Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 164 F.2d 21 - Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.

Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.’s Empirical Analysis

164 F.2d 21 · 1947

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
December 2003
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2003 · most notably Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad (1948), Moore-M v. Richardson (1961)

22 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions

1201947195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Federal Employers' Liability Act)

Relies on Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. · Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc. · Chesapeake Ohio Railway Company v. Addie Kelly · James Sackley Company v. United States · Chesapeake Ry Co v. Kuhn

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The only judgment which could then lawfully have been entered was, however, one which conformed to the mandate of this court. That directed judgment in the amount of the verdict but made no direction whatever as to interest. When our mandate specifically directs the entry of judgment for a designated amount, the District Court is without power to enter judgment for a different sum.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case re covered in a district court. * * * Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““It is true that subsequent events have shown that on the date of the original judgment the plaintiff was entitled to have a judgment entered on the verdict and that this judgment would have borne interest until it was paid. But from a practical standpoint it is equally true that the plaintiff then was ‘entitled’ only to have the trial judge decide the pending motions and direct the entry of such judgment as he fairly determined to be lawful and just. That is exactly what the trial judge did. Thereafter the plaintiff was ‘entitled’ only to take whatever action by way of appellate review the law afforded her. The delay in the entry of the proper judgment was necessary in the sense that time for appellate review was required; it was only after the ordinary appellate proceedings .had been completed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action had reached the point where her right to a judgment on the verdict was judicially established. That judgment was then promptly entered. The date of its entry became the judgment day from which interest is to be computed under the statute. It was, under the circumstances, the first day when the judgment could have been entered.” Id. at 23 (Emphasis added).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.