¶1agreeing in part, and dissenting in part.
¶2hi agree with the portion of the report affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs malpractice claim against Dr. Waguespack that is based on his alleged negligence in failing to diagnose plaintiffs condition, in performing surgery on someone in plaintiffs physical condition, and in the removal of the blood clots and spinal cord stimulator. However, I disagree with the portion of the report reversing the dismissal of the plaintiffs informed consent claim and remanding this matter for further proceedings on that issue. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is broad enough to encompass both plaintiffs claim for the alleged acts of negligence by Dr. Waguespack that fell below the applicable standard of care (lack of skill claim) and his claim for lack of informed consent. The motion broadly asserts that summary judgment is warranted “dismissing plaintiffs claims” because no genuine issue of material exists as to plaintiffs claim that Dr. Waguespack “caused or contributed to the alleged injury of plaintiff.” This broad assertion is not limited to any particular theory of recovery, i.e., lack of skill or lack of informed consent. The situation in the present case is similar to that in Smith v. Lincoln General Hospital, 27,133 (La.App.2d Cir.6/21/95), 658 So.2d 256, 262, writ denied, 95-1808 (La.10/27/95), 662 So.2d 3, wherein the court held that a jury interrogatory broadly asking whether the defendant physician’s conduct was “below the standard of care applicable to his activities” was sufficient to encompass the plaintiffs claim for lack of informed skill, as well as his claim for lack of skill.
¶3For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶4concurs.
¶5|!A summary judgment can only be granted on the grounds asserted in the motion. See La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 966F(1). The defendant’s motion states in relevant part that the “defendant ... moves ... for summary judgment ... on the grounds that, as will appear from the attached memorandum and exhibits, there is no genuine issue ... regarding plaintiffs claim ... that [Dr. Waguespack] caused or contributed to the alleged injury of plaintiff....” [Emphasis added.] The language in the motion incorporates the memorandum and exhibits by reference into the motion for summary judgment, where the defendant then argues solely *698based on standard of care and without mentioning in any way the lack of informed consent claims asserted in the petition. The motion and attached memorandum do not reasonably place the plaintiff on notice that the informed consent allegations are being challenged. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment, which dismissed all of the plaintiffs claims, exceeded the scope of the relief requested in the motion for summary judgment. See Coffee Bay Investors, L.L.C. v. W.O.G.C. Company, 03-0406 (La.App. 1 Cir.4/2/04), 878 So.2d 665, 672 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 04-1084 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 838 (alternative theories of recovery in the plaintiffs petition were not before the court in a motion for summary judgment and incorporated memorandum that were limited to one claim); St. Romain v. State, Through the Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 03-0291 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/12/03), 863 So.2d 577, 588 n. 8, writ denied, 04-0096 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 348 (defendant’s liability for other claims that were |?not specifically raised in the memorandum incorporated into the motion for summary judgment was not before the court)