Kirk v. Beard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 55 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . As said before the will devised to each brother the ranch lands without any restrictions or conditions and only the remainder of their estate to the nieces. They stand to recover here not on the will of their uncle, but on the oral contract made between their two uncles, as that contract has been incorporated in the will. The contract did not provide that the survivor would leave the land to the nieces . . . “In Burt v. McKibbin, 188 S.W. 187 (Mo.1916), it is said that the husband and wife may have intended that the survivor leave the property to certain heirs, but the intention alone will not suffice, it must have been embodied in the contract. Under the provisions of W. H. Sexton’s will J. E. Sexton took a fee simple title to the lands in the named counties and not merely a life estate. There is shown no contractual provision to the contrary . . . “In Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35 , 273 S.W.2d 588 , we said that while the makers of mutual wills have the right to provide that all property owned by the survivor at his death should pass under the terms of his will, nevertheless that effect should not be given to mutual wills unless the intention to do so is set forth therein by plain and unambiguous language. Obviously this ruling would apply with equal force to the terms of an oral contract.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kronenberger v. Beke

2. ““The respondents * * * are nieces of J. E. Sexton, deceased. They brought this suit to establish their claim to all of the estate, both real and personal, owned by J. E. Sexton at the time of his death. Their claim is based on a contract alleged to have been made between J. E. Sexton and his brother, W. H. Sexton whereby these brothers orally agreed that they would make mutual and reciprocal wills; that J. E. and W. H. Sexton each executed identical wills devising each to the other his undivided half interest in all lands owned by them in Johnson, Hill and Somervell Counties, together with all personal property situated thereon; and leaving to the nieces, share and share alike, the remainder of his property, both real and personal. “The brothers on the 23rd of November, 1948, did execute separate wills containing the foregoing provisions.” (See the provisions of the wills in 334 S.W.2d at pages S32-S3S.) “W. H. Sexton died on October 30, 1952. His will was probated and his estate distributed according to the terms of the will. J. E. Sexton died March 1, 1958.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Martinez v. Pearson

3. “[The appellants] stand to recover here not on the will of their uncle, but on the oral contract made between their two uncles, as that contract has been incorporated in the will. The contract did not provide that the survivor would leave the land to the nieces. The will has not been probated and may have been revoked. The question, as to whether the devise would have passed into the residuary estate had the will of the surviving brother been probated and became effective, is not material, we think, to the determination of the provisions of the oral contract. 345 S.W.2d at 273 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pitner v. United States