State v. Thomas’s Empirical Analysis
2001
Citation profile
102 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 16 · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on State v. Butler · Renz v. Penn Central Corp. · United States v. Reyes-Castro · State v. Galloway · State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 102 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"As a general rule of statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute. If the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act's literal terms to divine the Legislature's intent." State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 , 445 A. 2d 399 (1982). However, if the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its face, "we consider sources other than the literal words of the statute to guide our interpretive task.... `[T]he court considers extrinsic factors, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain the legislature's intent.'" Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 , 744 A. 2d 175 (2000) (quoting Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 , 733 A. 2d 1159 (1999)); State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 480-82 , 688 A. 2d 584 (1997). The policy behind the statute also should be considered. County of Monmouth v. Wissell, 68 N.J. 35, 43-44 , 342 A. 2d 199 (1975).”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“'such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain the legislature's intent.'”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Pena · State v. Livingston“That understanding of the crime of sexual assault fully comports with the public policy sought to be effectuated by Legislature. In redefining rape law as sexual assault, the Legislature adopted the concept of sexual assault as a crime against the bodily integrity of the victim. Although it is possible to imagine a set of rules in which persons must demonstrate affirmatively that sexual contact is unwanted or not permitted, such a regime would be inconsistent with modern principles of personal autonomy. The Legislature recast the law of rape as sexual assault to bring that area of law in line with the expectation of privacy and bodily control that long has characterized most of our private and public law. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Paint [Point] Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 94-96 [ 609 A. 2d 11 ] (1992) (recognizing importance of constitutional and common-law protection of personal privacy); id. at 106 [ 609 A. 2d 11 ] (Pollock, J., concurring) (emphasizing that common-law right of privacy protects individual self-determination and autonomy). In interpreting "physical force" to include any touching that occurs without permission we seek to respect that goal. [ Id. at 445-46, 609 A. 2d 1266 .]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.