Volume 163 — New York Appellate Division Reports

Appeal by the defendants, Thomas G-illeran and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 9th day of April, 1914, setting-aside an election of directors of a cemetery corporation held on March 27, 1914, and ordering a new election. (See Gen. Corp. Law [Consol. Laws, chap. 23; Laws of 1909, chap. 28], § 32.)

<p>Submission of a controversy upon an agreed statement of facts, pursuant to section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Appeal by Charles G-. Reynolds, Incorporated, a property owner, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 13th day of March, 1914, overruling preliminary objections to the petition of the Public Service Commission for the appointment of commissioners of appraisal herein, and appointing such commissioners.</p>

Reargument of an appeal by the City of New York and another, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings Comity Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 16th day of January, 1914, amending a previous order nunc pro tunc. (See 163 App. Div. 867.)

<p>Appellate Division — submission of controversy — statement of evidentiary facts only insufficient.</p> <p>Evidentiary facts in an agreed statement, with no ultimate facts, do not present a case for disposition by the Appellate Division under section 1379 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Where an agreed statement of facts merely sets forth that in a prior action to determine claims to real property an effort was made to reach and bar one L. and wife and other defendants whose existence was in doubt, and the summons ran against L. and three other persons named, or if dead, against them widows, heirs and grantees, the court will not decide whether jurisdiction was acquired over the necessary parties so as to cut off them possible adverse interests, but the proceeding will be dismissed without prejudice to relief by action. (Cerfv. Diener, 310 N. Y. 156,163, followed.)</p>

Appeal by Clara M. Truman, judgment debtor, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 8th day of January, 1914, vacating and setting aside a prior order, with notice of an intention to bring up for review two prior orders entered in said clerk’s office on the 12th and 29th days of December, 1913, respectively.

<p>Municipal corporations — negligence — injury to pedestrian by falling into open trench in street — failure to guard and light trench — pleading — evidence — admissibility of municipal ordinance — contributory negligence.</p> <p>Where, in an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by falling into a trench in the street, the complaint charges common-law negligence on the part of the defendants in failing to guard and light the excavation, a municipal ordinance requiring that such openings be guarded and lighted is admissible in evidence, although not pleaded.</p> <p>A finding by the jury that the defendants failed to properly guard and light the excavation was warranted.</p> <p>Although the person injured subsequently died, and no witness was produced who saw him fall into the trench, but direct evidence was given that he shouted for assistance and was found in the trench shortly after he had alighted from a street car which ran along one side of the trench, and the surrounding circumstances supported an inference of fact that the decedent was an ordinary wayfarer exercising proper care, and fell into the excavation accidentally, the question of his contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>Appeal by the defendant, Illinois Surety Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 6th day of March, 1914, denying its motion for a new trial made upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence.</p>

<p>Municipal corporations — certiorari — discharge of police officer, city of New York — failure to take person charged with crime into custody — evidence — when court should follow conclusion of commissioner.</p> <p>Certiorari to review the proceedings of the police commissioner of the city of New York in removing a detective sergeant for neglect of duty, in that he permitted a person charged with grand larceny to walk to the station house, without taking him into custody. Held, upon the conflicting evidence, that the determination Of the commissioner should be confirmed.</p> <p>Where there is any evidence of the offense charged, or the facts admit any inference of guilt, the court should follow the conclusion of the commissioner, in view of his peculiar responsibilities, and his greater opportunity of arriving accurately at the truth.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Manilla Anchor Brewing Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Westchester Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 10th day of March, 1914, directing it to assign a certain bond and mortgage for the foreclosure of which the action was brought.

<p>Motor vehicles — negligence — injury caused by automobile while in repair shop — master and servant — liability where car was operated by owner’s chauffeur.</p> <p>The defendant sent Ms automobile, in charge of Ms chauffeur, to a repair shop for the purpose of having it painted. The manager of the shop told the chauffeur to run the car upon an elevator, which he did, and it was raised to the tMrd floor and brought to a stop in order that a space in the paint shop might be cleared for it. Subsequently the defendant’s chauffeur started the car, and, while attempting to drive it into the paint shop, struck another car, causing' injury to the plaintiff.</p> <p>Held, that it was error for the court to dismiss the complaint on the theory that at the time of the accident, the chauffeur had ceased to be the agent of his master and was acting for the repair company, the question being, under the circumstances, one of fact for the jury.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Huntington Water Works Company, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Suffolk on the 12th day of January, 1912, upon findings of fact made by a justice of the Supreme Court after a hearing at the Suffolk Special Term.

Appeal by the petitioner, Henry E. 0. Watson, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Westchester, entered in the office of said surrogate on or about the 20th day of February, 1914, dismissing his petition for a compulsory accounting.

Appeal by the defendant, Pittsburg Contracting Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 12th. day of December, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $16,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Lena Crump, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 1st day of Hay, 1914, denying her motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Appeal by the defendant, The Delaware and Hudson Company, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Saratoga on the 20th day of January, 1914, overruling its demurrer to the complaint.

Appeal by the defendant, Alonzo 0. Schaller, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff’s intestate, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Schenectady on the 22d day of December, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for 1138.15, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on or about the 2d day of January, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Appeal by the defendant, Driscoll Brothers & Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Tompkins Trial and Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Tompkins on the 31st day of March, 1914, requiring the defendant to furnish plaintiff with a bill of particulars.</p>

<p>Insurance — fire insurance — proofs of loss not conclusive upon insured — action for additional loss discovered after filing of proofs — rights of mortgagee and other insurers — modification of judgment.</p> <p>Although the amount of loss stated in the proofs is strong evidence that the insured’s damage does not exceed that amount, it is not conclusive upon him.</p> <p>Hence an insured, who, after filing his proofs of loss, immediately discovers that there has been a mistake, notifies the company’s agent and is refused a readjustment, may, upon establishing the additional loss, recover the same.</p> <p>The insurance company cannot claim that the insured should have furnished new proofs of loss covering the additional items after it had unqualifiedly refused to make a readjustment.</p> <p>Where, in an action to recover such additional loss, the complaint alleged that a mortgagee, after refusing to bring the action, had been made a party defendant, and neither the mortgagee nor the insurance company brought to the attention of the court at the trial that the recovery, if any, should be in favor of the mortgagee, and no request was made to apportion the loss between the defendant and another insurer of the premises, the judgment in favor of the insured should be affirmed, with leave to the defendant to apply at Special Term for a proper modification thereof.</p> <p>Lyon," J., dissented.</p>

