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← 164 N.J. 487 - Cox v. RKA CORP.

Cox v. RKA CORP.’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
1
states following
July 2016
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 24 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Montells v. Haynes · Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yarborough · Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Walter P. Coons · Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. · Palamarg Realty Company v. Rehac

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Every deed or instrument of the nature or description set forth in section 46:16-1 of this title shall, until duly recorded or lodged for record in the office of the county recording office in which the affected real estate or other property is situate, be void and of no effect against subsequent judgment creditors without notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but any such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““An historical study of the [Recording] Act, as well as an analysis of the cases interpreting it, leads to the conclusion that it was designed to compel the recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title and to purchase and hold title to lands within this state with confidence. The means by which the compulsion to record is accomplished is by favoring a recording purchaser, both by empowering him to divest a former non-recording title owner and by preventing a subsequent purchaser from divesting him of title. This ability to deprive a prior and bona fide purchaser for value of his property shows a genuine favoritism toward a recording purchaser. It is a clear mandate that the recording purchaser be given every consideration permitted by the law, including all favorable presumptions of law and fact. It is lUceurise a dear expression that a purchaser be able to rely upon the record title." [Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehace, 80 N.J. 446, 453 , 404 A.2d 21, 25 (1979) (quoting Donald B. Jones, The New Jersey Recording Adr — A Study of Its Policy, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 328 , 329-30 (1957)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).]”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"[p]rospective application is appropriate when a decision establishes a new principle of law by overruling past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression." Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 295 , 627 A. 2d 654 (1993). In determining whether to apply a rule prospectively, "we must weigh, among other things, `whether retroactive applications could produce substantial inequitable results.'" Cox v. RKA Corp., 164 N.J. 487, 514 , 753 A. 2d 1112 (2000) (quoting Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 295 , 627 A. 2d 654 ). [ Alderiso v. Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 191, 203 , 770 A. 2d 275 (2001).]”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.