168 Colo.
Volume 168 — Colorado Reports
86 opinions
- 168 Colo. 1D. C. Burns Realty & Trust Co. v. Mack (1969)
- 168 Colo. 6Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 11Baker v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 19Dolan v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 37Hurtado v. CF&I STEEL CORPORATION (1969)
- 168 Colo. 43Wilson v. City and County of Denver (1969)
- 168 Colo. 48Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington (1969)
- 168 Colo. 52Cokley v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 59Bill Dreiling Motor Company v. Shultz (1969)
- 168 Colo. 67Cox v. Pearl Investment Company (1969)
- 168 Colo. 76Munn v. Munn (1969)
- 168 Colo. 80Woodman v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 91City & County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 112Cline v. City of Boulder (1969)
- 168 Colo. 120Moats v. Moats (1969)
- 168 Colo. 128Hennigh v. Board of County Commissioners (1969)
1. <bold>ZONING</bold> — <italic>Variance — Approval — District Court — Supreme Court —</italic><italic>Indispensable Party — Lack of Notice — Review — Impropriety.</italic> Where corporation which had had its application for zoning variance approved, but was not made a party by plaintiffs in review proceedings before district court, and nothing in record indicates that it had any notice that action of Board was under attack in district court or Supreme Court and also had no notice of pendency of action in latter court, <italic>held</italic>, under the circumstances the corporation was "indispensable party" to any proceedings in trial court and reviewing court, and, therefore, review could not properly had where such corporation had not been made a party.
- 168 Colo. 131Lofton v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 138Buchanan v. Brandt (1969)
- 168 Colo. 144CONSOLIDATED FINANCE CORPORATION v. Thorp (1969)
- 168 Colo. 154Public Utilities Commission v. Northwest Water Corp. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 183Hassler & Bates Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1969)
- 168 Colo. 190Rodriguez v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 195Fleming and Pattridge v. Singer (1969)
- 168 Colo. 202Abad v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 208City and County of Denver v. Lee (1969)
- 168 Colo. 215Duke v. Pickett (1969)
- 168 Colo. 219MARQUIEZ v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 226Houser v. Eckhardt (1969)
- 168 Colo. 236Lucky Tiger Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn (1969)
- 168 Colo. 242Reifsteck v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (1969)
- 168 Colo. 245Gullion v. Plymale (1969)
- 168 Colo. 250Peterson v. Wandell-Lowe Transfer & Storage (1969)
- 168 Colo. 255Medina v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 259Broome v. Broome (1969)
- 168 Colo. 265Brooks v. Zabka (1969)
- 168 Colo. 272Nye v. District Court for County of Adams (1969)
- 168 Colo. 276Huerta v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 280Cokley v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 286Beasley v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 290Pine v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 296Claim of Gosch v. Estate of Gomez (1969)
1. <bold>EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS</bold> — <italic>Claim Against Estate — Clear and</italic><italic>Convincing.</italic> Evidence in support of a claim against an estate must be clear and convincing. 2. <bold>TRIAL</bold> — <italic>Responsibility — Judge — Inferences — Evidence — Review —</italic><italic>Undisturbed — Exception.</italic> It is the peculiar responsibility of the trial judge to determine what inferences should be reasonably drawn from the evidence he hears, and the drawing of or the refusal to draw inferences by a trial judge will not be disturbed on review by the Supreme Court unless reasonable minds could not differ on the result. 3. <bold>COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT</bold> <italic>Dissolution — Accountant — Acceptance —</italic><italic>Decedent — Negative — Evidence — Unsatisfying — Partners.</italic> In action to recover claim against estate, where claimant and decedent met with their accountant to arrive at settlement for dissolution of their partnership and there was no direct evidence in record that decedent accepted terms of<page_number>Page 297</page_number> proposed settlement, <italic>held</italic>, under the circumstances, reviewing court cannot say that trial court committed error as matter of law when he held that evidence did not satisfy him that settlement was ever agreed to by partners.
