¶1(dissenting). "Whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging potential jurors is ... a question of historical fact." Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1870 (1991) (plurality opinion). "[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele*43vant facts . . Id.at 1868 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
¶2The totality of the relevant facts includes the following. Davidson is black. His key witnesses were black. The state's witnesses were all white. The state's informant was white. The prosecutor testified at Davidson's postconviction motion hearing that he associated the name of the prospective juror with criminal activity in Rock county, based on his previous experience with persons of that name. However, he did not question the venireperson as to his possible criminal record. He did not question him as to whether any members of his family or relatives had criminal records. He did not question the venireperson as to whether he had family, relatives or friends who were involved in drug activity. Finally, at Davidson's postconviction motion hearing, the prosecutor was asked the following question and gave the following answer:
Q. When you say that the name, H-, is synonymous with criminal activity in Beloit, do you mean those H-s that are black, or do you mean all H-s?
A. I guess when I think of H-s, I think of H-s in terms of their race, black race.
¶3I conclude from the totality of the relevant facts, that Davidson established "purposeful discrimination" forbidden by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
¶4I recognize that, " [i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed." Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1869. Therefore, deference to the trial court's findings on the issue of discriminatory intent is required. Id.However, this deference should be based on the tried court's *44evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility at the time the prosecutor's peremptory strike is challenged. Here, Davidson's trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's striking of the prospective juror. The prosecutor was not required to explain the basis for his peremptory strike. Therefore, the trial court did not have an opportunity to evaluate the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility. Because trial counsel did not object at the time the prosecutor exercised his peremptory strike, he deprived the tried court of the opportunity to assess the prosecutor's state of mind. I conclude, therefore, that trial counsel's performance was deficient. In this case, the prejudice to the defendant follows from the deficient performance.
¶5For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.