Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich’s Empirical Analysis
167 F.2d 969 · 1948
Citation profile
49 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 114 later decisions — most recently September 2016 · most notably Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp. (1961), McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc. (1979)
49 federal appellate · 6 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (§ 1 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act))
Relies on United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. · McLean v. Fleming · Singer Manuf'G Co v. June Manuf'G Co · Hawks v. Hamill
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 114 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Question has been raised as to whether the trade-name doctrine, by its creation of ‘perpetual monopolies,’ has not injured consumers, a question of peculiarly serious import in these days when living-costs are notoriously oppressive. Since, however, the Supreme Court has approved the doctrine, an intermediate court (such as ours) must enforce it. But, in the absence of legislation so requiring, we should not expand it. AVithout doubt, the judge-made trade-name doctrine or concept fosters monopolies ; and, generally speaking, the common-law tradition is inimical to monopolies (although opposition to monopoly when it takes the form of an obsessive monopoly-phobia becomes absurd). Some writers, disturbed by the suggestion that judicially-protected trade-names are monopolies, protest that the judicial protection of trade-names rests on prevention of unfairness between competitors, not on protection of monopoly. But, no matter by what doctrinal path the courts arrive at their results in this field, the judicial restraints of defendants do yield plaintiffs’ monopolies. To the practical, social consequences of their decisions, the courts ought not shut their eyes. . . . ” (footnotes omitted).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““It is settled law that a plaintiff who has established a right to a trade name which is fanciful or arbitrary or has acquired a secondary meaning is entitled to protection of his reputation against the use of that name by others even upon noncompeting goods, if the defendant’s goods are likely to be thought to originate with the plaintiff. Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 2 Cir., 26 F.2d 972 ; L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 2 Cir., 72 F.2d 272 ; Standard Brands v Smidler, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 34 ; * * *””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“had played an important part in the merchandising of teen-age apparel in various ways, such as by conferences with manufacturers, editorial fashion comments, sales to manufacturers and merchandisers of reprints, counter-cards and blow ups of its comments and of advertising, monthly bulletins advising merchandisers how to tie in with forthcoming issues of the magazine, and by aiding merchandisers in arranging window displays and departmental displays. Ibid.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.