- 168 Colo. 299Godfrey v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 303Green v. Green (1969)
- 168 Colo. 308Quintana v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 314Martinez v. People (1969)
1. <bold>SEARCHES AND SEIZURES</bold> — <italic>Incident — Valid Arrest — Lack of Warrant —</italic><italic>Propriety.</italic> A search which is incidental to a valid arrest is not unlawful, even though it is conducted without the sanction of a search warrant. 2. <bold>ARREST</bold> — <italic>Lawful — Probable Cause.</italic> A valid or lawful arrest is one which is based on "probable cause." 3. <italic>Probable Cause — Meaning.</italic> Probable cause means that the arresting officer had "reasonable grounds." 4. <italic>Probable Cause — Existence — Without Warrant.</italic> "Probable cause" for arrest without warrant exists where facts and circumstances, which are within arresting officers' knowledge and of which such officers have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 5. <bold>SEARCHES AND SEIZURES</bold> — <italic>Automobile — Possession of Marijuana —</italic><italic>Reasonable Grounds — Probable Cause — Arrest — Valid.</italic> In prosecution for the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana, record reflects that arresting officers in instant case did have "reasonable grounds" and "probable cause" for arresting defendant for the unlawful possession of marijuana, and search and seizure of automobile in which defendant had been riding was therefore properly incidental to such lawful arrest. 6. <italic>Incidental — Arrest — Precede — Follow — Insignificant.</italic> Whether a search which is incidental to a lawful arrest precedes or follows the formal arrest procedure is not significant.<page_number>Page 315</page_number>
- 168 Colo. 319Neighbors v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 324People v. Estate of White (1969)
- 168 Colo. 332Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 339Public Utilities Commission v. Weicker Transfer & Storage Co. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 345People Ex Rel. Dunbar v. Lee Optical Co. of Denver (1969)
- 168 Colo. 358Gilliland v. McClearn (1969)
- 168 Colo. 360Bennett v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 364Womack v. Industrial Commission (1969)
- 168 Colo. 374Ferguson v. Olmsted (1969)
- 168 Colo. 382Johnson v. Pavich (1969)
- 168 Colo. 388Cleveland v. Dow Chemical Company (1969)
- 168 Colo. 392Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v. Golden Key Manor Homes, Inc. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 398Schmelzle v. Key, Inc. (1969)
- 168 Colo. 409Sunshine v. Robinson (1969)
- 168 Colo. 417Patterson v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 424Lewis v. Great Western Distributing Co. of Borger (1969)
- 168 Colo. 429Valdez v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 431Kimmel v. Batty (1969)
- 168 Colo. 437Larson v. Chaussee (1969)
- 168 Colo. 444Coxen v. WESTERN EMPIRE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (1969)
- 168 Colo. 449Zietz v. Estate of Turner (1969)
- 168 Colo. 454Frazzini v. Wolf (1969)
- 168 Colo. 459Linville v. Russell (1969)
- 168 Colo. 466Morgan County Junior College District v. Jolly (1969)
- 168 Colo. 474Holdren v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 480Curtiss v. Ferris (1969)
- 168 Colo. 485Armstead v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 494Morse v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 499Board of County Commissioners v. Buck (1969)
- 168 Colo. 505Brewer v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 517Dressel v. Bianco (1969)
- 168 Colo. 524Primock v. Hamilton (1969)
- 168 Colo. 531Dodge v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 536Rosen Novak Auto Co. v. Hartog (1969)
- 168 Colo. 540Motlong v. World Savings and Loan Association (1969)
- 168 Colo. 545Gonzales v. People (1969)
- 168 Colo. 551Berae Company v. Gorman (1969)
- 168 Colo. 555Pritchard v. Temple (1969)
- 168 Colo. 558In Re Interrogatories by the Colorado State Senate Concerning Senate Bill 121 (1969)
- 168 Colo. 563In Re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 1060 (1969)
1. <bold>COURTS</bold> — <italic>Constitution — Judicial District — Seven Counties —</italic><italic>Limitation.</italic> A judicial district is limited to seven counties by reason of the provisions of article VI, section 24 (3) of the Colorado constitution. 2. <italic>Constitution — Prohibition — Member — Nominating Commission —</italic><italic>Representation — County — Judicial District.</italic> The requirement "there shall be at least one voting member from each county in the district" which appears in article VI, section 24 (3) of the Colorado constitution,<page_number>Page 564</page_number> prohibits a member of a nominating commission from representing more than one county in a judicial district. 3. <bold>COUNTIES</bold> — <italic>House Bill 1060 — Removal of Judicial District — Increase —</italic><italic>Six to Eight — Unconstitutional.</italic> House Bill 1060 — which would amend 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 37-12-5(1) and 14(1) so that Kit Carson and Lincoln Counties would be removed from the fourth judicial district of Colorado and placed in the thirteenth judicial district thereby increasing the number of counties in the thirteenth judicial district from six to eight — is declared to be unconstitutional. 4. <bold>CONSTITUTIONAL LAW</bold> — <italic>Construction — Read Together — Amendment — Latest</italic><italic>Expression — People.</italic> In construing a constitution, all its provisions relating directly or indirectly to the same subject must be read together, and any amendment in conflict with prior provisions must control, as it is the latest expression of the people. 5. <bold>COURTS</bold> — <italic>Amendatory Provision — One Voting Member — Each County —</italic><italic>Resident — Judicial Nominating Commission — Seven Members — Constitution —</italic><italic>Restriction.</italic> Adoption by people of amendatory provision that there should be at least one voting member from each county meant that at least one voting member of a judicial nominating commission should be a resident of each county; hence, where people adopted amendatory provision to Colorado constitution that there would be seven members of each judicial nominating commission, the result must follow that this provision placed a restriction upon Colorado constitution article VI, section 10 in that boundaries of any district could not be increased so that any district would embrace more than seven counties.
- 168 Colo. 568Howey v. Eshe (1969)