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← 168 F.3d 417 - Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.

Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

168 F.3d 417 · 1999

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
4
states following
September 2018
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently September 2018 · most notably Mendoza v. Borden, Inc. (1999), Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co. (2008)

15 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

360199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 703 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. · Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · Faragher v. City of Boca Raton · Monge v. California · Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “An employer can be held directly liable for a supervisor’s harassment when the employer either intended, or negligently permitted, the tortious conduct to occur. The harassment can be ascribed to the employer’s negligence when the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take remedial action. See Id. at 2267. Second, an employer can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment under any one of the following theories: 1) the supervisor holds such a high position in the company that he could be considered the employer’s “alter ego”; 2) the harassment violates a nondelegable duty of the employer; 3) the supervisor uses “apparent authority” granted by the employer; or 4) the supervisor is aided in committing the harassment by the existence of his agency relationship with the employer. Id. ... [A]n employer is liable for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor when the harassment results in a “tangible employment action” (such as termination or unwanted reassignment) against the victimized employee. When no such tangible action occurs, however, the employer’s vicarious liability is subject to a two-part affirmative defense: the employer can escape liability by demonstrating (a) that it took reasonable steps both to prevent sexual harassment and to remedy the sexually harassing conduct promptly once it was brought to the employer’s attention, and (b) that the victimized employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm or utilize any rem”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.