<p>Appeal by the defendant, Rondout Savings Bank, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor óf the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ulster on the 31st day of October, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Ulster Special Term.</p>

<p>Will — action under section 2653a of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine validity of probate—sufficiency of complaint — parties — objection that complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action does not raise question of non-joinder of parties — answer of non-joinder should state names of parties omitted.</p> <p>The complaint in an action under section 2653a of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the validity of the probate of a will alleged among other things that the intestate left her surviving one P. and the defendants, “her next of kin and only hens at law,” and that after her death the said F. died intestate, and the plaintiffs are the administrators of his estate. The executor of the testatrix and another defendant answered, and, among other things, admitted that the decedent left her surviving the heirs at law and next of kin set forth in the complaint, but on information and belief denied that they are all the heirs at law and next of kin her surviving.</p> <p>Held, that the complaint stated a cause of action;</p> <p>That although the complaint should have stated whether F. left heirs other than the defendants in the action, the omission cannot be taken advantage of under an objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>Ordinarily an answer of non-joinder of parties should state the names of the parties alleged to have been omitted, and, it seems, that a mere denial on information and belief is insufficient.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiffs, Albert Gaffey and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Tompkins on the 18th day of December, 1913, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint on the merits upon the pleadings, and also from the order entered in said clerk’s office on the 17th day of December, 1913, directing such dismissal.

<p>Replevin — action to recover chattel — sufficiency of complaint—■ allegation of wrongful detention—Code of Civil Procedure, section 1731, construed.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff in an action to recover a chattel alleges ownership and right to possession, and to show that the defendant’s detention was wrongful alleges that he, the owner, with right to immediate possession, demanded the same and that the defendant refused to deliver, the complaint states a cause of action.</p> <p>Under the provision of section 1731 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “ Where the taking of the chattel is not complained of, but the action is founded upon its wrongful detention, the complaint must set forth the facts, showing that the detention was wrongful,” the plaintiff must show that he has, as the owner, demanded the possession of the chattel or that there is some other fact which puts the defendant in the wrong. This provision has nothing to do with the facts relating to the title, but refers to the facts "Which show “ that the detention was wrongful.”</p>

Appeal by the defendant, E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Company, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Broome on the 14th day of February, 1914, overruling its demurrer to the complaint.

<p>Highways — change of grade of village street — construction of State road—recovery by property owner injured.</p> <p>Where the construction of a State road through a village at a higher grade necessitates the widening of an intersecting street by the village itself, an adjoining property owner whose access is interfered with cannot recover damages of the village under subdivision 1 of section 159- of the Village Law. This, because there was no change of grade made by the village itself.</p> <p>But such property owner may recover damages of the village under subdivision 2 of the section aforesaid, for it authorizes a recovery for an injury caused by a change of grade not made by the village itself.</p> <p>It is immaterial that, through inadvertence, the claimant brought his proceeding under subdivision 1 of said section, if the facts set forth show that he is entitled to redress under subdivision 2, if the defendant village has not been misled.</p>

Appeal by the defendants, The Canal Board and others, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Montgomery Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Saratoga on the 29th day of April, 1914, as imposes upon the defendants, as a condition for leave to serve a supplemental answer, the payment to plaintiff of all taxable costs and disbursements to date, and of an extra allowance of $1,500, and a waiver on the part of the defendants of…

<p>Appeal by the defendant, The New York Central and Hudson Eiver Eailroad Company, from an order of the County Court of Albany county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 7th day of May, 1914, affirming a judgment of the Police Court of the city of Albany, rendered on the 8th day of J anuary, 1914, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor and imposing a fine of twenty dollars, and also (as stated in the notice of appeal) from the judgment of conviction of the said Police Court.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Lewis Close, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Broome County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Madison on the 80th day of March, 1914, denying his motion to compel a delivery to him of the records, books and papers of and belonging to the superintendent of the poor of the county of Madison.

Appeal by the defendant, Claude J. Holding, from, an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 19th day of June, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Albany Special Term, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 18th day of July, 1913, denying appellant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Will •— proceeds of sale of real estate for purpose of paying specified legacies not applicable to payment of debts — equitable conversion — duty of court in ordering sale of real estate for payment of debts.</p> <p>Where a testator directs his executor to sell certain real estate for the purpose of paying specified legacies, the execution of the sale does not constitute an equitable conversion rendering the proceeds applicable to the payment of debts and expenses of administration.</p> <p>It seems., that it is the duty of the court in directing the sale of a decedent’s real estate for the payment of debts to first order that sold which has not been specifically devised and, if sufficient, save that specifically devised to carry out the intention of the testator.</p> <p>Where an executor has sold real estate for the purpose of paying specified legacies, the surrogate may postpone payment thereof until after the application to sell other real estate for the payment of decedent’s debts and administration expenses.</p> <p>Where an executor fails within a reasonable time to make application for the sale of property to pay debts, the legatees may apply to the surrogate to compel such executor to make payment of then- legacies.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, William Ruback, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Montgomery Trial and Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Montgomery on the 20th day of May, 1913, setting aside the verdict of a jury in plaintiff’s favor for the sum of $4,346.25, and granting defendant’s motion for a nonsuit.

Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 17th day of January, 1914, directed to William W. Parley, as State Commissioner of Excise of the State of New York, commanding him to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the county of Albany all and singular his proceedings had in removing relator from his position in the State Excise Department of the State of New York.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Gertrude St. John Wood, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Otsego on the 24th day of September, 1913, dismissing the complaint and vacating an injunction heretofore granted upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.

Appeal by the defendant, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 11th day of November, 1913, affirming a judgment of a Justice’s Court.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Biaso Di Chiro, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 23d day of June, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court without a jury at the Albany Trial Term.

Appeal by the defendant, James Stewart & Company, Inc., from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Albany Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 5th day of March, 1914, directing the defendant to serve a verified bill of particulars as to its defense of plaintiff’s contributory negligence and as to its defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a coservant, and further, as to its defense that plaintiff had assumed…

Appeal by the defendant, Charles Post, from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady county, rendered against him on the 2Tth day of March, 1914, convicting him of a violation of the Liquor Tax Law. (See Consol. Laws, chap. 34 [Laws of 1909, chap. 39], § 30, subd. A, as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 494.)

