163 Md. App. 492 - Chow v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"(d) Restrictions on possession—In general.—A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) Has been convicted of: (i) A crime of violence; (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; (iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years; or (iv) Any violation classified as a common law offense where the person received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years. (2) Is: (i) A fugitive from justice; (ii) A habitual drunkard; (iii) Addicted to or a habitual user of any controlled dangerous substances; (iv) Suffering from a mental disorder as defined in § 10—101(f)(2) of the Health-General Article and has a history of violent behavior against another person or self, or has been confined for more than 30 consecutive days to a facility as defined in § 10-101 of the Health-General Article, unless the person possesses a physician's certification that the person is capable of possessing a regulated firearm without undue danger to the person or to others; or (v) A respondent against whom a current non ex parte civil protective order has been entered under § 4-506 of the Family Law Article. (3) Is less than 30 years of age at the time of possession and has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for committing: (i) A crime of violence; (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; or (iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalt”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Chow v. State

2. ““[Petitioner’s] friend, Man Nguyen, was the State’s main witness at trial. Nguyen testified that, while driving his car on April 1, 2003, he was stopped by the Prince George’s County Police Department for a broken taillight. At that time, the police searched Nguyen’s vehicle, and discovered a Glock semi-automatic pistol (not the weapon that is the subject of this appeal). The pistol was properly registered in Nguyen’s name, but he did not have a permit to carry it. The police confiscated it in connection with their investigation of a recent murder of one of Nguyen’s friends. “The following day, Nguyen contacted [petitioner]. Nguyen explained to [petitioner] that this gun and other guns at his home had been confiscated by the police, and he was ‘anxious’ to buy another gun. He told [petitioner] that he needed to purchase a gun for protection, by which he meant ‘[h]ome security,’ ‘[s]o, [petitioner] offered me his gun.’ “The two men arranged to meet later that day for lunch at a restaurant in Bowie, Maryland. Sometime during this meeting, [petitioner] gave Nguyen a nine millimeter, semiautomatic handgun that he had owned since 1996. “Nguyen told [petitioner] that he wanted to test fire the weapon before purchasing it. The pair got into Nguyen’s vehicle and headed to a firing range in Upper Marlboro. En route, Nguyen received a business call on his cellular telephone, requiring that he abort the trip to the firing range. Nguyen drove [petitioner] back to the restaurant where [pe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chow v. State

3. ““the Court was presented with the task of construing what is meant by the term ‘willfully,’ in the section that sets forth the penalty for violating certain provisions of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act. Id. at 186-89 [, 118 S.Ct. at 1942-44 , 141 L.Ed.2d at 197 ], See generally 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(1)(D). That act, incidentally, was enacted in part ‘to protect law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes.’ Bryan, 524 U.S. at 187 [, 118 S.Ct. at 1943 , 141 L.Ed.2d at 197 ]. By the act, Congress amended certain provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to ‘add a scienter requirement as a condition to the imposition of penalties for most of the unlawful acts defined in § 922.’ Id. at 187-88[, 118 S.Ct. at 1943 , 141 L.Ed.2d at 197 ]. Congress enacted, inter alia, § 924(a)(1), which at the time provided: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, subsection (b), (c), or (f) of this section, or in section 929, whoever— (A) knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter or in applying for any license or exemption or relief from disability under the provisions of this chapter; (B) knowingly violates subsection (a)(4), (f), (k), (r), (v), or (w) of section 922; (C) knowingly imports or brings into the United States or any possession thereof any firearm or ammun”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Chow v. State