro se, the defendant did not again raise the issue of self-representation before the trial court. In particular, the dissent points to the language used by the trial court in denying the request — “Well, at least at this stage — that’s fine. I mean, I’m not removing Mr. Soldati. If there’s some further motion dealing with anything, I will address it.” — as signaling the court’s willingness to revisit the issue, and the dissent then infers equivocation (or waiver) from the fact that the defendant did not take the court up on its supposed offer by renewing the request for self-representation at some other point before or during the trial. While I concede that this may be the dissent’s strongest argument, I do not find it sufficient to carry the day. Although the court’s denial of the defendant’s request to proceed pro se was not as definitive here as in some other cases where courts have found the absence of repeated requests not indicative of waiver or equivocation, see, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 2000) (judge’s impatient resistance toward and extremely abrupt colloquy before denying self-representation request made it reasonable for defendant to believe that any further request would be pointless); Williams, 44 F.3d at 101 (“[t]he defendant’s acquiescence [after the trial court’s categorical denial of his request to proceed pro se] cannot be read to signify waiver of a constitutionally protected right”); People v. Dent, 65 P.3d 1286, 1289-90 (Cal. 2003) (same); but cf. Flanagan, 978 A.2d at 78 n.14 (that trial court, after denying request for self-representation, thereafter sua sponte raised the issue again at later hearing by asking, “Are you making the request to represent yourself in the remainder of this case?”, was not sufficient to infer waiver from failure of defendant then or later to repeat request), it is important not to lose sight of first principles. Under Farettaand its progeny, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself, which courts are required to respect by conducting an appropriate colloquy once a reasonably clear request to exercise the right has been made. It is not the responsibility of the legally untrained defendant to divine meaning at his peril from a non-responsive or otherwise ambiguous trial court reaction to his pro se request. Unfortunately, although undoubtedly inadvertent, that was the nature of the trial court’s response in this case. Thus, even if one assumes that the court’s statement that it would entertain “some further motion dealing with anything” displayed a willingness to revisit the self-representation issue, the court’s ruling that it would not remove Attorney Soldati “at this stage” could well have been understood by the defendant to mean that he had to provide some further grounds for removing Soldati before the court would reconsider its ruling; and if the defendant believed he had no basis for *811removal beyond what he had already told the court, there would have been no reason for his raising the issue again.
¶27Even if the defendant’s request to represent himself could be regarded as equivocal — a proposition I reject — it was surely at least sufficient to require an inquiry by the trial court under our decision in State v. Sweeney, 151 N.H. 666 (2005). Recognizing as much, the dissent offers a third rationale for its decision: it attempts to avoid the result that Sweeneymandates — reversal of the convictions — by recasting our holding in that case as mere dicta.
¶28In Sweeney, during a hearing immediately before the trial was to begin, the defendant complained about his attorney’s failure to make a particular argument, and then asked the judge: “[D]o I have the right to fire my lawyer?” Without making any inquiry, the trial court answered: “At this time, no.” Id. at 669. We determined that the defendant’s request could be interpreted as either a request to proceed pro se or as a request for substitute counsel, and held that it was incumbent upon the trial court to “eliminate the ambiguity the question presented. Once the defendant makes a sufficiently clear request to indicate an intention to switch *812representational gears, further judicial inquiry is necessary to clarify the nature of those changed intentions.” Id. at 671 (quotation and citation omitted).
¶29One of the cases we relied on in support of our ruling in Sweeneywas the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396 (1st Cir. 1999). Because the issue before the court in Proctorwas the revocation of a request to proceed pro se and a reassertion of the right to counsel, the dissent is correct that the court’s discussion wherein it wrote the following is technically dicta:
[E]ven though most circuits require “clear and unequivocal” Farettawaivers, it is generally incumbent upon the courts to elicit that elevated degree of clarity through a detailed inquiry. That is, the triggering statement in a defendant’s attempt to waive his right to counsel need not be punctilious; rather, the dialogue between the court and the defendant must result in a clear and unequivocal statement.
