Srajer v. Schwartzman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Applying the rule laid down in the above cases to the present situation and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from her evidence we have concluded that the arrangement between herself and defendant as to payment for re pairing the coat was only incidental to the business for which he was making the trip to Stafford and beyond. There had been talk about plaintiff going as far as Stafford with him before he brought the coat in to be repaired. There can be no doubt that he would have gone there anyway regardless of any arrangement with plaintiff. G.S. 193'5, 8~122b, was enacted to make it more difficult for guests to recover damages from their hosts on account of injuries sustained in automobile wrecks. It would not do to exempt carriers for hire from liability for such damages so. the provision making an exception in cases where the guest paid for his transportation was written into the statute. The intention was, however, that the exception should apply only where the payment was the chief motivating cause for the trip or carriage, not to a case such as we have here where the trip would have been made in any event by the driver of the car, and the plaintiff was in the car, in the main, on account of a desire on the part of the defendant to be accommodating and to extend the hospitality of his car to her and her son.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Allen v. Keck · 240 Mo. App. 451 - Yarnall v. Gass and Montague

2. ““. . . [T]o constitute wantonness, the acts complained of must show not simply lack of due care, but that the actor must be deemed to have realized the imminence of injury to others from his acts and to have refrained from taking steps to prevent the injury because indifferent to whether it occurred or not. If the actor has reason to believe his act may injure another, and does it being indifferent to whether it does or not, he is guilty of wanton conduct.” (Syl. ft 5.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Reynolds Ex Rel. Reynolds v. Estate of Stanosheck · Bailey v. Resner

3. ““ ‘Gross and wanton negligence’ within the meaning of such statute means wantonness, or willful and wanton conduct. There must be a realization that danger of injury to another is imminent, and conduct indicating an indifference to whether such injury results.” (Syl. ft 3.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Reynolds Ex Rel. Reynolds v. Estate of Stanosheck