OpenJurist › Volume 163 › S.C. › Page 421 163 S.C. 421
Gray v. Thomas Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1931-12-10
Good law ✅ — No negative treatment on record how we know
Decided 1931-12-10
How this case has been cited Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently January 1993
1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
2 0 1931 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 decided Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
View the full empirical analysis of this case →
¶1
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice Brease.
¶2
It is the opinion of this Court that the decree of his Honor, Circuit Judge Bonham, which will be reported, correctly disposed of the issues involved in the cause. Accordingly, the exceptions of the appellant are overruled, and the decree is affirmed.
Messrs. Justices Stabrer and Carter and C. C. Featherstone, Circuit Judge, concur.
Mr. Justice Cothran did not participate on account of illness.
Download
Copy
Embed on your site
iframe Markdown Preview card Button Hover to preview · click to copy the code
Case posture Posture Before BONHAM, J., Beaufort, June, 1928. Affirmed.Action by J.W. Gray against W.J. Thomas as Receiver of the Beaufort Bank and others. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
The decree of Judge Bonham in the lower Court, directed to be reported, follows:
In July, 1926, the Beaufort Bank, a corporation created by the laws of South Carolina to do a banking business, with its principal place of business at Beaufort, S.C. finding itself in financial difficulties, petitioned the State Bank Examiner to take over its business for a period of thirty days. Accordingly, on July 12, 1926, that officer took over the direction and control of the business of the bank pursuant to the provisions of Section 3981, Volume 3, Code 1922. Before the expiration of the period of thirty days, during which time the bank was in the hands of the Bank Examiner, to wit: August 10, 1926, on application to the Court, W.J. Thomas was appointed receiver of the bank, and is now engaged in liquidating its affairs. As soon as the Bank Examiner had taken over the business of the bank, and during the thirty-day period of his control, and before the appointment of the receiver on August 10, 1926, the officers and stockholders of the bank, aided by friends of the bank in the community, began efforts to raise funds and securities for the purpose of reopening it. Numerous meetings were held for the purpose of perfecting plans to this end. Strange to say, no minutes of any of these meetings were made. It would appear from parol testimony that they were not entirely harmonious, and there is diversity of opinion as to what occurred. This much seems clear: Committees were appointed to solicit and collect funds and securities to finance the reopening of the bank, and R.V. Bray and J.R. Bellamy were appointed trustees to receive and hold such contributions. The subscribers were to receive from the bank, when it reopened, certificates of deposit of the bank to the amount of their subscriptions. The plaintiff herein, J.W. Gray, made his note and executed his mortgage on the real estate described in the complaint in the sum of $10,000, which he left with his attorney W.J. Thomas, in whose office they were drawn, and who was an officer and stockholder of the bank, the note and mortgage to be delivered, as he testified, to the trustees appointed to receive
them, and to be held till the bank reopened, and then exchanged for a certificate of deposit of like amount. These papers were dated August 5, 1926. On or about August 6th, J.R. Bellamy and N.P. Bryan delivered to R.C. Horne, Jr., some $104,000 of the securities, including the note and mortgage of J.W. Gray hereinabove referred to. By whose direction or at whose instance this was done does not appear. On August 6, 1926, W.E. Richardson made the note of the Beaufort Bank in blank amount and blank as to the payee, which was also delivered to Horne, and Richardson also assigned in blank the securities which were delivered to Horne by Bellamy and Bryan. The note and the assignments were signed by W.E. Richardson as president of the Beaufort Bank.
It appears that the Beaufort Bank was indebted to the Hanover National Bank of New York in a sum of approximately $75,000, which was evidenced by the note of the Beaufort Bank, and for the securing the payment of which Hanover Bank held collaterals of the Beaufort Bank, which aggregated in value about $200,000. Horne testifies that the mission was given him of raising the money to pay the Hanover Bank, which would release the collaterals of the Beaufort Bank, which were about to be sold by Hanover Bank on August 12th. The plan was for Horne to go to Detroit and interest Mr. Edwin Denby and through him to raise the money, $75,000, with which to pay the debt to the Hanover Bank, and rescue the securities it held of the Beaufort Bank. He undertook the task. At Columbia he procured from W.W. Bradley, then the State Bank Examiner, a paper, of which the following is a copy:
State of South Carolina Executive Department State Bank Examiner W.W. Bradley, State Bank Examiner Columbia, S.C. August 7, 1926.
