167 W. Va. 385 - State v. Boyd’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In determining the admissibility of out-of-court identifications we have consistently followed the test of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). See, e.g., State v. Rickman, 167 W.Va. 128 , 278 S.E.2d 880 (1981); State v. Williams, 162 W.Va. 348 , 249 S.E.2d 752 (1978); State v. Kennedy, 162 W.Va. 244 , 249 S.E.2d 188 (1978); and State v. Casdorph, 159 W.Va. 909 , 230 S.E.2d 476 (1976). Our formulation of the Biggers test was set out in State v. Kennedy, supra, as follows: ‘In determining whether an out-of-court identification of a defendant is so tainted as to require suppression of an in-court identification a court must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the identification was reliable, even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive, with due regard given to such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.’ Syl. pt. 1, State v. Kennedy, 162 W.Va. 244 , 249 S.E.2d 188 (1978), citing Syl. pt. 3, State v. Casdorph, 159 W.Va. 909 , 230 S.E.2d 476 (1976). Although the test in Kennedy is framed in terms of whether an out-of-court identification is so tainted as to require suppression of a subsequent in-court identification, footnote ni”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 W. Va. 50 - State v. Cox · 182 W. Va. 472 - State v. Spence

2. “At the outset we note that in order for a waiver of constitutional rights to be effective it must be knowing and voluntary. Consequently, confessions elicited by law enforcement personnel from criminal suspects who because of mental condition cannot knowledgeably and intelligently waive their rights are inadmissible. [citing Hamrick ]. Even in the absence of psychiatric testimony that a criminal defendant was incapable of waiving his rights at the time a confession was made, courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights, and the prosecution’s burden of overcoming this presumption is great. See, e.g., State v. Mollohan, 166 W.Va. 60 , 272 S.E.2d 454 (1980). When, in addition to this judicial presumption, the defendant also offers evidence indicating that he was mentally incapable of understanding his rights or of appreciating the consequences of a confession, the State’s burden of proving a knowing and voluntary waiver becomes great indeed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 170 W. Va. 46 - State v. Adkins

3. “When deciding whether a defendant's motion for bifurcation should be granted, the trial court must first examine both the defendant's insanity defense and his defense on the merits to determine whether they are bona fide defenses supported by the facts and the law. If either defense is found lacking, bifurcation should be refused. If, however, both defenses are substantial, the court must then determine the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant which may result if both defenses are presented at a unitary trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 Wash. App. 231 - State v. Jeppesen