Knott Corp. v. Furman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 10 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““There is a distinction between express and implied consent, but this distinction has relation to the origin of the cause of action, not to the effect on venue. It is reasonable to imply consent to suit and service of process from the doing of business within the state as to causes of action arising out. of such business but not as to other causes of action. There is no reason for any distinction between express and implied consent, however, when it comes to the waiver of venue. If the doing of business can be held to furnish the basis of consent with respect to suit in the courts of the state, there is no reason why it should not be equally efficacious with respect to furnishing the basis of consent to suit in the federal courts. ■. If the view be taken that the consent is wholly fictitious, there is no reason why the fiction should not serve as well in the one case as in the other. If the court, ‘for purposes of justice,’ to use the language of Judge Learned Hand in the Smolik case, supra (222 F. [148] 151), treats the situation as if there had been consent, there is no reason why ‘purposes of justice’ should not be considered under federal as well as under state statutes. 'Certainly no purpose of justice is served 'by permitting a defendant to. be sued in the state but not the federal courts in a situation such as this, where the defendant himself unquestionably has the right to remove the case to the federal courts if sued in the state courts.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 108 F. Supp. 28 - Archambeau v. Emerson · 209 F. Supp. 499 - Goldberg v. Wharf Constructers

2. ““We come, then, to the question as to .whether the application of the statute is different because the business done was on the Fort Monroe Military Reservation. We do not think so. It would be an anomalous result, indeed, if a foreign corporation doing business in Virginia could not be sued in a federal court with respect to business done merely because it was done on federal territory; and we find nothing in the law which would lead to any such result. * * * ****** “Corporations doing business on the reservation come in contact with the citizens of Virginia and do business with them in the same way as foreign corporations doing business elsewhere within the state, and there is the same reason for making them amenable to process in the local courts. Since the state has retained the right to serve process on foreign corporations as well as on others within the reservation and has the power to say what shall constitute such service, it follows that any act which may be legally taken as an acceptance of service elsewhere within the state may be so taken within the reservation. This necessarily means that the doing of business by a foreign corporation within the reservation has the same effect, so far as submitting itself to the local jurisdiction for the service of process is concerned, as doing business elsewhere within the state.” 163 F.2d at page 206 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland · 111 F. Supp. 92 - Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co.

3. ““ * * * It is reasonable to imply consent to suit and service of process from the doing of business within the state as to causes of action arising out of such business but not as to other causes of action. There is no reason for any distinction between express and implied consent, however, when it comes to the waiver of venue. If the doing of business can be held to furnish the basis of consent with respect to suit in the courts of the state, there is no reason why it should not be equally efficacious with respect to furnishing the basis of consent to suit in the federal courts. If the view be taken that the consent is wholly fictitious, there is no reason why the fiction should not serve as well in the one case as in the other. If the court, ‘for purposes of justice’, to use the language of Judge Learned Hand in the Smolik case, supra, ([Smolik v. Philadelphia etc. Co., D.C.] 222 F. [148] 151), treats the situation as if there had been consent, there is no reason why ‘purposes of justice’ should not be considered under federal as well as under state statutes. Certainly no purpose of justice is served by permitting a defendant to be sued in the state but not the federal courts in a situation such as this, where the defendant himself unquestionably has the right 'to remove the case to the federal courts if sued in the state courts. “A very similar question has been raised in two of the District Courts of this Circuit in actions before Judges Waring and Chestnut in Krueger v. ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 95 F. Supp. 524 - Burnett v. Swenson