Appeal by the plaintiff, George Dzubak, from, an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Albany Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 7th day of February, 1914, setting aside the verdict of a jury in plaintiff’s favor for $4,550, and granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

<p>Will—revocation of second will by destruction—first will is not revived—republication necessary — statute construed.</p> <p>A testatrix who executed a will revoking former wills by destroying the later will in the presence of one of the witnesses to the original will, and by declaring to him alone that she desires the first will to be probated at her death, does not revive the prior will.</p> <p>In order to revive the first will it must be republished before witnesses in the manner required by the statute.</p>

Appeal by John H. Raynor, as executor, etc., from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Saratoga, entered in the office of said surrogate on the 15th day of July, 1913, judicially settling the accounts of Lewis S. Wagman, as executor, etc., of Rachel Wagman, deceased, and construing her will, and also an appeal from an order of said Surrogate’s Court, entered therein on the same day, denying appellant’s motion to compel the accounting executor to file a formal…

Appeal by the defendant, Northern Iron Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Essex on the 9th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $10,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 19th day of January, 1914, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff, Anna Powers, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Saratoga on the 29th day of February, 1912, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direc tion of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case upon a trial before the court and a jury at the Saratoga Trial Term.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Sarah J. Hutchins, as administratrix, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Franklin on the 25th day of November, 1913, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of the case upon a trial before the court and a jury at the Franklin Trial Term, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day setting aside the…

Appeal by the defendant, The Ludlum Steel and Spring Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Rensselaer on the 3d day of July, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $6,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 2d day of July, 1913, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendant, The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, from an order of the County Court of Schuyler county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 26th day of November, 1913, granting plaintiff’s motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment rendered in a Justice’s Court.

Appeal by the defendants, James E. Lowe and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Schenectady on the 4th day of February, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Schenectady Trial Term, a jury having been waived.

Appeal by the defendant, The Village of Marlborough, from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 20th day of January, 1914, upon the decision of the court, the issues having-been withdrawn from the jury by stipulation.

Appeal in the first case by the defendant, Alva Seybolt, from an order of a justice of the Supreme Court, made at the Broome Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Otsego on the 14th day of April, 1914, staying the defendant from enforcing the judgments of the Court of Appeals mentioned in the two following cases.

Appeal by the relator, John Trounstine, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term denying his motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the defendants and each of them to refrain in any manner, at the coming primary and general elections in 1914, from certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the office of, or certifying to the expiration of the term of office of, Joseph I. Green, now an incumbent of the office of justice of the City…

Appeal by the defendants, Richard Webber, Jr., and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 15th day of October, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $4,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Jacob Sackheim, as administrator, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 10th day of March, 1914, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case.

Appeal by the defendant, George M. Trefts, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 4th day of December, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court, a jury having been waived.

Appeal by the petitioners, Charles M. Town and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Onondaga Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Onondaga on the 27th day of March, 1914, denying their application for an order to resubmit to the electors of the town of Onondaga at a special election the four excise questions specified in section 13 of the Liquor Tax Law. (See Consol.

Appeal by the defendants, The Oity of Few York and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 11th day of December, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $15,000, and also from an order, entered in said clerk’s office on the same day, denying appellants’ separate motions for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, James N. Jarvie, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 7th day of July, 1913, dismissing the complaint upon the merits upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court, & jury-having been waived.

Appeal by the plaintiff, James N. Jarvie, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 10th day of May, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 27th day of May, 1913, denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 10th day of May, 1913, granting defendants’…

Appeal by the defendant, Louis Kaplan, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 20th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $9,996, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 23d day of January, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a.new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the contestant, Alice M. Horton, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Westchester, entered in the office of said surrogate on the 12th day of January, 1914, admitting to probate the paper propounded as and for the last will and testament of George W. Horton, deceased.

Appeal by the defendant, Erminio Oimino, from a judgment of the County Court of Kings county, rendered against him on the 3d day of February, 1914, convicting him of the crime of abduction, with notice of an intention to bring up for review an order granting a reargument of the motion to set aside the verdict, and also the order thereafter entered setting aside the verdict in so far as it convicted the defendant of the crime of rape in the first degree, but sustaining it in…

Appeal by the defendants, John F. Hylan and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the relator, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 5th day of June, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 4th day of June, 1914, denying defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, The New York State Construction Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 26th day of March, 1913, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendants, James A. P. Eamsdell and others, individually and as trustees, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Dutchess on the 12th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $1,800, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 22d day of January, 1914, denying defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendants, Joseph Haight and others, from orders of the Supreme Court, made at the Westchester Special Term, and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 9th day of February, 1914, overruling their demurrers to the amended complaint.

Appeal by the defendants, Joseph Haight and others, from orders of the Supreme Court, made at the Westchester Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 9 th day of February, 1914, overruling their demurrers to the amended complaint.

<p>Will construed — gift to wife with, contingent remainders to children or collateral relatives — failure of testator to provide for contingency ' which actually happened—when estate passes under statutes of descent and distribution.</p> <p>A testator gave the use and benefit of his estate to his wife for life with power to expend the principal if necessary for her maintenance. Upon the death of the wife he gave the residue of his estate to his “ children, if any, then surviving, absolutely and in fee.” He further provided that if he died without issue, then upon the death of the wife his estate should go to collateral relatives, the defendants in this action. He also provided that if the collateral relatives should die before the wife and he himself die without issue, then the estate should go to the wife absolutely.</p> <p>At the time of the execution of the will the testator had no children; but two children were born before his death, but they died, unmarried, intestate and without issue, during the lifetime of the wife. In an action to construe the will,</p> <p>Held, that the contingency upon which the estate was to go to the defendants, his collateral relatives, did not happen, as the testator died leaving issue;</p> <p>That, as he made no provision as to the devolution of the estate in case the children died before the widow, on her death it passed under the statutes of descent and distribution, through the deceased children, to the estate of their deceased mother as sole heir at law and next of kin, and that the defendants were not entitled to take.</p>

Motion by the defendant, The City of Rochester, for a new trial upon a case containing exceptions, ordered to be heard at the Appellate Division in the first instance, upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff for $475, rendered after a trial at the Monroe Trial Term in January, 1913.

<p>Appeal in the first case by the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding to the claimant the sum of $8,000 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p> <p>Appeal in the second case by the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding to the claimant the sum of $500 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p> <p>Appeal in the third case hy the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding the claimant the sum of $10,000 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p> <p>Appeal in the fourth case by the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding the claimant the sum of $800 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p> <p>Appeal in the fifth case by the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding the claimant the sum of $5,000 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p> <p>Appeal in the sixth case hy the defendant, The State of New York, from a judgment and determination of the Board of Claims in favor of the claimant, entered in the office of the clerk of said board on the 13th day of February, 1914, awarding to the claimant the sum of $2,000 and interest, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiffs, Zouve J. Wadsworth and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida on the 15th day of January, 1914, upon a dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiffs’ case, upon a trial before the court and a jury and the Oneida Trial Term.

