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← 167 KAN 349 - Marsh v. Hogeboom

Marsh v. Hogeboom’s Empirical Analysis

1949

Citation profile

22
cited by 22 later decisions
8
states following
January 1974
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently January 1974

3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

1001949195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Prager v. Isreal · Ruel v. Langelier · 52 Cal. App. 2d 178 - Harrison v. Gamatero · Head v. Morton · Hunter v. Baldwin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““That no person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or damage, unless such injury, death or damage shall have resulted from the gross and wanton negligence of the operator of such motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We think every case of this character must of necessity be decided upon its own peculiar facts. It must therefore not be assumed the conclusion we reach in the instant case necessarily means we are adopting similar decisions reached by some courts on materially different facts. We prefer to rest our decisions upon our own statute and the particular facts involved in each case as it may arise. “Did the negligence alleged in the instant petition constitute an incident of the gratuitous undertaking which appellee had assumed? If it constituted such incident it is clear the incident occurred in the course of carrying out the gratuitous undertaking. “Is it reasonable to assume that as a part of completing the gratuitous under taking appellee would not be required to permit appellant to disconnect herself from the vehicle? We do not think so. Is it reasonable to assume the closing of the door after appellant alighted was no part of the completion of the undertaking? We think it is not. The alleged negligent act occurred while appellant had her hand on the door handle and was attempting to close the door. Surely a host would not naturally or normally expect a guest to get out of the car and leave the car door open.” (pp. 352, 353.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““. . . It seems to us it would be drawing too fine a distinction to say if the negligent act of the driver occurred after the car had stopped and while the guest was endeavoring to open the door from the inside, the negligence occurred in the course of the gratuitous undertaking but if the negligent act occurred while the guest was endeavoring to close the door from the outside then the negligence did not occur in the course of the gratuitous undertaking. The closing of the door was the natural, the normal act culminating the gratuitous undertaking. The alleged negligence occurred while that act was in progress.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.