Jones v. Van Bever’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 70 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We find the rule to be thoroughly established that, in order to render the sheriff liable for the act of his deputy, the act of the deputy must be done by virtue of his office as deputy; and, in order for the deputy’s act to have that character, it must be done in an attempt to serve or execute a writ or process, and as a means to that end, or in acting under a statute giving him the right to arrest without a warrant; otherwise he is acting as an individual. In other words, when a deputy sheriff, although he assumes to act as such, commits a wrong under circumstances where the law does not impose a duty on him to act at all, the wrong is not a violation of any official duty, and is not embraced within the sponsorship of his principal.” (See also Taylor v. Shields, 183 Ky. 669 ; Rice v. Lavin, 199 Ky. 790 ; Elam v. National Surety Company, 201 Ky. 74 ; and Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. White, 209 Ky. 402 .)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth Ex Rel. Coombs v. Vincent · Fidelity Casualty Company of New York v. White

2. ““ ‘A peace officer may make an arrest—1. In obedience to a warrant of arrest delivered to him. 2. Without a warrant, when a public offense is committed in his presence, or when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony. . . . If he makes an arrest in any other way, it is not authorized by law, and is consequently his individual and not his official act. ... It will thus be seen that the test as to whether the officer is acting by virtue of his office is whether he is armed with a valid writ, or has authority to make the arrest without a writ, under a statute. If he is armed with no writ, or if the writ under which he acts is utterly void, and if there is, at the time, no statute which authorizes the act to be done without a writ, then the officer is not acting by virtue of his office. ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth Ex Rel. Coombs v. Vincent · Shelton v. National Surety Co. of New York

3. ““If he (the arresting officer) is armed with no writ, or if the writ under which he acts is utterly void, and if there is at the time no statute which authorizes the act to be done without process, then there is no such color of office as will enable him to impose a liability upon the sureties in his official bond. ’ ’”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lewis v. Treadway · Shelton v. National Surety Co. of New York