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← 165 F.2d 758 - Mitchell v. United States

Mitchell v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

165 F.2d 758 · 1948

Citation profile

95
cited by 95 later decisions
4
states following
September 1999
most recently cited

54 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 95 later decisions — most recently September 1999 · most notably 563 So. 2d 594 - Bell v. Parker (1990), O'Brien v. Elder (1957)

54 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions

360194819501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Bradley v. United States · Roberts v. United States · Collins v. United States · Johnson v. White · 71 F. Supp. 114 - Egleston v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The cases are unanimous that in war-risk insurance cases involving change of beneficiary the courts will brush aside all legal technicalities in order to effectuate the manifest intent of the insured; and that if he manifests an intent to make a change and has done everything reasonably within his power to accomplish his purpose, leaving only ministerial acts to be performed by the insurer, the courts will treat that as done which ought to have been done and give effect to the insured’s intent. The cases are also unanimous that a mere intent to change a beneficiary is not enough. Such an intent must be followed by some affirmative act on the part of the insured evidencing an exercise of the right to change the beneficiary. Where the courts differ is as to the degree of affirmative action necessary to effect a change. Literal compliance with the provisions of a policy is never necessary.””
    11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured ‘shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance [within a designated class], * * * and shall * * * at all times have the right to change the bene ficiary or beneficiaries * * *.’ 38 U.S.C. § 802 (g), 38 U.S.O.A. § 802(g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other. Pursuant to the congressional command, the Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured’s choice. He chose his mother. It is plain to us that the judgment of the lower court, as to one-half of the proceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the insurance money. We do not share appel-lee’s discovery of congressional purpose that widows in community property states participate in the payments under the policy, contrary to the express direction of the insured. Whether directed at the very money received from the Government or an equivalent amount, the judgment below nullifies the soldier’s choice and frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress. It cannot stand.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.