¶1concurring.
¶2In Houston v. State, 162 Texas Cr. Rep. 551, 287 S.W. 2d 643, I endeavored to make it clear that a trial judge was without lawful authority to excuse an empaneled and sworn juror from the jury at any time for any reason. I also pointed out that when conditions or circumstances arise which make it necessary to excuse an empaneled juror the proper and legal method to be followed is to excuse the entire jury panel, and that trial by jury could be preserved only by following that method.
¶3I have not changed my views as expressed in the dissenting opinion in the Houston case and, if I were so authorized, I would reverse the conviction in this case because appellant was denied trial by jury, as contemplated by the Constitution and statutes of this state.
¶4My brethren, however, remain convinced of the correctness of the majority holding in the Houston case but have different views as to whether sufficient cause was shown to authorize the discharge of the juror in this case.
¶5I agree with the reasoning of my brother Woodley upon that question, and I therefore concur in the affirmance of the case.