Appeal by the defendant, The Hew York Central and Hudson Eiver Eailroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Steuben on the 16th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $6,500, as modified on resettlement by an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29th day of January, 1914.

Appeal by the defendant, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ontario on the 8th day of May, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $2,300, and also from an amended order entered in said clerk’s office on the 22d day of May, 1913, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, First National Bank of Waterloo, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants’ testator, Leonard Story, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Seneca on the 18th day of January, 1913, upon the decision of the cpurt after a trial before the court at the Seneca Trial Term, a jury having been waived. The judgment dismissed the complaint upon the merits.

Appeal by the relator, Eucarpio Pisani, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Erie Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 5th day of February, 1914, denying his motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondents as and constituting the Board of Eegents of the University of the State of New York to indorse the license, or diploma, authorizing him to practice medicine in the State of Michigan, heretofore…

Appeal by the defendant, Willis Vernon Cole, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered against him on the 30th day of March, 1912, convicting him of the crime of practicing medicine without lawful authorization and registration, in violation of section 174 of the Public Health Law. (See Consol. Laws, chap. 45 [Laws of 1909, chap. 49], § 174.)

Appeal by the defendants, Edwin A. Ely and others, from, parts of a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff and certain of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of January, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the New York Special Term in an action to construe the will of Smith Ely, deceased.

<p>Dower — action to admeasure — when devise to wife not in lieu of dower — claim of dower in property situate in this State, governed by law of this State — burden of proof—waiver of right to dower — damages.</p> <p>In an action to admeasure plaintiff’s dower in certain real estate in Hew York city, of which her husband died seized, it appeared that the testator, after making certain specific bequests to his wife and others, devised the residue of his estate, consisting of personal property and real estate situate in the District of Columbia, Hew York and Hew Jersey, to his wife and two children “ absolutely and in fee simple, share and share alike.”</p> <p>Under the law of the District of Columbia, where the will was executed and probated, and where the testator resided at the time of his death, the terms thereof barred dower. The will contained no clause providing that the provisions for the widow were “ in lieu of dower.” Thereafter the plaintiff, without claiming her dower interest, joined in the conveyance of the real estate, but about seven years after the probate of the will, learning of her rights under the law of this State, brought this action.</p> <p>Held, on all the evidence, that the plaintiff is entitled to her dower interest in the lands of which her husband died seized, situate in this State;</p> <p>That the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to dower in the lands of which the testator died seized, situate in this State, should be determined by the laws of this State, unaffected by the laws of the District of Columbia;</p> <p>That the burden was upon the defendants to establish beyond question both the facts and the law necessary to deprive the plaintiff of her dower;</p> <p>That since the defendants are not sued as heirs, but as devisees, they are “other persons” within the meaning of section 1600 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff may only recover mesne damages from the time of her demand of dower.</p> <p>The plaintiff cannot be deemed to have waived her claim as she knew nothing of her right under the New York law until a short time prior to the commencement of the action.</p> <p>A provision of a will in favor of the wife, in order to bar her claim to dower, must be so clear and incompatible therewith as to compel the conclusion that that was what the testator intended. Where there is no room for doubt it must be resolved in favor of the dower right. Laughiiw, J., dissented.</p>

<p>Submission of a controversy upon an agreed statement of facts pursuant to section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Edward T. Platt, as treasurer, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court hr favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 28th day of April, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, both sides having moved for the direction of a verdict at the close of the case, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 26th day of April, 1913, denying the defendant’s motion…

Appeal by the defendants, Alphonse J. Stephani and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff and certain of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 24th day of March, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the, New York Special Term. The judgment construed a will, settled the accounts of the trustees thereunder, and directed the payment to the plaintiff of certain accumulated income.

Appeal by the defendants, Atlas Assurance Company of London and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of September, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the New York Special Term.

Appeal by the plaintiff, J. Stewart Barney, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 1st day of November, 1913, dismissing the complaint upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues, and also (as stated in the notice of appeal) from the decision of the referee pursuant to which the judgment was entered.

<p>Corporation-—railroad — right of trustee under refunding mortgage to use moneys for purchase of bonds of another company.</p> <p>Provisions of a real estate and refunding mortgage of a railway company examined, and held, not to authorize the trustee thereunder to use moneys accumulated for the purchase by the mortgagor of bonds of another railway company.</p>

Appeal by Arabella D. Huntington, a property owner, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of March, 1912, overruling objections to the confirmation of the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment herein, and confirming the said report.

Appeal by the defendants, Henry B. Slayback and another, from part of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Hew York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 14th day of May, 1914.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Ettar Realty Company, from a judgment of the County Court of Bronx county in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 25th day of March, 1914, upon a dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case, and also from the order dismissing the complaint entered in said clerk’s office on the 1st'day of April, 1914.

Appeal by Blanche Hendricks, individually and as sole executrix, etc., from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in said Surrogate’s Court on the 9th day of May, 1914, affirming an order assessing a transfer tax.

Appeal by the defendant, Illinois National Bank, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 29th day of April, 1913, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues.

Appeal by the defendant, The City of New York, from an order and determination of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 11th day of December, 1913, affirming a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York in plaintiff’s favor for $500, with interest and costs.

Appeal by the defendants, The County of Erie and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 30th day of December, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Erie Special Term.

Appeal by the defendant, Charles M. Bedell, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Onondaga on the Tth day of July, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Onondaga Special Term.

Appeal by the defendant, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 5th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $1,600, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 1th day of January, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a hew trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Intoxicating liquors—violation of statute by selling liquors on Sunday without serving meals therewith — evidence of special agents — corroboration unnecessary.</p> <p>Where in an action to recover upon a liquor tax bond upon the ground that the defendant violated the Liquor Tax Law by the selling of liquors on Sunday without serving meals therewith, it appears that special agents employed by the plaintiff were told by'the defendant’s waiter that they could not have a drink of whisky unless they bought something to eat, in response to which they stated that they did not want to eat but if it were necessary to buy something in order to get a drink of liquor they would do so, and that then sandwiches were brought and paid for, but not eaten, a violation of the law is established.</p> <p>Special agents employed by Commissioner of Excise are not accomplices in the commission of a crime and it is not necessary to corroborate their evidence as a matter of law to establish the fact that the statute has been violated.</p> <p>Dowling, J., dissented.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Louis Block, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 18th day of April, 1914, overruling his demurrer to the first separate defense set up in the answer, and striking out his demurrer to the third separate defense.