To Whom it may Concern:
This certifies that Mr. R.C. Horne, Jr., presented to me a list of collateral which he intends using for the purpose of borrowing certain funds to be turned over to the Beaufort Bank in reorganization. Mr. Horne requests that I state that these securities have not been heretofore pledged in any manner or owned by the Beaufort Bank. I can state as a certainty that the securities mentioned, and as indicated on list bearing my signature on its margin, have not heretofore belonged to the Beaufort Bank, and are now to be used for the benefit of said bank only by consent and agreement of the makers of the note, which consent, I understand, was voluntarily given.
Yours very truly,
W.W. BRADLEY,
WWB-PMH State Bank Examiner.
Thus equipped, Mr. Horne went to Detroit and entered upon negotiations with Mr. Denby to raise the sum of $75,000, with the stated purpose of relieving the situation with the Hanover Bank. Mr. Denby was unable to furnish the money himself, but did interest himself in the effort to get it from others, one of whom advised him to have nothing to do with the transaction. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Mr. J.J. Kennedy, partner of Mr. Denby in the practice of law, participated in these discussions, and was familiar with the whole situation. It was he, according to his recollection, who suggested, that Mr. Horne might be able to handle the situation with the New York bank with a smaller sum than $75,000; he thought they could get $25,000. Horne accepted this suggestion. Kennedy stated that the money was that of a client who demanded a premium of $2,000 for the loan. Accordingly, the note of the date of August 6, 1926 (left blank as to the amount, the name of the payee, and the time of payment), was filled in with the sum of $27,000, and the name of Edwin Denby, trustee;
the time of payment was sixty days after date. This note had been signed by W.E. Richardson, as president of the Beaufort Bank. At the same time, certain of the securities which Richardson, as president of Beaufort Bank, had assigned in blank were filled in with the name of Edwin Denby, trustee, and delivered to him. These amounted in the aggregate to $30,000, and included the note and mortgage of J.W. Gray for $10,000. With the money thus obtained, Horne went to New York to relieve the situation with the Hanover National Bank. He testifies that he accomplished his purpose by paying to that bank the $25,000 which he got from Mr. Denby and giving his individual note for the balance of the debt due by Beaufort Bank to Hanover Bank. One is left to infer that he secured the release of the Beaufort Bank collateral held by Hanover Bank. But it was admitted in argument before me that he did not get these collaterals. He did get the note of the Beaufort Bank in exchange for $25,000 and his individual note, but it is a fair inference that the Hanover Bank retained the collaterals as security for his note. They were never delivered to the Beaufort Bank, or to the receiver. What became of them, and the remainder of the $104,000 of new securities which Horne took to Detroit does not appear. The Beaufort Bank has never reopened.
When J.W. Gray discovered the use which had been made of his note and mortgage, he began this action to have them declared to be null and void, and to have the mortgage canceled of record. The action is against W.J. Thomas, as receiver of the Beaufort Bank, and Edwin Denby individually, and as trustee. W.J. Thomas, receiver, has not answered, and is in default. Mr. Denby answers, setting up the history of his transactions with R.C. Horne, Jr.; that he guaranteed the payment of the note given for the money to Horne, and the premium of $2,000, and has paid these sums and is now the owner and holder of the note for $27,000 and the securities ($30,000) which were given to secure
its payment; that by reason of the certificate given by the Bank Examiner to the representative of the bank, which was exhibited to this defendant, Horne was held out as being authorized to sell and dispose of said securities, and that neither the bank nor the receiver thereof, nor the Bank Examiner, can thereafter seek to repudiate, or set up lack of authority in reference to such sale. He further pleads that he purchased the note and mortgage given by the plaintiff to the Beaufort Bank for full value before maturity, and without notice or knowledge of any defenses which might exist between plaintiff and said Beaufort Bank, and that he is a holder in due course, and a bona fide holder before maturity. He admits certain allegations of the complaint, and denies those not admitted.
