165 Or. App. 226 - State v. Allred’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Hindering prosecution is a descendant of the common-law crime of accessory after the fact, which was an offense based on accessorial liability. At common law, accessorial liability `rested on the notion that one who helps an offender avoid justice becomes in some sense an accomplice in the original crime.' Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 242.3, 224 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). One guilty of accessory after the fact was, in effect, derivatively liable for the underlying crime. Consistent with the notion of derivative liability, the accessory had to have knowledge that the principal committed the crime, the principal had to be tried first or jointly with the accessory, the principal's conviction was a prerequisite to punishment of the accessory, and the accessory was subject to the same sentence as the principal. Id. "The Model Penal Code (MPC) broke `decisively' from the common-law view of the offense by rejecting its tradition of accessorial liability and adopting instead `the alternative theory of prosecution for obstruction of justice.' Id. at 224-25. The MPC therefore reformulated the crime as that of hindering apprehension or prosecution. It aimed the prohibition at the `purposeful efforts to aid another to evade justice' and did so `without regard to whether the person assisted in fact committed a crime and with penalties not invariably tied to those prescribed for the underlying offense.' Id. at 225."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 192 Or. App. 56 - STATE EX REL. JUV. DEPT. v. Fitch

2. “The legislature repealed the former accessory statute ( former ORS 161.230) and replaced it with hindering prosecution, codified as ORS 162.325. Although borrowing in part from the MPC, Oregon did not abandon accessorial liability altogether. Rather, it retained the requirement that the person aided be one `who has committed a crime punishable as a felony.' See ORS 162.325(1). Significantly, however, Oregon shifted the emphasis to the public's interest in preventing the obstruction of justice. The legislature changed the mental state required for hindering prosecution by deleting the requirement that a defendant know that the person he or she aided in fact had committed a felony. Instead, the mental state required is the intent to hinder apprehension or prosecution, thus aiding the offender in `escaping justice.' See generally Commentary to Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, § 162.325, 106 (1975).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 192 Or. App. 56 - STATE EX REL. JUV. DEPT. v. Fitch

3. “a distinctly retrospective and completed-act focus.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 295 Or. App. 205 - State v. P. T. (In re P. T.)