Appeal by the defendant, Erie Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Steuben on the 11th day of September, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $5,500, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 26th day of September, 1913, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Negligence — action for death.—Federal Employers’ Liability Act — interest on verdict.</p> <p>Under section 1904 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff in an action for death brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is not entitled to tax interest on a verdict in her favor from the date of the death.</p>

■ Cross-appeals by the plaintiff, William B., Curtis, as trustee, etc., and by the defendants, Dunkirk Savings and Loan Association and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Chautauqua on the 8th day of December, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court without a jury.

Appeal by the defendant, The New York Central and Hudson Elver Eailroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 10th day of April, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the New York Special Term.

Appeal by the defendants, Continental Asphalt Paving Company and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 28th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 23d day of January, 1914, denying defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Appeal by the defendant, The Western Union Telegraph Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of April, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the New York Special Term.</p> <p>Appeal by the plaintiff, George 0. Glendening, from so much of said judgment as decrees that plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages only in this action.</p> <p>The judgment restrained the defendant from interfering with plaintiff’s possession of the store 8, 10 and 12 Dey street, and the storeroom in the basement thereunder, in the city of New York.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Lucius H. Beers, as trustee, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 26th day of January, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court without a jury.

Appeal by the defendant, The Corn Exchange Bank, from an order and determination of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 6th day of March, 1914, reversing a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York in favor of the defendant and directing judgment in plaintiff’s favor. The facts were stipulated as follows: “First.

Appeal by the defendants, Anna May Blake and others, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 9 th day of December, 1913, upon the report of a referee in an action for the partition of real property. Appeal by the plaintiff, Charles Yung, and the defendant, Charles Francis Yung, from parts of said judgment.

<p>Trial — general verdict—landlord and tenant—provisions of lease construed—when occupation under sub-lease does not constitute an assignment rendering alleged assignee liable under original lease — estoppel.</p> <p>A judgment on a general verdict cannot be sustained unless the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding in favor of the plaintiff on all propositions left to them as questions of fact.</p> <p>Where a lease made on the 25th day of August, 1903, expressly provides that the premises were granted for a term of twenty-one years ending-on the 1st day of November, 1924, and that the lessee shall be permitted to enter upon the premises upon the date of the lease and hold the same rent free until the 1st day of November, 1903, the lease should be deemed to end on the 1st day of November, 1924, notwithstanding the specification of the term of twenty-one years, and a sub-lease from July 14, 1908, to October 1, 1924, cannot be held to be equivalent to an assignment of the original lease so as to render an assignee thereof who took possession as security for a loan liable for rent and taxes under the original lease.</p> <p>As the sub-lease was recorded and was, therefore, constructive notice to the lessor, the assignee was not estopped from denying that it had taken an assignment of the original lease by conversations between its president and the lessor’s agent to the effect that it would take over the lessee’s interest and go on with it and would pay the taxes.</p>

Appeal, by the defendant, American Fruit Product Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 26th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $1,500, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 6th day of February, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, James S. Herrman, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of June, 1913, setting aside the verdict of a jury in plaintiff’s favor for $17,051.30, and granting defendant’s motion for a new trial; also an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the same time and entered on the same day denying plaintiff’s motion to add interest from…

Appeal by the defendants, Adelaide M. Anderson and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Sullivan on the 25th day of May, 1912, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Columbia Special Term in an action to foreclose a mortgage. A special verdict of a jury was taken on a specific question of fact, which finding, however, was disapproved by the court who refused to adopt it.

Appeal by the defendant, Henry B. Sire, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, adjudging defendant guilty of contempt of court in failing to appear and to submit to an examination in proceedings supplementary to execution, and. fining him therefor the sum of $250.

Appeal by Harvey H. Hevenor, judgment debtor, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Hew York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 5th day of Hovember, 1913.

Appeal by Fannie Van Schaick, individually and as executrix, etc., from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in said Surrogate’s Court on the 26th day of September, 1913, and also from said decree, as amended by an order entered in said court on the 8th day of October, 1913.

Appeal by The City of New York from part of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Bockland Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 20th day of January, 1914.

Appeal by the defendant, Horwitz & Schanback, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 29th day of April, 1914.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Anna Stevens, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the, office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 19th day of May, 1914.

<p>Decedent’s estate — claim against estate for money loaned to deceased — evidence — checks and stubs as evidence of loan.</p> <p>Upon the presentation of a claim against an estate for money loaned to the deceased, it is reversible error to allow the claimant to read checks with their stubs into the record and characterize them as having been made by himself, indorsed by the deceased, and paid, and as representing the alleged loans made to the deceased.</p> <p>The checks and stubs of themselves would be insufficient to establish the loans.</p>

<p>Submission of a controversy upon an agreed statement of facts, pursuant to section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Appeal — duty of County Court to transmit copy of notice of appeal, etc., in criminal case, without charge, to clerk of Appellate Division.</p> <p>A county clerk is bound under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to transmit to the clerk of the Appellate Division, without charge, a certified copy of the notice of appeal, judgment roll and a transcript of the stenographer’s minutes of the proceedings upon the trial of a criminal case.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 17th day of May, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 16th day of May, 1913, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Motion by the plaintiff, Jennie S. Moren, for a new trial upon a case containing exceptions, ordered to be heard at the Appellate Division in the first instance, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case upon a trial before the court and jury at the Kings County Trial Term in October, 1913.

Appeal by the defendant, The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Eailroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 14th day of February, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $40,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 13th day of February, 1914, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, and also from an order entered in said…

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff, John Streuber, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 20th day of February, 1914, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close .of the plaintiff’s case.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Joseph Fegelli, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered against him at the Kings County Trial Term on the 22d day of December, 1913, convicting him of the crime of knowingly receiving the proceeds of prostitution (Penal Law, § 2460, subd. 8) as a second offense, being under the fourth count of the indictment.

Appeal by the defendant, George Cohen, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Dutchess on the 26th day of March, 1914, granting plaintiff’s prayer for a mandatory injunction preventing interference with his right of way and directing the removal of the defendant’s structures thereon pursuant to the decision of the court after a trial at the Dutchess Special Term.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Fred Bauer, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 19th day of ¡November, 1913, granting defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict of a jury in plaintiff’s favor for $2,500 and for a new trial.

