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← 163 SW3D 361 - Bowling v. Commonwealth

Bowling v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

2005

Citation profile

58
cited by 58 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
15
states following
May 2026
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 42 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 58 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2026 · most notably State v. Were (2008), 134 S. Ct. 1986 - Hall v. Florida (2014)

9 federal appellate · 42 state decisions — followed in 15 states

300200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 848 (§ 408 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · Blakely v. Washington · Coleman v. Thompson · Teague v. Lane · Murray v. Carrier

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “.... Kentucky [ ] had in effect at the time of [Appellant’s] trial a statute affording the same right subsequently created by Atkins. “Atkins merely reaffirmed this State’s preexisting prohibition against executing the mentally retarded.” [citation omitted]- Even a constitutional right can be waived by failure to timely assert it. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 , 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355 , 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998) (rules of procedural default apply to constitutional provisions). No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751 , 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (internal citation and quotation omitted). See also Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 823-24 (5th Cir.1991) (claim of incompetency to stand trial partially because of mental retardation procedurally defaulted where not asserted at trial), aff'd, Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 , 112 S.Ct. 2514 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); cf. Bonar v. Commonwealth, 180 Ky. 338 , 202 S.W. 676, 677 (1918) (waiver may be either by express consent, by failure to assert in time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist on it). “[T]he question is ... whether at the time of the default the claim was ‘available’ at all.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 , 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 .L.Ed.2d ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Not every defendant who claims to be mentally retarded is entitled to a hearing on the issue. [T]he granting of an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental retardation is not a perfunctory matter or a ministerial duty of the trial court, and is not guaranteed to every [defendant] in every [capital] case. There is no auto matic right to a hearing on the issue of mental retardation, whether the hearing is sought pre-trial, while the case is on appeal, or as post-conviction relief. State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835 , 858 n. 33 (La.2002) (internal citation and quotation omitted). [15] To be entitled to a hearing, there must be at least a prima facie showing that the defendant may, in fact, be mentally retarded. Were it otherwise, then literally any prisoner under a death sentence could bring an Atkins claim in a second or successive petition regardless of his or her intelligence. No rational argument can possibly be made that this result is appropriate.... In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 , 1173 n. 1 (11th Cir.2003). [[Image here]] We hold that to be entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing on a claim of entitlement to the mental retardation exemption provided by KRS 532.140(1), a defendant must produce some evidence creating a doubt as to whether he is mentally retarded. As noted earlier, two IQ tests were administered to Appellant within a month of his December 1990 trial. The WAIS-R test administered by the court-appointed psychologist measured Appellant’s IQ at 86. The Shipley-Hartf”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Generally, claimants seeking equitable relief through independent actions must meet three requirements. Claimants must (1) show that they have no other available or adequate remedy; (2) demonstrate that movants’ own fault, neglect, or carelessness did not create the situation for which they seek equitable relief; and (3) establish a recognized ground — such as fraud, accident, or mistake — for the equitable relief. Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 662 (2nd Cir.1997) (emphasis added). Further, an independent action for equitable relief from a judgment is unavailable if the complaining party has, or by exercising proper diligence would have had, an adequate remedy in the original proceedings.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.