¶1The appellant, Pinkston, was convicted of the unlawful sale of narcotics (heroin) in a trial to the court. The sole error assigned is that the court erred in denying a motion *634for a directed finding made at the conclusion of the state’s case in chief.
¶2The trial court denied the motion and Pinkston elected to proceed with the presentation of her evidence. At the conclusion of all the evidence no effort was made to renew the motion. The motion to correct errors and Pinkston’s argument on appeal do not assert that the decision was not sustained by the evidence or was contrary to law.
¶3We are thus presented with the question of whether any error has been preserved for appeal. We conclude that it has not.
¶4IC 1971, 35-4.1-2-2, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1102 (Burns 1974 Supp.) and Indiana Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 21, provide for application of the rules of civil procedure to criminal trials when those rules do not conflict with express rules of criminal procedure. Rule Tr. 41(B) is applicable to a criminal trial. It provides the mechanism for a “directed finding” in a trial to the court by permitting a motion for involuntary dismissal based upon failure of proof.
¶5Other decisions have already noted that TR. 41(B) and TR. 50 (providing for judgment on the evidence in jury trials) are to be construed as companion rules and do not materially modify the practice formerly followed in Indiana. See, Hoosier Ins. Co. v. Ogle (1971), 150 Ind. App. 590, 276 N.E.2d 876; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Verzele (1971), 148 Ind. App. 429, 267 N.E.2d 193.
¶6Traditionally, where such a motion was denied, the movant was put to an election. She could stand on the record and seek reversal on appeal, or she could proceed to present her own evidence.
¶7While some of the reasons for this waiver doctrine are to be found in the code pleading theories of another day, a more enduring reason lies in the recognition of substance over form and the desire that cases be adjudicated upon their factual merits. Thus, if the defect is cured as a result of the subsequent evidence, justice requires that the court consider such evidence in reaching its decision. This was recognized by the framers of Rule TR. 41(B) in providing that when the motion is made, the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. The necessary implication of that provision is that the court may consider all the evidence. Thus, the court in Hoosier Ins. Co. v. Ogle, supra,held that under TR. 41(B) a defendant waives any error in the denial of his motion if he proceeds with the presentation of evidence.
¶8Accordingly, since no error but the overruling of the motion was assigned, and since any error in that ruling was waived by Pinkston’s election to proceed with the introduction of evidence, no error was preserved for appeal.
¶9Affirmed.
¶10. It is unnecessary to consider the evolution of the reservation of the right to proceed. Early problems appear to have arisen from the concept that the motion was in actuality or effect a demurrer to the evidence.
¶11. The cases clearly establish the election to proceed and the introduction of evidence as the operative event. Some of the decisions further analogize to jury trial practice and additionally mention the failure to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence. See, e.g. Dowell v. Jolly (1959), 130 Ind. App. 280, 159 N.E.2d 590; McDaniels v. McDaniels (1945), 116 Ind. App. 322, 62 N.E.2d 876. Renewal of the motion in a trial to the court would appear to be superfluous to the preservation of error since the defect, if still present, can be reached by the assignment that the decision is not sustained by the evidence and is contrary to law. Accord: Farm & Home Ins. Co. v. Templeton (1967), 142 Ind. App. 110, 232 N.E.2d 367.
¶12. TR. 50(A) (6) expressly provides that error in the denial of a motion shall be deemed corrected by evidence thereafter offered or admitted.