<p>Appeal by the defendants, Samuel Jankelson and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 19th day of November, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $2,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 25th day of November, 1913, denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Morris Berry, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 24th day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 26th day of January, 1914, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendant, American Bridge Company of New York, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 19 th day of June, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $32,396.50, and also from two orders entered in said clerk’s office on the 19th and 26th days of June, 1913, respectively, denying defendant’s motions for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendant, The Long Island Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 6th day of February, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $6,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29th day of January, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff, William T. Emmet, as Superintendent of Insurance, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of March, 1914, dismissing the complaint upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court without a jury at the New York Trial Term.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Augusta Wickstrom, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 3d day of July, 1913, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case upon a trial before the court and a jury at the New York Trial Term.

Appeal by the relator, Julius Goldstein, from an order of the County Court of the county of Westchester, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 4th day of February, 1914.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Frank P. Danzilo, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 21st day of May, 1914, suspending the lien of a judgment on appeal.

Appeal by the plaintiff, The People of the State of New York, from an order of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, entered in the office of the clerk of said court on the 2Hh day of April, 1914, granting a motion in arrest of judgment herein. Sentence was suspended upon the defendant, after his conviction, upon an information filed by the district attorney of the county of New York, charging him with violating section 93b of the Labor Law (Consol.

Appeal by the plaintiff, David Wagner, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 8th day of January, 1914, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court at the New York Trial Term, a jury having been waived.

<p>Insurance — life insurance — section 88 of Insurance Law, relating to lapsed or forfeited policies, construed — when beneficiary only entitled to paid-up insurance upon lapse of policy by failure to pay premium.</p> <p>Section 88 of the Insurance Law permits parties to a life insurance contract to agree in the application or in the policy itself, in the event of a lapse for non-payment of a premium, either to the continuance of the policy at its full amount so long as such single premium will purchase temporary insurance, or to the issuance of a policy of paid-up insurance.</p> <p>It is only when no such agreement is expressed in the application or policy that a choice of the modes specified in the statute is available to the insured.</p> <p>Hence, where a policy of insurance provides that “If after three years from the date hereof, this Policy be terminated solely by the non-payment of any premium when due, the owner hereof will be entitled to the surrender value in extended insurance * * * provided written application thereof shall be made while this Policy is in full force and effect; otherwise, if this Policy be duly surrendered within six months after such termination, a paid-up policy for an equitable amount ® * * will be issued in exchange therefor,” and the insured fails to make application for extended insurance under the terms of his policy, which lapses upon the failure to pay a premium, the beneficiary is bound to accept a paid-up policy.</p>

<p>Sale — conditional sale — attempted sale of chattels pursuant to the provisions of the Personal Property Law pending an action to recover possession of the same—-right of vendee to recover installments paid.</p> <p>A vendee under a conditional contract Of sale is entitled to recover the amount of payments made by him where the vendor, after default by the vendee and pending an action for recovery of the chattels and before the entry of a judgment therein, sells the same in attempted compliance with the provisions of the Personal Property Law. This, because the chattels were during the pendency of the action 'in custodia legis, and were not “retaken by the vendor,” within the meaning of section 65 of the Personal Property Law, until the final judgment awarding him. possession.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Thomas Merritt, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Orange on the 13th day of February, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 24th day of February, 1914, denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, with notice of an intention to bring up for review part of…

Appeal by Frederick W. Senff and others, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Queens, entered in the said Surrogate’s Court on the 10th day of February, 1913, admitting to probate a paper offered as and for a codicil to the last will and testament of Charles H. Senff, deceased.

Appeal by Henry E. 0. Watson, as executor and trustee, etc., from part of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Westchester, entered in said Surrogate’s Court on the 1st day of December, 1913, settling his accounts.

<p>Crime — indictment — failure to procure order of resubmission after demurrer has been sustained.</p> <p>Where a demurrer to an indictment has been sustained, a second indictment for the same crime cannot be lawfully found without procuring an order of resubmission as authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure.</p> <p>Where upon the trial of a defendant his counsel objected that the indictment had been found illegally in that the grand jury was without jurisdiction because a demurrer to a prior indictment for the same offense had been interposed and no order for resubmission granted, and the records of the court and the testimony of an assistant district attorney substantiate this contention, a judgment of conviction should be reversed.</p>

Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 23d day of October, 1913, directed to Rhinelander Waldo, as police commissioner of the city of New York, commanding him to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the county of Kings all and singular his proceedings had in dismissing the relator from the police force of the city of New York.

Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 6th day of January, 191-1, directed to Douglas I. McKay, as police commissioner of the city of New York, commanding him to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the county of Kings all and singular his proceedings had in dismissing the relator from the police force of the city of New York.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Automatic Sprinkler Company of America, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 7th day of July, 1913, setting aside the verdict of a jury in plaintiff’s favor rendered by direction of the court, and granting a new trial as a matter of law.

<p>Municipal corporations — city of New York — action for personal injuries — failure to allege filing of notice of intention to sue pursuant to chapter 572 of the Laws of 1886 — nuisance.</p> <p>A complaint in an action against the city of New York by an engineer in the fire department to recover for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained by an explosion while examining the pipe projecting from a gasoline tank, which alleges the maintenance by the defendant below the surface of the ground of a tank for the storage of a limited quantity of gasoline, and also of a drain for surface water by absorption or percolation, does not state a cause of action for a nuisance.</p> <p>The failure of a plaintiff in an action against the city of New York to recover for personal injuries based on negligence to allege the filing with the corporation counsel of a notice of intention to sue within six months after the cause of action accrued in compliance with chapter 572 of the Laws of 1886, is fatal, but such statute does not apply to actions for a nuisance:</p>

Appeal by the defendant, The City of New York, from, a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of June, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the New York Special Term. The judgment enjoined defendant from enforcing as against plaintiffs certain ordinances by requiring the payment of compensation for the use of vault space.

Appeal by the defendants, J. Gabriel Britt and others, from an order of the Supreme Court made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 24th day of August, 1914, granting relators’ motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring those of them who are custodians of the primary records and commissioners of elections of the city of New York and the city clerk of said city to refrain from taking any proceedings for…

Appeal by the plaintiff, The Colorado and Southern Railway Company, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of certain of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 29th day of August, 1913, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 4th day of April, 1914, directed to the Public Service Commission for the First District and Edward E. McCall and others, as commissioners thereof, commanding them to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the- county of New York all and singular their proceedings had in dismissing the complaint of the relator against the New York Edison Company.

Appeal by the plaintiff, First Commercial Bank of Pontiac, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 5th day of December, 1913, sustaining a demurrer to the first and third causes of action set up in the amended complaint, with leave to plaintiff to amend upon payment of costs.

