Volume 166 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - securing writings by deception motion to continue motion to prohibit testimony death of a witness continuance denied jury trial restitution due process abuse of discretion review of admitted evidence de novo relevance Evid.R. 403 unfair prejudice hearsay plain error Crim.R. 52(B) harmless error Crim.R. 16 exclusion of evidence discovery sanctions sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight Crim.R. 29 disposes or encumbers property pecuniary interest execution of a writing deception restitution supported by competent, credible evidence R.C. 2929.18 affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - First Amendment to the United States Constitution Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 11 free speech State Employment Relations Board Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act R.C. 4117.11(B)(7) unfair labor practice labor relations dispute employee organization induce or encourage picketing residence or place of private employment representative of the public employer unconstitutional restriction on speech public forum content-based strict scrutiny not necessary to serve a compelling state interest protect residential privacy preserve labor peace encourage public service not narrowly tailored not the least restrictive means prohibits lawful conduct secondary picketing distinction between lawful and unlawful secondary activity based on picketer's conduct and objective.

Reasonble use, surface water

The disorderly conduct ordinance, Columbus City Code Section 2317.11(A)(2), is not unconstitutional, as limited by Supreme Court of Ohio precedent, to fighting words. The n-word is a "fighting word" when uttered by a white person to a black person in conjunction with other slavery-references such as "go back to the plantation." The City of Columbus's ethnic intimidation ordinance, Columbus City Code Section 2331.08, is facially constitutional. It is also constitutional as applied to a predicate offense of disorderly conduct based on fighting words, because it does not punish the content of fighting words, but instead punishes the biased motive or reason for the utterance without regard to the content of the words uttered.

SEX OFFENSES – OUT-OF-STATE OFFENDER – MEGAN'S LAW – SEXUAL PREDATOR – FORMER R.C. 2950.09(F)(2): Where an out-of-state sex offender subject to a lifetime registration requirement moves to Ohio, is automatically classified as a sexual predator under former R.C. Chapter 2950, Ohio's version of Megan's Law, and challenges his automatic classification pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2), the trial court, in making its determination, is to examine why the out-of-state offender was required to register for life and whether that reason is substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator in Ohio under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2): the offender must prove the reason for the lifetime registration requirement in the other state and that the lifetime registration requirement is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2). Lingle v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6788, ¶ 28 and syllabus. The cause must be remanded where the trial court did not make its determination under former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) pursuant to the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Lingle.

H.B. 62 traffic cameras preliminary injunction irreparable harm likelihood of success on the merits public interest constitutionality of a statute home rule amendment. The trial court's judgment denying the cities' motions for preliminary injunction was affirmed with respect to the provision of H.B. 62 that stated municipal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to citations from a traffic camera. However, the trial court's judgment denying the cities' motions for preliminary injunction was reversed with respect to two provisions of H.B. 62 that (1) reduced the cities' local government funds and (2) required the cities to pay advance court deposits because these two provisions violate the Home Rule Amendment.

The trial court did not err in finding that a rental agreement existed and that appellant breached the agreement by failing to provide a habitable premises. In addition, the court correctly found that a subsequent agreement lacked consideration due to appellant's breach of the original contract. Due to the allegations of fraud and the need to consider facts relating to habitability, the trial court also did not err in admitting parol evidence. The damages award was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed as to drug offenses, but reversed and vacated as to conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, as generalized testimony of the existence of drug cartels and past investigations of cartel activity does not establish the existence of an enterprise with a solo drug dealer in a particular case, lacking any evidence linking the defendant to the cartel.

Motion to vacate sexual predator sexually violent predator specifications res judicata unlawful sentence R.C. 2971.01(H). Appellant's life-tail sentence was unlawful therefore, appellant's appeal is not prohibited based on the doctrine of res judicata. The amendment to R.C. Chapter 2971 has no retroactive effect on appellant. It was error where the trial court denied appellant's motion to vacate sentencing on the sexually violent predator specifications.