¶30Proctor, 166 F.3d at 402-03 (citation omitted). However, even though dicta, Proctor’s discussion of the trial court’s duty of inquiry regarding self-representation requests addressed an important issue that has generally been overlooked in the case law. While Farettaand its progeny plainly require that a defendant’s assertion of his right to self-representation must be clear and unequivocal, most cases have not explored the question of when the required level of clarity is to be assessed. Since it is universally recognized that before a request to proceed pro se can properly be granted, the trial court must engage in a detailed colloquy with the defendant regarding waiver of the right to counsel, the dangers of self-representation, etc., there can be no doubt that at the conclusion of that colloquy the defendant’s desire to represent himself must be absolutely clear. What Proctorrecognized — and what we found persuasive in Sweeney— is that the very requirement to engage in the colloquy contemplates that at least some level of ambiguity or uncertainty is not enough to defeat the court’s obligation to conduct the colloquy in the first place. See Proctor, 166 F.3d at 403; accord Flanagan, 978 A.2d at 77; Edwards v. Com., 644 S.E.2d 396, 404 (Va. Ct. App. 2007) (Humphreys, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is only after [a Faretta] dialogue that a trial court can determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the request for self-representation is unequivocal, and the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, if complete clarity were demanded from the outset, there would be little purpose in conducting the inquiry. See Sweeney, 151 N.H. at 671 (“Once the defendant makes a sufficiently clear request to indicate an intention to shift *813representational gears, further judicial inquiry is necessary to clarify the nature of those changed intentions.” (emphasis added)).
¶31Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Sweeneycannot be “properly read,” post at 822, to limit the duty of inquiry to situations in which a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. While we undoubtedly relied on the above dicta from Proctorin support of our decision, it does not follow that the duty of inquiry we imposed in Sweeneycan itself be regarded as dicta insofar as requests for self-representation are concerned. Quite the contrary, Sweeneyclearly held that the duty of inquiry applied regardless of whether the defendant’s “[D]o I have the right to fire my lawyer?” remark was an expression of dissatisfaction with counsel or a request to proceed pro se. See Sweeney, 151 N.H. at 670 (“While we agree with the State that the defendant’s question did not, by itself, constitute a demand to proceed pro se, we hold that it was sufficient to trigger the court’s duty to inquire further.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)).
¶32Finally, I believe there can be no serious dispute that the defendant’s request for self-representation in this case was far clearer than the request at issue in Sweeney. Unlike in Sweeney, where the defendant merely asked if he could fire his lawyer and said nothing about self-representation as an alternative, here the defendant specifically expressed his desire “[t]o proceed pro se.” Thus, while I beheve that Sweeneywas correctly decided and did not press the duty of inquiry further than is prudent, even if the dissent does not share that view, this is hardly the case to use as the vehicle for correcting any such perceived error.
¶33Before concluding, I also feel the need to address an institutional concern regarding the importance of our ruling in Sweeneyin light of some of the case law from other jurisdictions. I fully support the proposition that, because of the antithetical nature of the right to counsel, on the one hand, and the right of self-representation, on the other, and because the harm to *814both the individual defendant and the justice system that results from the absence of counsel is usually more severe than that flowing from the denial of self-representation, the former should be treated as the “paramount right” when, after efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances, such ambiguity or uncertainty remains that a court cannot ascertain which right a defendant desires to invoke. See Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 1987); Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444. At the same time, however, courts must be vigilant to avoid adopting procedures for invoking the right of self-representation that have the effect of relegating it to a “disfavored” status in the constitutional hierarchy. See Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 573 (Murhaghan, J., dissenting); see also Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting idea that right to counsel is the “preferred right, so that defendants have to be especially articulate or forceful to win the right to represent themselves. The two rights are equivalent [and] the defendant is entitled to choose without a thumb on the scale; but because counsel is the normal and prudent choice, it is the default outcome.” (citations omitted)). Judges well know that, in all but truly exceptional cases, a defendant’s choice of self-representation will prove detrimental to his defense and will almost assuredly prolong and complicate the trial. But paternalistic instincts and/or considerations of judicial convenience must not lead us to countenance a sort of “don’t ask — won’t tell” policy regarding self-representation, under which courts are tempted to ignore all but the clearest expressions of a desire to proceed pro se in the hopes that, by not asking follow-up questions, the defendant will fail to provide the court with sufficient clarification of his wishes as to require the court to grant his request of self-representation. Such an approach would seriously undermine the respect for human dignity and individual autonomy that lies at the heart of Faretta.
¶34 Although a trial court has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the defendant regarding the merits of the reasons upon which the decision to proceed pro se is based, this is not to say that the court is prohibited from inquiring into those reasons insofar as they may have a bearing on whether the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See Buhl, 233 F.3d at 798.
