Volume 165 — New York Reports

This action was brought to recover the sum of $7,500 paid by the plaintiff upon a certain contract, which he seeks to rescind upon several grounds, and among them that - he was induced to make it through fraud and deceit practiced upon him by the defendants. The defendant Warner served no answer, but the Central Trust Company put at issue every allegation tending to show fraud or deceit on its part, either through false representation or fraudulent concealment.

<p>Railroads — Maintenance of, and Repairs to Bridges over Crossings Existing at the time the Railroad Law took Effect. tiection 64 of the Railroad. Law(L. 1897, ch. 754), providing that “ when á highway crosses a railroad by an overhead bridge, the framework of the bridge and its abutments shall be maintained and kept in repair by the railroad company, and the roadway thereover and the approaches thereto shall be maintained and kept in repair by the municipality in which the same are situated,” is not limited in its application to railroads constructed subsequent to its enactment or to bridges over crossings thereafter constructed, but applies to all bridges constituting the highway at railroad crossings whether constructed before or after the law went into effect.</p>

<p>1. New York City — Assessment for Local Improvements — Rights of Property Owners. Property owners in the city of New York have a right to be heard before the proper city authorities with reference to an assessment for a local improvement, hut after the hearing and confirmation of the assessment they have no right to attack it in the courts, except as specifically prescribed in the statute.</p> <p>2. Saving Clause of Charter—Review of Assessment. The saving clause of section 1614 of the charter of the city of New York (L. 1897, oh. 878), to the effect that no right or remedy of any character shall he lost, impaired or affected by reason of the act, and that the act shall not affect or impair any act done or right accruing, accrued or acquired, is comprehensive enough to enable a property owner to review an assessment for a local improvement made when the law in force was the Consolidation Act (L. 1882, ch. 410), although at the time the petition for the review of the assessment was filed in the court the new charter had gone into effect.</p> <p>8. Whether an Assessment is Based on Erroneous Principle a Question of Law — When Court may not Review Inequality in Assessment — Limitation on Power not Applicable to Certain Cases. Whether an assessment for a local improvement is based upon an erroneous principle, so as to enable the court, in the exercise of its .discretion, to set it aside under section 903 of the Consolidation Act, as amended by chapter 613 of the Laws of 1895, is a question of law, and if the assessment was based upon the proper principle courts have no power to review it, upon the ground that it is unequal and unjust, since that was a question exclusively for the assessors, subject to review and correction by the board of revision; but this limitation does not apply to condemnation or street opening proceedings, or other proceedings under special statutes that are subject to confirmation by the courts.</p> <p>4. Assessment in Name of Former Owner. An assessment for a local improvement in the city of New York under the Consolidation Act is not invalidated by the insertion in the roll as owner of the name of a former owner in whose name the property stood on the assessment roll for the purposes of general taxation, since the fair meaning of the provision of section 8G9, that the assessors shall state the name of the owner of the property, and that it shall be their duty to ascertain by inquiry to be made of the deputy commissioner of taxes of the ward in which the property assessed is situated, and by inquiry of the receiver of taxes as to such ownership, is that, in designating the owners, they shall he guided hy the names on the tax hook.</p> <p>5. Appeal—When Order Setting aside Assessment bob Local Improvement is a Pinal Order in a Special Proceeding. An order in a special proceeding instituted hy a property owner to review an assessment levied for a local improvement which sets aside the assessment not only as to him but as to all the property owners, is a final order determining the proceeding and is appealable to the Court of Appeals.</p>

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Defendant offered at the trial the death records from the Brooklyn health department of certain relatives of the deceased, and sought also to prove the cause of death by their attending physicians, all of which proofs should have been admitted in evidence. (Hanna v. C. M. L. Ins. Co., 150 N. Y. 526 ; M. B. L. Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 95 U. S. 380; 2 Bacon on Ben.

12,271, issued to Thiel Brothers. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The answer to the question was not such a false statement of a matter of fact as would justify a revocation of this certificate.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The question of negligence on the part of the defendant should have been submitted to the jury.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The findings of fact of the trial court are conclusive upon this appeal, and as they fully justified the conclusion of law, the judgment of the trial court must stand. (Code Civ.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The finding of the Special Term, that the indebtedness of the relator respecting $9,500,000 of the bonds of the Yew York Com.pany evidenced by $8,500,000 of the latter’s first mortgage bonds and by $1,000,000 of its debentures, was directly contracted by the relator in the acquisition of the Yew York Company’s railroad franchises; and that $1,127,112 of its own first mortgage bonds. represented a cash payment…

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The evidence received was sufficient to justify the jury in finding for plaintiff, and the court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a nonsuit. (Steinweg v. E. Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. 123; O'Neil v. N. Y., 0. & W. Ry.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The recommendation of the board of railroad commissioners cannot be upheld and enforced, because it appears upon its face that the commissioners did not, in making it, act or proceed in obedience to the provisions of the statute, as no personal examination was ever made by them. (L. 1890, ch. 565, § 161; Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587; Grinnell v. Buchanan, 1 Daly, 538; Lewis v. Ingersoll, 1 Keyes, 347; People ex rel.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Chapter 448 of the Laws of 1896 is a valid exercise of. the police power of the state. (Const. N. Y. art. 10, § 2; Den ex dem. v. Hoboken Co., 18 How. [U. S.] 272; Davidson v. Bd.

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered December 8, 1898, affirming a judgment of Special Term dismissing the complaint entered upon the report of a referee. The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. This court has jurisdiction to review the finding as to the recriminatory charges.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Upon the facts proven upon the trial and established by the decisions of the Special Term, confirmed by the Appellate Division, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment setting aside the Maltby mortgage.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The trial judge erred in admitting proof of the value of specific property other than that in suit. (Matter of Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463; Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 365 ; Gouge v. Roberts, 53 N. Y. 619; Blanchard v. N. J. S. Co., 59 N. Y 292; Jamieson v. K. C. El. Ry. Co., 147 N. Y. 322; City of Chicago v. Baker, 86 Fed. Rep. 753; Whitmark v. N. Y. El.

' This was an action for an injunction and damages by reason of an elevated railroad erected and operated in the street on which plaintiff’s premises abut, and also by reason of the ,ele vated railroads and other structures of the defendant erected on its own land, around and adjacent to the, premises of the plaintiff, situated on the easterly end of Broadway, in what is now the borough of Brooklyn.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 19, 1898, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict, and an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered December 7, 1898, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon the report of a referee.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered July 31, 1900, reversing an order of Special Term revoking and canceling liquor tax certificate No. 26,903, issued to Daniel Slattery and James J. Hammond.</p>

Appeals from judgments of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered November 1, 1898, affirming judgments in favor of plaintiff entered upon verdicts and orders denying motions for new trials.

Court in the second judicial department, entered October 8, 1897, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered March 2, 1899, modifying, and affirming as modified, interlocutory and final judgments entered in an action for the partition of certain real property upon the report of a referee.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered May 16,1898, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict; also appeal from three orders of the Appellate Division, entered May 16, 1898, affirming orders made in the action — one denying a motion for a new trial, another severing the issues, and a third vacating a stay of proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered June 5, 1899, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict, and an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, made December 18, 1897, reversing a judgment in favor of plain- ■ tiffs entered upon the report of a referee and granting a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered June 7,1900, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>