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165 Mass. 396

Commonwealth v. Young

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided February 29, 1896

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1896-02-29

<p>Short Lobsters — Inferences from Agreed Facts — Statute.</p> <p>If, on a complaint for having in one’s possession “ short lobsters,” in violation of the provisions of Pub. Sts. c. 91, § 84, as amended by St. 1887, c. 314, § 1, the case is submitted to the jury upon a written statement of facts admitted to be true, to the effect that the lobsters, which were in barrels in the defendant’s store, had arrived in the morning from Nova Scotia, consigned by parties there to the defendant in Boston, had been opened and repacked, but had not been offered or intended for sale in this Commonwealth, and that each barrel, marked with the name of a person addressed in New York City, was placed where it was found for an express company to take, the agreed facts, if unexplained, will warrant a finding that the defendant was in possession of the lobsters within the meaning of the statutes.</p> <p>The provisions of St. 1887, c. 314, § 1, entitled “ An Act for the protection of lobsters,” apply to lobsters caught out of the Commonwealth.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently November 1939

2 state decisions

Relies on Commonwealth v. Savage

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1896-02-29

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Allen, J.

¶1This case was submitted to the jury upon a written statement of facts, which were admitted to be true, and upon which the defendant asked the court to rule that he could not be convicted. This ruling was rightly refused. The defendant now contends that “ the location of the packages, under the strict construction and presumption of which the court will give the defendant the benefit, shows no more than temporary custody of another’s property.” But the jury might draw the same *398inferences that might have been drawn if the Commonwealth had introduced evidence to prove exactly the same facts which were admitted in the agreed statement. If the defendant had any other evidence to explain or qualify those facts, it was open to him to introduce it. In the absence of any such evidence, the jury might draw reasonable inferences as to his relation to the lobsters, and might find that he was not merely a forwarding agent for the Nova Scotia owners. We are not, therefore, called on to determine whether, as the defendant argues, a mere forwarding agent should not be deemed to be in possession of the lobsters within the meaning of St. 1887, c. 314, § 1.

¶2The objection that the statute does not apply to lobsters caught out of the Commonwealth cannot prevail. Commonwealth v. Savage, 155 Mass. 278. Exceptions overruled.

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