¶35 Although the record indicates that the defendant had been represented by several other attorneys before Soldati was appointed, it contains no evidence whatsoever about the circumstances under which prior counsel were appointed or discharged. In particular, there is no evidence that prior to the appointment of earlier counsel the defendant had made similar requests to proceed pro se, or that, having made such a request, he then changed his mind and asked for counsel again. See Williams, 44 F.3d at 101 (“Of course, when a defendant changes his mind [about self-representation] after trial begins, or does so repeatedly at any stage, a court may find that the conduct is manipulative or abusive in some other way. If so, the conduct can be considered vacillation, and a trial judge may find the request equivocal.”).
¶36 believe the dissent is wrong in suggesting that the trial court could reasonably have thought it adequately addressed the defendant’s conditional request for self-representation by granting the four-week trial continuance. See post at 818. Unlike in Jordan v. Ficco, 134 Fed. Appx. 452 (1st Cir. 2005), on which the dissent relies, here there is no basis for concluding that a continuance was the defendant’s “preferred form of relief.” Id. at 454. To the contrary, the defendant’s preferred form of relief in this case was the replacement of Attorney Soldati with new counsel — relief which the trial court denied. That the granting of the four-week continuance did not satisfy the defendant is made clear by the fact that he raised his complaints against Soldati after the court had already granted the continuance.
¶37 The cases relied upon by the dissent as support for its assertion that the defendant’s failure to press his request for self-representation after the January 25 hearing demonstrates the request’s equivocal nature are distinguishable. In Commonwealth v. Davido, 868 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2005), before trial the defendant requested the appointment of new counsel or, alternatively, to proceed pro se. At the next judicial event following these requests, the court had a brief colloquy with the defendant in which it denied both requests. Thereafter, on the day before trial, the court initiated a further colloquy with the defendant in which it inquired if the defendant still desired to represent himself, and the defendant responded that he wished to proceed with counsel. Id. at 439. Thus, although the court referred to the defendant’s prior requests for counsel as a “bargaining device,” id. at 440, the court did not reject his Farettaclaim on this basis alone. Rather, the court found that, under the totality of the circumstances — including the defendant’s colloquy with the court on the day before trial — his request to proceed pro se was equivocal. Id.; see also id. at 449 (Saylor, J., concurring) (rejecting view that conditional nature of defendant’s request to proceed pro se, posed as an alternative to request for substitute counsel, rendered request equivocal, and opining that only appropriate ground for upholding denial of self-representation was defendant’s affirmative abandonment of request).
¶38In People v. Tena, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Ct. App. 2007), the trial court denied as untimely the defendant’s request to appear pro se at his preliminary hearing, but specifically advised him that he could renew the request before trial. Id. at 418. Instead of taking the court up on this offer, the defendant retained private counsel who represented him at trial. The court held that the defendant’s failure to renew his request after the preliminary hearing not only demonstrated that the request was equivocal, id. at 421, but also showed, alternatively, that the request had been abandoned, id. at 422.
¶39Finally, unlike in United States v. Manthey, 92 Fed. Appx. 291, 295 (6th Cir. 2004), and Morris v. Kikendall, 2009 WL 1097922, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2009), there is nothing in the record of this case that would support a finding that the defendant’s request for self-representation constituted an “off-the-cuff” remark triggered by his frustration with the court’s rulings. Indeed, from all that appears, the defendant at all times conducted himself calmly and respectfully throughout the January 25, 2010 hearing.
¶40 It is important to note that the remedy we implemented in Sweeneywas reversal of the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. This remedy was required only because of the prospect that what the defendant was asking for was to proceed pro se, and denial of that right is not subject to harmless error analysis. If we had regarded the duty of inquiry as applicable' only to ambiguous expressions of dissatisfaction with counsel, the appropriate remedy would have been to remand the case to the trial court to determine which right — replacement of inadequate counsel or self-representation — the defendant was attempting to assert, and, if it was the former, whether there had in fact been grounds for discharging the defendant’s counsel. Had the trial court found (1) that the defendant was seeking substitute counsel rather than self-representation and (2) that there were no grounds for removing counsel who represented the defendant at trial, we then could have affirmed the defendant’s conviction. While such an inquiry no doubt would have inherent difficulties — with the benefit of hindsight the defendant would have an obvious incentive to assert that what he had been seeking was to proceed pro se — as an alternative to automatic reversal, it would have been worth the effort.