The case was referred to H. Klugh Purdy, Esq., as special referee, to take the testimony, and decide the issues of law and of fact. He has filed his report, by which he sustains the allegations of the defendant Denby. The matter was heard by me, by consent at Walterboro, on exceptions to the report of the special referee. It was ably and exhaustively argued, and counsel have submitted written briefs. I reserved my decision, which I come now to render. There are many ramifications of facts, and the preliminary statement of them is necessarily a long one. The exceptions are numerous, but I shall not take them up seriatim. I shall discuss them under a few general heads, which involves the determination of certain subsidiary issues included in the main questions.
Was the note executed by W.E. Richardson as president of Beaufort Bank a valid obligation of the bank? Were the securities assigned to the defendant Edwin Denby assets of the property of the Beaufort Bank? If they were, could W.E. Richardson, as president of the bank, dispose of them by assignment without the approval or direction of the State Bank Examiner during the thirty-day period when the bank was under the supervision and control of the State
Bank Examiner, under the provisions of Section 3981, Vol. 3, Code, 1922? In other words, did Edwin Denby acquire a valid title to the note and securities.
Is the defendant Edwin Denby a holder in due course without knowledge of any infirmities in the instruments or defect in the title of him who negotiated it?
As affecting Mr. Denby's title to the note and securities, did W.E. Richardson on August 6, 1926, have the power to make a valid note as president of the Beaufort Bank, it being borne in mind that at that time the bank was under supervision and control of the State Bank Examiner? The special referee, for whose opinion I have much respect, holds that at that time the bank was in the joint control of its officers and the State Bank Examiner. I think this is hardly an exact statement of this relationship. The lucid opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Law v. Bank , 123 S.C. 1 , 115 S.E., 812 , makes plain what that relationship is. It is there held that the executive officers of a bank, under the supervision and control of the Bank Examiner, may rightfully exercise any of the functions of their offices which they might have done before the bank was taken over by the Bank Examiner, provided it be done with the approval of the Bank Examiner or by his direction. His approval or direction is the prerequisite to give validity to the acts of the bank's officers in and about its business. The defendant's counsel seems to recognize this as the true interpretation of the opinion in the Law Case , and thinks he finds his approval and authority as did the special referee, in the certificate of the Bank Examiner, which he gave to Mr. Horne. I do not concur in this view. The testimony shows that Mr. Fant, then Assistant State Bank Examiner, was in immediate charge of the affairs of the Beaufort Bank after it was taken over by the State Bank Examiner. There is evidence that he participated in the meetings of the officers and stockholders of the bank, which had for their purposes the formulation of plans for reopening the bank.
But there is an utter absence of evidence to show that he knew anything of Richardson's intention to execute the note of the bank, and to assign the securities taken outside in aid of the reorganization of the bank. He was not examined as a witness in the case, nor was Richardson. If such knowledge on his part existed, it would have been easy to show it. Strange to say, no minutes of any of these meetings seem to have been kept. Why did not Horne or Bellamy or Bryan secure from Fant, who was in charge, a certificate to the effect that Richardson had been given authority by the Bank Examiner to make the note and assign the securities? Why were not Bellamy and Bryan examined in reference thereto? Instead, resort is had to the State Bank Examiner at his office in Columbia. The note and the securities, with Richardson's assignment as president, were not exhibited to Mr. Bradley. The certificate shows that only a list of securities was shown him. There is no mention of the note in the certificate; there is nothing there to show that the examiner knew of the existence of the note and of the assignment, and he testifies that he did not know. The note and the assignments are dated August 6th, and the certificate August 7th. If the examiner had given his approval before August 6th, it is not reasonable to suppose Horne would have exhibited to him a list of securities on August 7th, and asked him to certify that they were not the property of the bank, and had not been pledged by the bank. There is a complete failure to show that W.E. Richardson had the approval or direction of the State Bank Examiner to make the note which the defendant Denby holds. Both Mr. Denby and Mr. Kennedy testify that they thought and understood that the securities were the property of the bank, yet the very certificate upon which they rely informs them that these securities did not belong to the bank. They certainly could not have assumed then that the Bank Examiner had given Mr. Richardson authority to assign securities which he was therein assuring the world did not
belong to the bank. Mr. Bradley testifies that the whole transaction was outside the bank. The proof is satisfactory that these certificates were given in furtherance of the effort to reopen the bank; that they were to be held by the trustees to be delivered to the bank when it reopened, and was in position to accept them, and to issue therefore certificates of deposit. The bank never reopened. It never issued any certificates of deposit to Gray. Hence, it never acquired title to Gray's note and mortgage. Gray is not indebted to the bank; he has never received any consideration in any way, shape, or form for his note and mortgage. It does not admit of denial that Denby holds Gray's note and mortgage as collateral security for the note which W.E. Richardson signed as president of the Beaufort Bank. If the note is invalid, then Denby's title to the securities given to secure it is invalid. Richardson could not execute the note as president of the Beaufort Bank without the authority of the Bank Examiner, which he did not have. It is a singular fact that, although more than a year has elapsed since the maturity of the note, Mr. Denby has never presented the note for payment, nor filed a claim with the receiver.
