Flaharty v. Reed’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"... the rule that the causal connection between an actor's negligence and an injury is broken by the intervention of a new, independent and efficient intervening cause, so that the actor is without liability, is subject to the qualification that if the intervening cause was foreseen or might reasonably have been foreseen by the first actor, his negligence may be considered the proximate cause, notwithstanding the intervening cause. ( Clark v. Powder Co., 94 Kan. 268 , 146 Pac. 320 , L.R.A. 1915 E 479, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 340; Fraser v. Railway Co., supra.) It has also been held that one who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the innocent act of a third person may have contributed to the final result. See Crow v. Colson, 123 Kan. 702 , 256 Pac. 971 , 53 A.L.R. 457 , where it was said: "`Where defendant knows or has reasonable means of knowing that consequences not usually resulting from the act are likely to intervene so as to occasion damage, he is liable although it be not an ordinary and natural consequence of the negligence.' ..." (p. 303.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Steele v. Rapp

2. ““The proximate or legal cause of an. injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act. “If an intervening act was foreseen or might reasonably have been foreseen by the first actor, his negligence may be considered the proximate or legal cause of the injury, notwithstanding the intervening act. “It is not a necessary element of negligence that one charged with it should have been able to anticipate the precise injury sustained. “There is no precise formula for marking the line between proximate and remote consequences following a negligent act, and ordinarily the question of negligence, including proximate cause, and whether an alleged intervening cause could have been foreseen or anticipated by the exercise of ordinary prudence and foresight, are for the jury.” (S'yl. HU 2, 3, 4, 5.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Phillips v. Doyle