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165 Tex. Crim. 113

303 S.W.2d 406

Lee v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided January 2, 1957

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1957-01-02

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently November 1973

4 state decisions

Relies on 57 Tex. Crim. 269 - Brown v. State · 56 Tex. Crim. 6 - Hare v. State · White v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1957-01-02

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¶1ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

DAVIDSON, Judge.

¶2With much earnestness, appellant insists that the cross-examination of the appellant by state’s counsel as to her failure to testify upon a former trial constitutes a violation of Art. 710, C.C.P., and renders mandatory a reversal of this conviction.

¶3There is no question but that counsel for the state are prohibited by Art. 710, C.C.P., from referring to the failure of the accused to testify in the case.

¶4This preclusion extends to and covers the failure to testify at other trials. Hare v. State, 56 Texas Cr. Rep. 6, 118 S.W. 544; Brown v. State, 57 Texas Cr. Rep. 269, 122 S.W. 565; White v. State, 83 Texas Cr. Rep. 252, 202 S.W. 737.

¶5The facts show that state’s counsel, upon cross-examination of appellant, repeatedly referred to the fact that on a former trial of the case she did not testify, and that she admitted not having done so.

¶6That a violation of the provisions of Art. 710, C.C.P., occurred is not subject to serious contradiction.

¶7Whether such proof, under the facts of this case, constitutes reversible error presents quite another question.

¶8Upon her direct examination, appellant was propounded the following question by her counsel:

“Q. Now, Mrs. Lee, you didn’t testify at the other trial, did you?”
Her reply was: “No, sir.”

¶9The appellant placed before the jury, therefore, the fact that “at the other trial” she did not testify as a witness in her own behalf.

¶10*120Such was the sole fact that Art. 710, C.C.P., precluded from proof by the state.

¶11It is true that the cross-examination of appellant was in much detail and included facts and circumstances to which she did not testify or contradict at the other trial.

¶12It must be kept in mind that the only provision of the law which precluded state’s counsel from making the cross-examination was the reference to her failure to testify.

¶13When the impediment was removed by proof of that fact by appellant, the right to object because thereof was eliminated.

¶14We remain convinced that a correct conclusion was reached originally.

¶15Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

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