Cincinnati Ry Co v. Interstate Commerce Commission’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

67 federal appellate · 27 district · 57 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 334 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But when the Georgia Railroad Company enters into the carriage of foreign freight, by agreeing to receive the goods by virtue of foreign through bills of lading, and to participate in through rates and charges, it thereby becomes part of a continuous line, not made by a consolidation with the foreign companies, but made by an arrangement for the continuous carriage or shipment from one state to another, and thus becomes amenable to the federal act, in respect to such interstate commerce. ° * * All we wish to be understood to hold is, that when goods shipped under a through bill of lading, from a point in one state to a point in another, are received in transit by a state common carrier, under a conventional division of the charges, such carrier must be deemed to have subjected its road to an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment, within the meaning of the act to regulate commerce. When we speak of a through bill of lading, we are referring to the usual method in use by connecting companies, and must not be understood to imply that a common control, management, or arrangement might not be otherwise manifested.””

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Bellaire, Z. & C. Ry. Co.

2. ““The commission is an administrative board, and the courts are only to be resorted to when the commission prefers to enforce the provisions of the statute by .a direct proceeding in the court, or when the orders of the commission have been disregarded. The theory of the act evidently is, as shown by the provision, that the findings of the commission shall be regarded as prima facie evidence, that the facts of the case are to be disclosed before the commission. We do not mean, of course, that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted to the evidence that was before the commission, but that the purposes of the .act call for. a full inquiry by .the commission into all the circumstances and conditions pertinent to the questions involved.” 1 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Western New York & P. R. Co. v. Penn Refining Co. · Puget Sound Electric Ry. v. Lee

3. ““ It is argued on behalf of the commission that the power to pass upon the .reasonableness of existing rates implies a right to prescribe .rates. This is not ■ necessarily so. The reasonableness of the rate, in a given case, depends on the facts, and.the function of the commission is to consider these facts and give them their proper weight. If the commission, instead of withholding judgment in such a matter until an issue shall be made and the facts found, itself fixes a rate, that rate is prejudged by the commission to be reasonable.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. · Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Railway Co.