Appeal, in the first action, by the defendants, Daniel J. McBride and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Steuben on the 6th day of October, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court at the Steuben Trial Term, a jury having been waived.

<p>Libel — complaint stating separate causes of action — dismissal of first cause of action—publication maybe considered in connection with other causes properly set forth—when publication should not be divided — striking portions from record —words libelous per se.</p> <p>Where in an action for a libel which by innuendo is alleged to have charged the plaintiff with the crime of participating in a violation of the Liquor Tax Law, etc., the court has ruled that there can be no recovery upon a first cause of action, it is not error to refuse to strike the article .from the record and to refuse to charge that the jury cannot consider it in connection with other separate causes of action which .are well pleaded.</p> <p>Where a long" article, admitted to have been published by the defendant, charged the plaintiff with various shortcomings, the defendant is not entitled to have the article divided and to a nonsuit as to some particular parts thereof, if the defendant fails to justify the publication.</p> <p>Where a publication, taken in connection with prior publications, in effect charged the plaintiff with being an “up-to-date gold brick swindler,” it is libelous per se.</p>

Appeal by the relator, Joseph G-. Robin, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Ulster Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ulster on the 13th day of September, 1913, quashing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the relator to custody, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 7th day of February, 1914, denying relator’s application upon a renewal, rehearing and reargument of the original writ.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Eleanor 0. Rosekrans, and the defendants, Elizabeth Rosekrans and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of certain of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 15th day of January, 1914, dismissing the complaint upon the merits upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Kings County Special Term.

Appeal by the relator, Owen B. Murphy, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, denying relator’s application for a peremptory writ of mandamus.

Appeal by the defendants, J. Gabriel Britt and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 24th day of August, 1914, granting relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring defendants to certify at the coming primary and general elections for the year 1914 to the existence of but one vacancy in the office of justice of the City Court of the City of New York.

Appeal by the plaintiff, William Jay Schieffelin, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 25th day of August, 1914, denying his application for an injunction to restrain the boards of elections and the election officials of the State from taking steps preliminary to the nomination and election of delegates to a constitutional convention.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Alvan Adams, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Tioga on the 8th day of January, 1914, upon a dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of the case upon a trial before the court and a jury.

Appeal by the defendant, Schenectady County Coal Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Schenectady on the 22d day of December, 1913, as resettled by an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 15th day of January, 1914. The judgment was entered upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Schenectady Special Term in an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien.

Appeal by the defendant, Natural Carbonic Gas Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Saratoga Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 10th day of February, 1914, granting a discontinuance of the action without prejudice to any right by action or proceeding which the defendant may have upon the undertaking given by plaintiffs upon obtaining the preliminary injunction herein, and denying defendant’s motion for a…

<p>Appeal by the defendant, Paquette Falls Land Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Montgomery Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Essex on the 1st day of May, 1914, denying a motion made by the defendant.</p>

Application by the American and Foreign Marine Insurance Company of New York for a writ of certiorari directed to William Sohmer, as Comptroller of the State of New York, to review a determination of said State Comptroller whereby he refused to revise and readjust the petitioner’s franchise tax for the year 1913.

Appeal by the defendant, Leo F. Adt, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 3d day of November, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $4,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Clarence E. Pitts, from an order and judgment of the County Court of Franklin county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 6th day of November, 1913, reversing a judgment of a Justice’s Court in plaintiff’s favor.

Appeal by the defendant, Louis Fishman, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Sullivan on the 16th day of June, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 5th day of July, 1913, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 20th day of August, 1913, directed to State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Hew York and Thomas F. Byrnes and others, as State Tax Commissioners, or members of the said State Board of Tax Commissioners, commanding them to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the county of Albany all and singular their proceedings had in dismissing the appeal of the relator, the Town of Hempstead, from the…

Appeal by the plaintiffs, Joseph P. Kinner and another, as administrators, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Washington on the 14th day of May, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial before the court without a jury.

Appeal by the defendant, Leonard C. Piser, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Washington on the 21st day of September, 1911, upon the decision of a referee appointed to hear and determine the issues, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day, granting plaintiffs an extra allowance.

Separate appeals by the proponent, John J. Sinnott, and the contestant, Edward H. Sinnott, from parts of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in said Surrogate’s Court on or about the 22d day of November, 1913.

Appeal by the defendant, Amelia G. Spencer, individually and as executrix, etc., from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Otsego on the 8th day of April, 1914, denying appellant’s motion to compel the plaintiff to assign the mortgages in suit to her upon the payment of the amount due thereon.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Gragry Bitondo, as administrator, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Schenectady on the 4th day of April, 1914, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of the case on a trial before the court and a jury at the Schenectady Trial Term.

Appeal by the relator, George G. Smith, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Albany Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 9th day of April, 1914, denying his motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus and dismissing the proceedings.

<p>Real property — easement — right of way over railroad property acquired by prescription — parties —suit by one of several tenants in common—waiver of failure to j oin parties —action by trustee — agreement not creating tenancy in common.</p> <p>Where a railroad company by condemning aright of way cut off the plaintiff’s predecessor from all means of ingress to or egress from his lands to a highway, except over the lands of adjoining owners, and constructed on property owned by it a gate in the fence line for the express use of the plaintiff’s predecessor so that he could reach the highway by a well-defined road not used for railroad or public purposes, and the plaintiff and his predecessor used said way for over thirty years under a claim of right, he acquires a right of way by prescription. And this is so, although the railroad company and its successors at times sought to obstruct the way, if the plaintiff asserted his rights and forced a passage.</p> <p>It seems, that a right of way can be obtained by prescription within the right of way of a railroad company, where the facts are sufficient to warrant the finding, and especially as to such portions of the way as have not been dedicated to public use.</p> <p>The defendant railroad company waives the objection that the plaintiff was a tenant in common and should have joined the other tenants in common as parties to the action, where the objection was not taken by demurrer or answer.</p> <p>It seems, that as the parcel of land was conveyed to the plaintiff as “trustee,” he may bring action without joining with him the other persons interested.</p> <p>It seems, that where the plaintiff took title with the understanding that he was to pay other persons certain sums of money and has done so, or made arrangements to do so, the relation between them is not that of tenants in common, though the person unpaid may have an equitable lien.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered on the 39th day. of November, 1913, denying a motion to vacate and set aside a referee’s report.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Term, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 17th day of June, 1913, affirming a judgment of the Municipal Court and an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 17th day of January, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury and also from an order entered on the 18th day of January, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a final order of the Supreme Court, as resettled by an order entered on the 4th day of June, 1913, directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus, and from an order entered on the 36th day of May, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 28th day of May, 1913, on verdict, and also from an order entered on the 27th day of May, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Hew York, entered on the 19th day of December, 1913, which affirmed an order fixing a transfer tax on the estate.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 24th day of December, 1913, denying a motion for a receiver of the assets of the defendant Gilbert Manufacturing Company, during the pendency of the action.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 11th day of July, 1913, denying a motion for an injunction during the pendency of the action.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the New county clerk’s office on the 5th day of November, 1913, upon a verdict, and also from an order entered on the 20th day of November, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Charges preferred by the New York County Lawyers’ Association against the respondent for professional misconduct.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 15th day of May, 1913, and also from an order entered on the 34th day of March, 1918.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered on the 4th day of June, 1918, convicting the defendant of the crime of arson in the second degree.</p>