Where there is no valid obligation there can be no lawful consideration for the security as a pledge, and if the original contract is void, property pledged in support of it can be recovered. 21 R.C.L., § 8, under title of Pledges.
Mr. Denby knew these things. Mr. Horne testifies that he explained the whole matter. Indeed, Mr. Denby, in effect, admits that he knew them. Then he knew that these securities were delivered to the trustees upon the condition that the bank should reopen and should issue certificates of deposit as the consideration for them. He knew there was no consideration passing at the time of their execution. The certificate upon which he places so much reliance expressly informs him that, while these securities were to be used to raise funds to be used in the reorganization of the bank,
they could not be used without the agreement and consent of the makers. True, the examiner says he understands that this consent has been voluntarily given. Since the only person with whom he held any converse in regard to them was Mr. Horne, it is a legitimate conclusion that his understanding came from Horne. Mr. Denby, in spite of the plain warning contained in this certificate that the Bank Examiner did not know that such consent had been given, was content to accept the information thereabout from the same interested source.
I am convinced that the defendant Edwin Denby acquired no valid title to the note made in the name of the Beaufort Bank, by W.E. Richardson, as president thereof, and therefore he acquired no valid title to the securities assigned in the name of the Beaufort Bank, by W.E. Richardson, as president thereof.
It was not seriously argued that Gray, the plaintiff, is estopped from contesting Denby's ownership of and title to his note and mortgage, because of the acts of Horne, the bank, the receiver, and the State Bank Examiner. None of these acted for him, or by his authority, or with his knowledge and consent. No one of them was his agent. There was nothing done by him to evidence the intentional relinquishment of his rights, which would operate as an estoppel.
Is the defendant Edwin Denby a holder in due course of the note made by Richardson in the name of the Beaufort Bank, and of the securities pledged to secure its payment?
To constitute one a holder in due course under the Negotiable Instrument Act, these essential conditions must exist:
1. That the instrument is complete and regular upon its face.
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact.
3. That he took it in good faith and for value.
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. Section 52, Negotiable Instrument Act, Section 3703, Volume 3, Code 1922,
I think it will be conceded that it is within the meaning of the act that, if one has notice or information which, if pursued, would lead to knowledge of infirmities in the instrument, or of defects in the title, he must follow that lead or suffer the consequences, he cannot willfully shut his eyes to signals of danger and claim to be an innocent holder in due course; the positions are incompatible.
A party must not be willfully blind and inattentive to such facts and circumstances as would lead him directly to the infirmities of the paper. Willful innocence is deemed equivalent to actual knowledge. A person who takes a bill under circumstances that excite suspicion, and have the means of knowledge, willfully abstains from making inquiries must be considered a holder with notice of equities — if any exist. 3 R.C.L., 1073.
Section 56 of the Act (Section 3707 of the Code) provides:
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith. I do not understand that the term bad faith as used in the section quoted is synonymous with actual fraud and dishonesty, but with a lack of frankness and perfectly fair dealing by which the purchaser of the instrument got an unfair, an unconscionable advantage. A Michigan case
thus states the proposition. The pledgee of property must not only be free from participation in the fraud of the pledgor, but must have no knowledge or notice of the fraud, or facts and circumstances calculated to put an ordinary prudent business man on inquiry to ascertain the truth. Ann. Cas., 1915-B, 894.
