Pulliam v. Pulliam’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Our code of civil procedure specifies the particular matters on which a trial court’s rulings will furnish a basis for an appeal (G. S. 1935, 60-3302). Resort to its provisions does not reveal that an order overruling a motion to strike is one of them. Clearly the motion to strike does not involve the merits of the action or any part thereof. It cannot be construed as a demurrer for we have held that an alleged defect in the affidavit verifying a divorce petition cannot be reached by demurrer (Warner v. Warner, 11 Kan. 121 ). Neither can it be regarded as the equivalent of a demurrer for if so treated it must, of course, concede the facts alleged in the pleading which if accepted as true unquestionably state a cause of action for divorce. Nor can the order overruling the motion be held to be a final order, the only other ground specified in the statute of possible application, not heretofore mentioned, which authorizes an intermediate appeal. True enough, we have held that an order striking a petition from the files is a final order and therefore appealable (Hicks v. Parker, 148 Kan. 679 , 84 P. 2d 905 ; Dwinnell v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 464 , 126 P. 2d 221 ). The reason for the rule announced in the decisions just cited is so obvious as almost to preclude the necessity of commenting upon it. When a motion to strike is sustained the plaintiff’s right to proceed with the cause on its merits is wiped out with the result the ruling is to all intents and purpose ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Materi v. Spurrier · Sherk, Administratrix v. Sherk

2. ““Appellant’s contention the amended verification to the petition does not relate hack to the date of the original petition is not tenable. Assuming, without passing upon his contention, the original affidavit was improperly verified it was, nevertheless, verified in such manner that at the very most it can be said to be voidable only. This court has so held (Swearingen v. Howser, 37 Kan. 126 , 14 Pac. 436 ; Cheyenne County Comm'rs v. Walter, 83 Kan. 743 , 112 Pac. 599 ; Belinder v. Cupp, 156 Kan. 729 , 137 P. 2d 139 ). In that situation, in attachment proceedings and proceedings to open judgments, we hold the original affidavit may be amended by a proper verification and that when the amendment is filed it will relate back to the original (Cheyenne County Comm’rs v. Walter, supra; Swearingen v. Howser, supra). We see no reason why the same rule should not be applicable to the affidavit to a petition in a divorce proceeding. Such is the general rule. See 17 Am. Jur. 310 , § 316, holding that even where, the verification of the petition in a divorce action is a jurisdictional requirement the right to amend by supplying the necessary verification before trial is generally recognized and 27 C. J. S. 713 § 120, stating amendment of defects in the affidavit should be allowed on timely request and that a plaintiff may properly be permitted to file an amended or substituted affidavit.” (p. 500.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ruggles v. Smith

3. ““We have repeatedly and uniformly held that the overruling of a motion to dismiss an action, made by the defendant, is not one of the orders of the district court from which an appeal lies to the supreme court until final disposition of the cause in the court below” (citing cases), (p. 499.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kansas State Highway Commission v. Moore