<p>Certiorari to review a determination of the police commissioner of the city of New York.</p>

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Nassau on the 23d day of October, 1913, in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 3d day of December, 1913, denying his motion for a new trial.

<p> Debtor and creditor —fraudulent conveyance to wife. </p>

<p>Crime — seduction — evidence.</p>

Appeal by the defendants, Henry E. Beakey and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 10th day of July, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Kings County Special Term. Judgment affirmed, with costs, on the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmar at. Special Term. J enks, P. J., Burr, Cárr, Rich and Stapleton, J J., concurred.

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, made at Special Term and entered in the ¡New York county clerk’s office on the 23d day of March, 1914, directing the plaintiff to serve a reply to the first defense and the third partial defense in amended answer.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, as resettled by an order entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 1st day of April, 1914, as denies its motion for an injunction; also an appeal by certain of the defendants from the parts of said order which grant the plaintiff an injunction.

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 15th day of April, 1914, denying a motion for an open commission to examine a witness in London, England, and to stay the trial of the action until the return of such commission.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 38th day of June, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the 35th day of August. 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 8d day of March, 1914, denying a motion to compel the plaintiff’s attorney to disclose the address of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Term, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 3d day of January, 1914, affirming a judgment of the Municipal Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 15th day of January, 1914, dismissing complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case upon a trial at Trial Term, and also from an order entered on the lGth day of January, 1914, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 5th day of June, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the 6th day of June, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Hew York, entered on the 17th day of June, 1913, so far as it failed to allow commissions to the appellants for receiving principal of estate upon their appointment as successor trustees.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 2d day of April, 1914, denying a motion for leave to serve an amended complaint.</p>

<p> Decedent's estate—will. </p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 18th day of October, 1912, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 25th day of October, 1912, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, made at Special Term and entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 20th day of December, 1913, denying a motion to confirm the report of a referee to discontinue the action and to cancel an attorney’s lien.

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 5th day of December, 1913, denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings and sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

<p>Court — calendar practice.</p>

<p>Appeal from a determination of the Appellate Term reversing an order of the City Court which denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside a verdict and for a new trial, and ordering judgment in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 5th day of December, 1913, denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings.</p>

<p> Attorney censured. </p>

Charges of professional misconduct against the respondent, an attorney and counselor at law, presented by the Association of the Bar of the City of Hew York.

Charges of professional misconduct against the respondent, an attorney and counselor at law, by the Association of the Bar of the City of Hew York.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, made at Special Term and entered in the Sew York county clerk’s office on the 24th day of January, 1914, granting the defendant’s motion for a further bill of particulars.

<p> Sale—false representations—inconsistent verdict. </p>

<p>Accounting— depositions.</p>

Appeals by Joseph J. Hearns and another, individually and as executors, etc., of Stewart Barr, deceased, and by Beatrix H. Barr, by Fannie B. Barr, her guardian ad litem, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Kings, entered in said court on the 30th day of June, 1913.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Nassau on the 20th day of May, 1913, in favor of the defendants, and from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 9th day of June, 1913, denying his motion for a new trial.

<p> Appeal —practice. </p>

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 6th day of October, 1913, in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 3d day of October, 1913, denying his motion for a new trial.

<p>Equity — specific pe-rformance.</p>

Cross-appeals by the plaintiff and the defendant, R. V. Wechsler Realty Company, from such parts of a judgment of the Supreme Court, made at Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 24th day of June, 1913, as dismiss the complaint and the counterclaim respectively.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court of Kings county, rendered on the 15th day of December, 1913, convicting him of the crime of carrying a dangerous weapon. Judgment of conviction of the County Court of Kings county affirmed. No opinion. Jenks, P. J., Burr, Carr and Rich JJ., concurred; Thomas, J., read for reversal.

<p>Contract —duress—presumption—beer agreement — transfer of liquor tax certificate.</p>

<p>Motion for a reargument. (See 162 App. Div. 911.)</p>

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs, upon the opinion of Hasbrouck, J., at Trial Term. The following is the opinion of the court below:

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 5th day of May, 1914, granting a motion for a preference.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 5th day of May, 1914, denying a motion for a commission to take the depositions of witnesses without the State.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 13th day of May, 1913, upon a verdict, and also from an order entered on the 6th day of June, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Term, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 30th day of December, 1913, reversing an order of the City Court setting aside a verdict and granting a new-trial, and from an order of the City Court entered upon such determination.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s, office on the 8th day of Hovember, 1912, upon a verdict, and also from an order entered on the 4th day of Hovember, 1912, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 16th day of March, 1914, on the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the same day denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Term, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 6th day of April, 1914, affirming an order of the City Court denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew-York county clerk’s office on the Sth day of December, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the 9th day of December, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 7th day of March, 1914, granting a motion for a commission on written interrogatories.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the ISth day of January, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the same day denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered on the 9th day of April, 1914, confirming an order authorizing administrator to compromise claim.</p>

<p>Appeal from orders of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 8th day of April, 1914, granting the plaintiff’s motion for a bill of particulars.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the New York county clerk’s office on the 13th day of December, 1913, on the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered on the 26th day of December, 1913, denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 26th day of May, 1914, directing appellants to furnish verified bill of particulars.</p>

<p>Banking — delinquent bank — Superintendent of Banks in possession — completing contract for sale bf land.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Nassau on the 19th day of February, 1913, upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Nassau Special Term.</p>

<p>Attorney and client — discipline — excessive bill of costs.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Nassau county, entered in said court on the 25th day of February, 1914, modifying a previous order.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the Hew York county clerk’s office on the 39th day of October, 1913, setting aside a verdict and ordering a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and to the weight of the evidence.</p>