165 Ind. App. 369 - Winston v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 101 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider the merits of an improperly raised error if the reviewing court finds that”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clay v. State · Elliott v. State

2. “"In the cases in which Indiana courts have found 'fundamental error', the error involved the mistake or misconduct of the trial judge in the exercise of his own affirmative duties.... In all these cases, the trial judge erred in performing some duty which the law had charged him to perform sua sponte. Presumably a trial judge is aware of his own sua sponte duties. Thus the necessity of informing him of dereliction in such duties, and the likelihood that he would properly perform such a duty merely because defense counsel informed him of it, is slight. Therefore, in the case of error by a trial judge in his sua sponte obligations, the policy requiring timely and specific objection ... is not as significant a factor weighing against invocation of the 'fundamental error' doctrine as in matters wherein the parties necessarily shoulder the burden of pointing out error. Such matters without doubt include the admission of evidence, since only the interested party himself can really know whether the introduction or exclusion of a particular piece of evidence is in his own best interest. Thus, adherence to the proper objection requirement in the realm of evidentiary issues is both necessary and reasonable to insure that 'the administration of the exclusionary rules of evidence is ... foir and workable'.... The connection between the policy favoring speedy correction of prejudicial errors so as to avoid needless mistrials and the timely objection rule as to the introduction of evidence”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mullins v. State · Jones v. State

3. ““Presumably a trial judge is aware of his own sua sponte duties. Thus the necessity of informihg him of dereliction in such duties, and the likelihood that he would properly perform such a duty merely because defense counsel informed him of it, is slight. Therefore, in the case of error by a trial judge in his sua sponte obligations, the policy requiring timely and specific objection ... is not as significant a factor weighing against invocation of the ‘fundamental error’ doctrine as in matters wherein the parties necessarily shoulder the burden of pointing out error.” 332 N.E.2d at 233 (citation omitted).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Meredith v. State · 170 Ind. App. 525 - Grimes v. State