166 Ind. App. 409 - Linton v. Linton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

67 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It has long been the rule in Indiana that alimony decrees which take the form of a simple money judgment are not enforceable through contempt. Marsh v. Marsh (1904), 162 Ind. 210 , 70 N.E. 154 . Enforcement through contempt would constitute imprisonment for-debt in violation of Article 1, § 22, of the Indiana Constitution. Appellee contends that two recent cases, State ex rel. Schutz v. Marion Superior Court, Room No. 7 (1974), Ind., 307 N.E.2d 53 ; and Wellington v. Wellington (1973), 158 Ind. App. 649 , 304 N.E.2d 347 (trans. den. 5/21/74), have sufficiently modified the law to allow contempt as a remedy in this case. See also State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan Circuit Court (1968), 249 Ind. 649 , 232 N.E.2d 871 . In Roberts and SchutZ, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between enforcement of alimony which is a simple specific sum money judgment awarded to the spouse, and enforcement of alimony which requires other types of payments or property transfer, e.g., an order for conveyance of real estate, or to pay creditors of the spouse. When the latter type alimony award has been made, contempt may be a proper means of enforcement. . . .” (Original emphasis)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 175 Ind. App. 612 - Marburger v. Marburger

2. “Contempt of court is neither civil, criminal nor equitable for the reason that the right to exercise this power is inherent in all our courts. It is purely judicial power and is not the creature of legislation and is inalienable and indestructible. (Cita tions) It follows that contempt of court, not being a matter of civil, statutory or equitable nature is not within the terms of said § 2-1402 of our statutes. Furthermore, courts have always been jealous of their inherent judicial powers and due to this fact the great weight of authority is that unless a statute providing for a change of venue specifically gives the right of such change in contempt of court cases, the parties are not entitled to the same. (Citations)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Heltzel

3. “However, to the extent the custodial parent has met the present needs of the child from his own funds, he has fulfilled his “trustee” obligations (as well as his legal obligations as a parent) and is entitled to repayment from the one who was legally obligated by the decree to pay for the support of the child.... The one entitled to repayment may also, of course, forgive the debt. Linton, 336 N.E.2d at 695 (citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Matter of Henady