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164 F.2d 387

Docket No. 34, Docket 20680.

Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Dec. 8, 1947.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1947-12-08

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“each claimant must, as to his own claim, meet the jurisdictional requirements.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc.

Relies on Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin · Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York · Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1947-12-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2004

8 federal appellate · 2 district ·

501947195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*388Shulman, Shulman ,& Abrams, of Chicago, 111., and Bennett I. Schlessel, of New York City (Meyer Abrams, of Chicago, 111., of counsel), for appellants.

¶2. Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl, of New York City (Ralph M. Carson and Francis W. Phillips, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

¶3Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND and FRANK, Circuit Judges.

¶4FRANK, Circuit Judge.

¶5On the former appeal, we said (143 F.2d at page 528) that, if non-accepting noteholders, other than the original plaintiff, Mrs. York, intervened, the action could be maintained as a class suit under Rule 23(a)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. However, in Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2 Cir., 117 F.2d 95, we had held that a proceeding under 23 (a) (3) is, in effect, but a congeries of separate suits so that each claimant must, as to his own claim, meet the jurisdictional requirements.

¶6The district court lacked jurisdiction as to Stern, Lamberson, Steele and the Bank. This appears from the following: Each'has a claim not based upon loss of any part of a trust fund but solely for a loss consisting of the reduction of his' recovery from the debtor, due to defendant’s alleged wrong. The face amount of the notes and coupons held by each plaintiff is not the measure of his claim, but merely fixes its maximum. The loss, as shown in our former opinion, bould not have exceeded the sum of (1) about 38% of the face of his notes,1 2plus (2) a proportionate amount of what might have been recovered on the open account claim against the debtor’s subsidiary,2 plus (3) perhaps interest, as damages, on the aggregate of the first two items.3 On this record, this total would surely not exceed 100% of the face of the notes. As no one of the four plaintiffs above-named held more than $3,000 face amount of notes, none showed the requisite jurisdictional amount.

¶7The other plaintiff, “Baseball,” is an unincorporated association. An undisputed affidavit, forming part of the motion papers, shows that two members of this association are corporations organized under the laws of New York. Defendant is also such a New York corporation. There was therefore an absence, with respect to this plaintiff, of the needed diversity of *389citizenship.4 Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction of this claim also.

¶8Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the plaintiffs other than Mrs. York.

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