concurrence">TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,

concurring in the result.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in its treatment of defendant’s request for the appointment of substitute counsel. However, I believe that a pro se inquiry analysis is not appropriate because defendant’s repeated request was not that the trial court allow him to proceed pro se, but that the trial court appoint substitute counsel.

Defendant agreed to represent himself pro se only after the trial court denied his request for substitute counsel. Yet, defendant renewed his request for substitute counsel at the commencement of trial, which demonstrated his desire to be represented by counsel. Therefore, I believe that defendant’s repeated request that the trial court appoint substitute counsel should be the focus of this Court’s analysis.

Defendant asserts that the court failed to determine if any conflict of interest or other facts existed that would have justified or required appointing new counsel. I agree.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

While it is a fundamental principle that an indigent defendant in a serious criminal prosecution must have counsel appointed to rep*403resent him, an indigent defendant does not have the right to have counsel of his choice appointed to represent him. This does not mean, however, that a defendant is never entitled to have new or substitute counsel appointed. A trial court is constitutionally required to appoint substitute counsel whenever representation by counsel originally appointed would amount to denial of defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, that is, when the initial appointment has not afforded defendant his constitutional right to counsel. Thus, when it appears to the trial court that the original counsel is reasonably competent to present defendant’s case and the nature of the conflict between defendant and counsel is not such as would render counsel incompetent or ineffective to represent that defendant, denial of defendant’s request to appoint substitute counsel is entirely proper.

State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 351-52, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1980) (citations omitted). In the case sub judice, the trial court made no inquiry whatsoever regarding defendant’s request that substitute counsel be appointed to represent him, and that he could either keep his current counsel or represent himself at trial. The court afforded defendant no opportunity to explain why substitute counsel should be appointed. Thus, the trial court failed to determine whether there was a conflict of interest or other grounds upon which continued representation by his appointed counsel would deny defendant his constitutional right to counsel. Id.Therefore, I conclude that the trial court erred in its treatment of defendant’s request for the appointment of substitute counsel.

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