¶1*391ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶2In his motion for rehearing, appellant challenges the correctness of the conclusions expressed in our original opinion. No new contentions are expressed in the motion.
¶3We have again reviewed the entire case.
¶4As we understand appellant’s contention as to the charge of the trial court touching his defense of insanity, it is that he was entitled to have that defense submitted from two viewpoints, one of which is the so-called right and wrong test— that is, in order for the defense of insanity to be complete the accused must be unable to know the difference between the right and wrong of the act he is then doing.
¶5The trial court adequately charged the jury from that viewpoint.
¶6The other viewpoint which appellant insists should have been submitted is to the effect that though he may have known the difference between the right and wrong of the act he was committing, yet if he was unable to choose between the right and wrong of that act, the defense of insanity would be established, nevertheless.
¶7Such a charge the trial court refused.
¶8We are unable to agree that the trial court was in error.
¶9If an accused knows or is able to distinguish the difference between the right and wrong of the act he is then doing, he has sufficient mentality to know that the act which he is then doing is wrong. Otherwise, there would be no occasion for the right and wrong test.
¶10In order for one to choose between two alternatives he must, of necessity, understand those alternatives. So if appellant had sufficient mentality to know that the act he was then doing was wrong, he had sufficient mentality to choose between the wrong and the right. On the other hand, if he was unable to know that the act he was doing was wrong, then he was not possessed of sufficient mentality to choose between that which he did not know and the right.
¶11*392It is apparent, therefore, that if appellant’s contention be correct and that the defense of insanity may be predicated upon the ability of one to choose between right and wrong when he knows the right or wrong of the act, the doctrine of irresistible impulse has been written into the law of insanity as a defense.
¶12We are unwilling to approve that doctrine.
¶13Consideration has been given again to appellant’s contention. that reversible error is reflected by the statement of state’s counsel that a member of appellant’s counsel knew the whereabouts of an absent witness.
¶14While the question is not without difficulty, we remain convinced that the statement was not of such nature as that it would require a reversal of the conviction notwithstanding the action of the trial court in withholding the statement from the jury’s consideration.
¶15All other questions have been examined, and we remain convinced that a correct conclusion was reached originally.
¶16Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.