Volume 163 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

Law of the case recovery of illegally collected taxes unjust enrichment county immunity prejudgment interest class action class decertification common fund equal protection. Finding that the trial court had jurisdiction over claims to recover overpayment of taxes was law of the case. Plaintiffs could not recover on unjust enrichment claim against the county even though the county unjustly retained moneys belonging to plaintiffs where the county no longer had possession of the funds. Trial court properly denied motion to decertify class action where all requirements for class certification were maintained and no individual calculations of damages were required because the parties stipulated to each class member's damages amount. Trial court properly ordered the county to pay the judgment on behalf of all plaintiffs' class to plaintiffs' counsel where court retained jurisdiction to ensure that all class members, including absent members, are remunerated. Trial court properly denied plaintiffs' equal protection claim where distinction between class members and other property owners occurred because members of the plaintiffs' class challenged their property values for taxation purposes and other property owners within the county did not. Trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claim for illegally collected taxes where evidence showed that the county collected taxes in excess of the amounts authorized by law.

The probate court erred by dismissing appellant's application for approval in advance of transfer of structured settlement payment rights based solely on a blanket policy in a local rule. The probate court failed to exercise its discretion by failing to consider the facts and circumstances of this case. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in concluding that alleged misuse by a teacher of a non-defective "body sock" that resulted in injury to a student was not a "physical defect[ ] within or on the grounds of" a public school building for purposes of overcoming political subdivision immunity under the exception stated in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). Judgment affirmed.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Trial court's determination that property held in an irrevocable trust was marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence where husband relinquished all interest in the property used to fund the trust and established the trust for wife's benefit and in order to protect the assets from federal estate taxation, thus demonstrating the donative intent necessary for the transfer to constitute a valid inter vivos gift.

sufficiency – Crim.R. 29(A) – engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity – association in fact enterprise – isolated incidents – predicate offenses – break-ins

Overruling four of its previous cases, the appellate court found the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion to dismiss an indictment charging appellee with various drug offenses based on the state's failure to adhere to the requirements set forth by R.C. 2925.51(E) without first finding the state had acted in bad faith by destroying the substance that served as the basis of those charged offenses where the evidence that was destroyed was only potentially useful evidence that could aid in appellee's defense rather than materially exculpatory evidence that could be used to exonerate appellee of the crimes for which he was charged. Therefore, because there was no evidence to indicate the state had acted in bad faith when it destroyed the evidence at issue, the trial court's decision to grant appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment was error.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record contrary to law R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) imposition of consecutive sentences commission of new offenses while on judicial release R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) conduct R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) agreed sentence H.B. 49 R.C. 2929.34(B)(3)(c)-(d). Imposition of consecutive prison sentences was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record or contrary to law. Trial court was not limited to consideration of the facts associated with the specific offenses to which defendant pled guilty in determining whether consecutive sentences were warranted. "Spirit" of H.B. 49 did not preclude trial court from imposing consecutive prison sentences where defendant agreed to a prison sentence as a condition of plea agreement and offenses to which defendant pled guilty included drug trafficking offenses. R.C. 2929.24(C) had no application to the fourth- and fifth-degree felonies to which defendant pled guilty.