These securities in their uncompleted shape were offered to bankers in Detroit, who declined to handle them even as security for a loan, and one of them advised Mr. Denby to let them alone.
In the case of Fehr v. Campbell , 52 A.L.R., 506, there is a useful discussion of this question of good faith (as the Act puts it, bad faith).
The freedom from the defense of prior equities afforded to a holder in due course is an extraordinary protection, which, although having its origin in the law merchant, is closely akin to similar protection given in other types of cases by courts of equity; and running through all the authorities dealing with holders in due course we find the principle not always stated, perhaps, that he who seeks the protection given one in that position must have dealt fairly and honestly in acquiring the instrument in controversy and in regard to the rights of all prior parties; this is the kind of good faith which the law demands, and the principle is closely analogous to the equitable doctrine of clean hands. As said in Goodman v. Simonds , 20 How., 343, 366, 15 L.Ed., 934 , 941 : `Everyone must conduct himself honestly in respect to the antecedent parties. when he takes negotiable paper in order to acquire a title which will shield him against prior equities.'
This from the same case: But we are of opinion that this difference has no bearing on the principle involved, since all the cases on the subject, no matter at what point they touch it, indicate the demand for good faith on the part of one who takes a negotiable instrument as a requirement of general good faith. If such a person, when acquiring title, acts in bad faith in any material particular towards one to whom the party he is dealing with owed good faith he cannot be a holder in due course, and this is true no matter who so situated is immediately affected by his misconduct.
Mr. Denby was dealing with Horne, who held himself out as the representative and agent of the Beaufort Bank. Mr. Denby knew that the bank was in the hands of the Bank Examiner; that, in pursuance of a general plan to reopen the bank, Gray had given this note and mortgage upon the condition that it be held by trustees till the bank was reopened; he knew that there was no immediate consideration moving from the bank to Gray; that the consideration was that if and when the bank reopened Gray was to receive a certificate in the amount of his note and mortgage; if the bank did not open, the securities would not be delivered, and Gray would get nothing. Mr. Denby knew the conditions in Beaufort; he has a home there, and varied interests; he was a depositor in the Beaufort Bank, and the very day Horne offered him these securities he mailed to the bank his written agreement to leave his deposit in the bank for a stated period. He and his partner, Kennedy, negotiated a loan for Horne of $25,000, and Denby got as security therefor collateral of the face value of $30,000. Kennedy got $2,000 for getting the loan; he says Mr. Denby got none of this; that it all went to the client from whom they got the $25,000, and was exacted in order to evade the usury laws of Michigan.
Clearly, Mr. Denby had no regard for the rights of Mr. Gray; he was willing to make a profit of $3,000 out of this transaction, even if he got no part of the $2,000 premium for which his partner, Kennedy, gave his receipt.
I don't think Mr. Denby's conduct measures up to the legal requirements of good faith.
Does his conduct square with the requirements of subdivision 4 of Section 52, to wit: That at the time the note and securities were negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title.
It must be borne in mind that Mr. Denby is a man of large affairs, of extensive practice and experience as a lawyer. It would be an insult to his reputation and attainments
to suggest that he did not know the laws of South Carolina as they pertain to insolvent banks in the hands of the State Bank Examiner. It imposes upon one's credulity to intimate that Mr. Denby did not know that Richardson, as president of the Beaufort Bank, could not legally execute the note which Horne offered to him, and which he accepted. It further staggers one's powers of belief to suggest that a lawyer of Mr. Denby's reputation — a former Secretary of the Navy of the United States — would be content to accept, without further inquiry or investigation, the wholly indefinite certificate of the State Bank Examiner. He knew, for Horne told him, the conditions upon which these extra securities were given, to wit, to be held by trustees until the bank reopened, and delivered upon the receipt of a certificate of deposit for a like amount. He knew that the contract was an executory one, dependent upon the reopening of the bank; he knew that as an absolutely necessary requisite to this end the collateral of the Beaufort Bank held by the Hanover National Bank in New York must be released, and that it would require approximately $75,000 to accomplish this purpose, yet he affects to believe that Horne would succeed in doing it with $25,000. He was bound, as a man of business sense and experience, to realize that the bank might not reopen, and that the consideration of the securities which he held must fail, yet he elected, as he says, to purchase them. Such conduct does not comport with that of a prudent business man, and that is the standard by which the law will judge his conduct. Authorities in support of this position may be cited abundantly from text-books and the opinions of the Courts of other jurisdictions, but I shall cite but few.
In Blanchard Press, Inc., v. Stanton , 134 S.C. 218 , 132 S.E., 617 , 620 , this is taken from the concurring opinion:
There seems to be no doubt under the authorities, that when the indorsee has notice that the note is directly connected with an executory contract, the time for the performance
of which had passed at the time he acquired it, he will not lose his position as a holder in due course, unless he had knowledge at that time of the breach which may have occurred. See extended note to 46 L.R.A. (N.S.), 862. At the same time it has been held, and justly, that, where the time has not passed, and the indorsee has notice of facts which would convince a man of ordinary prudence that the breach is bound to occur at the time fixed for the performance of the contract, he does lose that position.
See Florence v. Bank , 34 Ga. App., 329 , 129 S.E., 560 .
See, also, the case of Harris v. Nichols , 26 Ga. 413 , where the facts are in close analogy with our case. There the analysis of the opinion is in conformity with the rule of our Court, above quoted, to the effect that, when the contract is an executory one, and the person takes the instrument with knowledge of that fact, and that the consideration is liable to fail, he is not a holder in due course.
In my opinion, Mr. Denby is not a holder in due course. The special referee gives to Mr. Denby the benefit of the equitable rule that when one of two innocent persons must suffer because of the wrong of a third person, he who made the wrong possible must bear the loss. I think that salutary rule might better be invoked for the protection of the plaintiff, Gray. The mere execution of the note and mortgage cannot be imputed to Gray as a carelessness or negligence for which he should suffer. It was in pursuance of a policy adopted practically by the whole community to aid a weak bank, and to save the community. Unusual precautions were taken to prevent these securities from being put on the market, or to be negotiated separately, until the purpose for which they were given, to wit, the reopening of the bank, had been accomplished. In my view, Mr. Denby was guilty of far more negligence than Mr. Gray, and is alone responsible for the predicament in which he finds himself. The attitude of Mr. Denby in this whole matter is revealed by his own testimony. On page 19 of his
deposition, he says, I was a little surprised at first to think of the Hanover Bank settling for less than the face of the note, and I said if I had the money I would be glad personally to advance it upon that security. He (Horne) told me, already, that I was the last resort; he did not know where to get any money, and the community was likely to suffer a very serious situation unless it were handled, and he had come to me at their suggestion because of my known affection for the place. And I told him if I had $25,000.00 at that time I would certainly advance it in view of all these circumstances, and I would even pay it, if I could; I would even lose it, to save the community. These are generous sentiments and do credit to Mr. Denby's heart. Evidently they overcame his caution as a prudent business man, and they induced him to take a chance. That he knew there was risk and danger of loss is made manifest by the statement of Mr. Horne, who testifies in answer to a question as to whether Mr. Denby manifested any concern as to the safety of the loan: He told me on the street car going out to Pontiac that he hoped I would see that he did not lose the money, and that he would get it back all right, etc. This remark, in substance, was made several times.
It seems hard that Mr. Denby should suffer because of his kindly feeling for Beaufort. But it would be even harder to make Mr. Gray suffer, who was actuated by the same generous interest in the community, and who is not, in my judgment, responsible for the position in which Mr. Denby is cast by his own lack of prudence.
It follows, from the conclusions which I have reached, that the exceptions to the report of the special referee which are in accord with the views herein expressed must be sustained, and the report overruled, and it is so ordered, adjudged and decreed.
And it is ordered, further, that the note and mortgage executed to the bank of Beaufort by J.W. Gray in the sum of $10,000 dated August 5, 1926, and payable one year after
date, and now held by the defendant Edwin Denby be delivered to the Clerk of Court for Beaufort County, who shall mark the mortgage satisfied on the record thereof in his office, and shall deliver the mortgage, with the note, to the plaintiff, J.W. Gray, or his attorney.
Let the defendants pay the costs of this action. Source: CourtListener
/163/sc/421 · .json · Public domain 